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ABSTRACT

Gleason, James A., Ph.D., Purdue University. December 2016. Judicial Selection
Methods as Public Policy: The Missouri Plan. Major Professor: Eric N. Waltenburg.

State judiciaries are foundational institutions of governance in the United States.
They are coequal, policy-making branches of government whose members, along with
the legislative and executive branches, are constitutionally authorized and empowered in
all fifty American states. Extant research on judicial selection in the American states
provides neither a comprehensive theory of why states choose their particular judicial
selection method nor a comprehensive empirical assessment of this important question.
This research seeks to fill this lacuna by increasing understanding of American state
courts through the formulation of a theory of state judicial selection, a short but
comprehensive history of state judicial selection reform, and an event history analysis of
the adoption of merit selection by states for choosing judges to their courts of last.
The major finding is that, similar to other institutional arrangements, state
judicial selection methods are highly path dependent. Once established, they are on a
trajectory which is difficult to alter. An important secondary finding is that lawyers play a
significant role in bringing about judicial selection reform when and where the possibility
of change arises. They are incentivized actors who historically have taken the lead in
judicial selection reform efforts. Geography also seems to be an influential factor in
judicial selection reform, suggesting that reform-minded states take cues and learn and
from their neighbors.
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CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM OF STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION

State Judicial Selection
State judiciaries are foundational institutions of governance in the United States.
They are coequal, policy-making branches of government who, along with the legislative
and executive branches, are constitutionally authorized and empowered in all fifty states.
More than 98% of all legal cases are filed in state courts,1 and the vast majority of personal
experience Americans have with the judicial system occurs at the state-court level (Tarr
1998a). Each state independently decides how to choose its judges and a range of
approaches are used.
There are three principal methods of judicial selection in American state courts:
popular election, appointment, and merit selection. In turn, there is meaningful variation
within each principal method. Popularly elected judges are chosen in either partisan2 or
nonpartisan races.3 Appointed judges are chosen by both governors4 and state legislatures.5
Merit selection states employ a wide array of nominating commissions and retention

1

Figure computed with data drawn from LaFountain et al. (2015) and Hogan (2012).
Six states elect judges to their court of last resort by partisan ballot: Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana,
Pennsylvania, Texas and West Virginia. Also, Ohio uses a partisan primary to select candidates for the
general election.
3
Fifteen states elect judges to their court of last resort by nonpartisan ballot: Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin.
4
Three governors have the authority to appoint judges to their state courts of last resort: California, Maine,
and New Jersey. California appointees must be confirmed by the state commission on judicial appointments.
In Maine and New Jersey, gubernatorial appointees are confirmed by the state senate in a fashion similar to
the federal system. However, Maine and New Jersey jurists are initially appointed to a fixed term of seven
years. Maine judges are then eligible for reappointment for an unlimited number of seven-year terms. In
New Jersey, a judge that is reappointed after his or her initial term is granted tenure during good behavior.
5
Judges on their state courts of last resort are appointed by the legislatures of South Carolina and Virginia.
2

2

schemes.6 To further confuse the situation, many states vary the methods utilized at
different levels of courts.7
Not surprisingly, then, what constitutes “the best” method for the selection and
retention of state court judges is one of the most enduring political questions in the United
States and has generated a considerable amount of scholarly attention (Hall 2001). The last
half century has witnessed the majority of American states change the methods by which
they select all or some of their judges. A prominent judicial scholar once observed, “It is
fairly certain that no single subject has consumed as many pages in law reviews and lawrelated publications over the past 50 years as the subject of judicial selection” (Dubois
1986, 31). A generation later, the situation essentially remains unchanged. Recent reform
efforts in Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, and Tennessee suggest this trend
will likely continue.
Reddick (2002) observes that the social science research regarding judicial
selection focuses almost exclusively on the impact methods have on the balance between
judicial independence and judicial accountability (e.g., Hall 2001, Shugerman 2012).
Another well-researched question is whether differing methods of judicial selection result
in jurists that are distinguishable in characteristics and quality (Reddick 2002).
In contrast, little research exists regarding the choice of judicial selection methods
employed by the individual American states. The contributions of Glick (1981; 1983),
Puro, Bergerson, and Puro (1985), Dubois (1990), Hanssen (2002; 2004), and Haydel

6

Commissions vary widely in terms of numbers (six to seventeen) and composition (a mix of judges,
lawyers, legislators and private citizens). Around half require partisan balance while a similar number
mandate geographic representation. Most merit selection states utilize retention elections, although in some
states judges can be reappointed while in others jurists serve life tenure (Reddick and Kourlis 2014).
7
For example, Kansas, Indiana and Missouri all use merit selection to choose justices to their respective
supreme courts, but each uses partisan elections to select some of their trial judges.
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(1987) provide a modest yet useful foundation for further research. These researchers
address state judicial selection from the context of the adoption of merit selection as a
preferred policy and most utilize innovation and diffusion research techniques.
When considered as a whole, however, existing research on state judicial selection
methods of the American states has neither formulated a comprehensive theory of why a
state chooses its particular judicial selection method, nor has there been a meaningful
empirical assessment of this important question. This research seeks to fill this lacuna by
increasing our understanding of American state courts through the formulation of a theory
of state judicial selection, a short but comprehensive history of state judicial selection
reform, and a time-series quantitative assessment of the adoption by states of merit
selection judicial selection for choosing judges to their courts of last resort. 8

Statement of the Problem
The principal research question is this: Why do American states choose to utilize
merit-based selection of judges for their courts of last resort? In seeking to discern a
recognizable pattern of phenomena that predict a state’s decision to formally change its
institutions for choosing its most important jurists to merit selection, this research explores
the leading theories of institutionalism and the historical record of state judicial selection

The term “court of last resort” is used herein to identify the ultimate appellate court within a state. Most
states designate this court as the state “supreme court.” In other states, however, the label “supreme court”
is either not used or has other meaning (New York being the most well-known example, where the “supreme
court” is a trial-level court). The term “highest state court” is also found in the extant literature to describe
the ultimate appellate court within a state. Herein, “court of last resort,” “state supreme court,” and “highest
state court” will be used interchangeably. Oklahoma and Texas each has two state courts of last resort which
demark jurisdiction of a case upon whether it is a civil or criminal matter. Both states apply the same selection
method to each of their highest courts, and each state will be treated herein as a single unit for purposes of
quantitative assessment.
8
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reform. Theory and history provide the basis for conceptualizing the explanatory variables
which are tested in the quantitative assessment.
Following the lead of earlier studies, merit selection is posited as the preferred
policy outcome (Haydel 1987; Puro, Bergerson, and Puro 1985). Gleason (2010) conducted
a one-period pilot study that considered whether demographic, institutional, political, and
geographic characteristics of states have a meaningful relationship to whether they utilize
merit selection as the method for choosing judges for their courts of last resort. Statistical
analysis produced inconsistent results that were often contrary to theorized expectations.
Nonetheless, when a parsimonious model was constructed, maximum likelihood estimates
produced insightful predictions. The model correctly predicted the nine cases with the
highest probability that the state will use merit selection as the method for choosing judges
for their courts of last resort and accurately forecasts twelve of the fourteen with the lowest
likelihood (Gleason 2010).
A comprehensive theoretical, historical, and quantitative analysis of state judicial
selection methods fulfills multiple research objectives. By connecting state judicial
selection to existing studies of intuitionalism, it allows for theory building on an important
subject that is conspicuously lacking theoretical foundation. This study also illustrates the
complex historical configuration of why jurisdictions choose particular selection methods,
thereby increasing our understanding of factors that enter into making these important
institutional choices. Third, it will reveal significant characteristics of jurisdictions that are
more or less inclined to adopt and maintain merit selection to choose judges for their state
courts of last resort.

5

When a state chooses to modify the method by which it chooses judges for its court
of last resort, it is an instance of institutional design and an expression of preferred ideals
by political winners who use their authority to design new structures and impose them on
the jurisdiction (Moe 1990). Specifically, if a state uses a merit-based process, its preferred
ideal is quality jurists. If a state favors popular election for the selection of its judges,
democratic control through electoral accountability is the preferred ideal. Judicial
independence, a marked concern of the Founding Fathers and the basis for the life-time
tenure of federal judges, is the preferred ideal of an appointed judiciary (Tarr 2007).
The preferred ideals are not mutually exclusive. The appointment of judges, for
example, retains some democratic control through the appointing authority being an elected
official or group of officials. Similarly, eligibility laws limit those who may run for judge
through such requirements as mandating membership in a state bar and a minimum number
of years of legal experience and enhance the quality of jurists.9 Merit selection, as it is
conventionally constituted, combines facets of both appointive and elective approaches.
Judicial institutions reflect the preferred ideals of the political elites and citizens of
a particular state. These institutions are subject to refinement, modification, and change in
a manner generally similar to other phenomena of public policy, and can be properly
thought of and treated as a discrete policy. However, it would be a mistake to expect the
adoption of an innovative judicial selection method to be identical to the adoption of other
types of policies. To be sure, the formal requirements for altering a state’s judicial selection
method are typically more onerous than those necessary for the adoption of other types of

9

For example, eligibility to serve as a justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court requires a person to be a citizen
of the United States, a current member of the Kentucky State Bar, a resident of the district they represent for
no less than two years prior to taking office, and a licensed attorney for at least eight years (KY. CONST. §
122).
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policy. But more importantly, altering institutional arrangements that dictate how those
who decide public policy are selected will necessarily involve heightened levels of political
and public scrutiny. Such determinations implicate basic conceptions of how governance
ought to occur and will vary over time and place, which is readily apparent in the context
of state judicial selection.
Merit selection seeks to balance the independence of judges by minimizing the
political influences brought to bear on their selection while retaining accountability through
an appointive process that relies on democratically chosen officials. The preferred ideal,
quality jurists, is thought to be found somewhere in the balance. It is this sense of balance
that has produced the most widespread judicial selection reform in American history.
Each of the fifty states has a discrete judiciary with its own history, institutions, and
procedures–no state currently selects and retains judges in accord with the federal
constitution. Every state that entered the Union prior to 1845 provided for the appointment
of judges to their courts of last resort (See 2007). The primary appointing authority were
state legislatures, although governors and councils were designated in about one-third of
the states. Tenure in office varied as well, and most early American state court judges
served only short, fixed terms.
In contrast to the founding period, all states admitted to the Union between 1846
and 1912 provided for a predominantly elected judiciary (See 2007). The wave of
democratization that enveloped the United States in the decades prior to the Civil War
witnessed fifteen of the twenty-nine states existing in 1846 amending their constitutions to
provide for popular election as the primary means of selecting judicial officers (Winters
1968).
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By the end of the 19th century, however, the Progressive era ushered in widespread
dissatisfaction with the functioning of the legal system. In particular, undue partisan
influence in the popular election of judges became the scapegoat for the shortcomings of
the entire judicial process (e.g., Hall 1919; Perry 1934). Nonpartisan judicial elections were
adopted in more than fifteen states between 1908 and 1941. However, continued
dissatisfaction with political influences in judicial selection prompted advancement of yet
another Progressive reform.
In 1937, the American Bar Association (ABA) endorsed nonpartisan merit-based
selection and retention of judges (Wood 1937). The “merit system”–a combined appointive
and nonpartisan elective process–was thought to balance judicial independence and judicial
accountability, minimize political considerations in the selection of judges, produce highly
qualified and capable judges, and stimulate the adoption of other administrative
innovations (Reddick 2002; Savage 1985). Missouri was the first state to adopt such a plan
in 1940, and the term “Missouri Plan” became synonymous with nonpartisan merit
selection of state court judges.10
With the active support of state bar associations and others,11 the ABA continues
to advocate for merit selection. Enthusiasm for the approach has been far from universal,
however, as any proposal aimed at changing existing institutions in the American states

In their definitive study of the Missouri Plan, Watson and Downing (1969, 9-10) observe, “It is difficult
to determine the precise reasons why Missouri became the first state to adopt the Plan favored by the
American Judicature Society and American Bar Association, but certain factors contributed to the
successful campaign waged there.” They identify four particular exigencies that appear to have helped
further the cause in Missouri, but they are very case specific. I intend to look for possible “triggering”
mechanisms as part of the historical analysis.
11
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Sandra Day O’Conner has become an
outspoken advocate for the use of merit selection by the states. Her efforts include several op-ed pieces in
the New York Times supporting merit selection initiatives in Nevada and Minnesota. She has also lent her
name to “The O’Conner Judicial Selection Plan,” a version of merit section that includes judicial performance
evaluations (Reddick and Kourlis 2014).
10
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necessarily involves the redistribution of political power. There has been substantial
resistance to merit selection, with much of the opposition emanating from governors and
state legislators (Hanssen 2002). The use of merit selection to choose judges for courts of
last resort has only been adopted by twenty-four states,12 with the majority of those
adoptions occurring during the 1960s and 1970s.
[Table 1.1 about here]
A great deal of variation exists within the details of merit selection systems as
applied by individual states.13 The quintessential merit system for selecting judges to its
court of last resort includes three features. First, a nonpartisan nominating group, most
often a specially constituted judicial selection commission, considers nominees and
submits a list of qualified candidates to an appointing authority. Individual state laws
dictate the membership of the nominating groups, but they usually include members of the
public and the state bar chosen by both the governor and the state bar association (Reddick
and Kourlis 2014).
Second, the appointing authority, usually the governor but in several instances the
state senate, chooses from the candidates submitted by the nominating group and appoints

12

Twenty-four states use merit-based selection to choose judges for their court of last resort: Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. The District of Columbia also uses a merit selection system for
choosing its appellate court judges. A judicial nominating commission recommends candidates to the
President of the United States who then appoints his preferred candidate.
13
The classification of judicial selection method is not as straight-forward as it might appear. In four states
where the governor is constitutionally authorized to appoint judges to their state courts of last resort,
Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, it has been the established practice of those states’
chief executives to appoint jurists from a list of nominees advanced by a nonpartisan judicial nominating
commission pursuant to an established executive order. New Mexico utilized merit selection pursuant to
executive order for more than thirty-five years before a constitutional amendment providing for merit
selection was enacted in 1988. Of course, a state that utilizes merit selection pursuant to executive order does
not employ retention elections.
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them to serve on the bench until a subsequent election. In some states where governors
appoint, the selection must be ratified by a vote of the state legislature.
Finally, each seated judge who desires to remain on the bench is subject to
retention. This is usually accomplished by popular vote at the next general election
following a predetermined period after appointment and periodic elections thereafter, at
which the electorate is asked whether a seated judge should be permitted to continue as a
judge for a set term of years. If a judge fails to receive the necessary percentage of votes in
a retention election, the process begins anew (Winters 1968).14

Problem Significance and Rationale
As Chief Justice John Marshall famously observed more than 200 years ago in
Marbury v. Madison, “It is emphatically the province and the duty of [judges] to say what
the law is.”15 Today, leading judicial scholars argue the attitude of jurists is the key
component of judicial decision making (Brace, Hall, and Langer 2000; Segal and Spaeth
2002).16 The judicial selection process, therefore, is an a priori consideration to the
attitudes of judges. Thus, a state’s choice of judicial selection method impacts both who
sits on the bench and the policies that are produced.

14

Only fifteen states utilize all three criteria. They are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.
15
1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
16
The attitudinal model is but one of three analytical approaches to the question of how judges make
decisions. The legal model explains judicial outcomes as looking at the facts of a case in light of the plain
meaning of the text of the relevant law and prior judicial interpretations. The attitudinal model posits that
facts are considered and interpreted entirely in light of the ideological attitudes and preferences of the judges.
The strategic model identifies judges as being goal oriented, but outcomes are tempered by the preferences
of other decision makers and the institutional context in which cases are decided (Murphy et al. 2005).
Research suggests state court judges are more constrained than their federal counterparts, but attitudinal
factors still influence outcomes (Randazzo, Waterman, and Fix 2011).
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There are three principal reasons for conducting this study. First, there is a lack of
sufficient knowledge given the importance of the question. The vast majority of academic
literature concerning the institutions of the American judiciary focuses on the federal courts
in general and the Supreme Court of the United States in particular. Accordingly, the
rationale and consequences of the constitutionally mandated life-tenure of appointed
federal judges is well known to students of American politics.
Much less is known about state judicial selection methods, despite the obvious
importance of state judiciaries and the significant level of variation between the methods
employed by various American states (Dubois 1990). This dearth of extant research has
yet to produce either useful quantitative assessments of the question or a sound theoretical
approach to the study thereof. Given that state judiciaries are foundational institutions of
governance in the United States and reform efforts seem ever-present, such omissions are
conspicuous.
Second, this inquiry is unique with respect to the use of time-series data to
investigate state judicial selection methods. Previous quantitative studies are generally
limited to a single time period (Dubois 1990; Gleason 2010; Glick 1981; 1983; Puro,
Bergerson, and Puro 1985; but see, Hanssen 2004). While these studies are interesting,
informative, and provide a foundation for further research, they fail to move beyond the
mere surface of the question because they fail to consider the question over time.
Institutions are conspicuously resistant to change and a comprehensive study of any
institutional change must consider a wider span of time. Missouri was the first to adopt
merit selection in 1940 and a proper inquiry must consider relevant factors from that time
through the present.

11

This research will employ event history analysis to provide the historical dynamic
that is absent from prior research. An event-specific and historical approach provides
meaningful insight into the complex social process that is policy adoption and is preferable
to cross-sectional and panel designs (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). There are many
possible factors in state decisions, and it is probable that these factors vary over time such
that single-period analyses fail to identify critical determinants of state behavior. The
historical analysis introduces a degree of rigor unavailable to previous analyses of state
judicial selection and provides theoretical insights that are absent in single-period studies.
Third, the proposed study will lend insight into the conditions necessary for future
adoption of merit selection as the method of choice for states that do not currently utilize
it. If it is possible to estimate with any degree of accuracy why states have previously
adjusted their methods of judicial selection, it will permit advocates of merit selection to
focus their efforts on certain jurisdictions at an appropriate time. Similarly, the results may
be utilized by opponents of merit selection as a signal to anticipate and combat potential
reform efforts.

Chapters Roadmap
The analysis to follow will be presented in three substantive chapters and a
conclusion. Chapter 2 presents a theory of state judicial selection. The problem is posited
as a question of institutional analysis and theoretical constructs of path dependence, the
role of actors, and the diffusion of institutions are developed. The study of state judicial
selection is analogous to and benefited by consideration of policy innovation and diffusion
research, which provides micro-level methodological tools that are notably absent in the

12

conventional study of institutions. A review of the extant political science literature on
state judicial selection reveals a void in received knowledge in need of further theoretical
development and empirical assessment. A rudimentary theory of merit selection adoption
in the American states is presented and six theoretical propositions are advanced. These
propositions serve as the basis for specific hypotheses and models that are quantitatively
tested in Chapter 4.
A short history of judicial selection in the American states is presented in Chapter
3. Actual and ideal forms of judicial selection are tracked from Tudor-era England to the
present day. The chapter is structured in the familiar approach of preferred reforms:
appointment in the colonial and early-U.S. period, partisan elections in the 19th century
democratization period, nonpartisan elections in the Progressive era, and merit selection in
the mid-to-late 20th century.

This discussion provides a qualitative and sometimes

anecdotal addition to the qualitative analysis that follows. It also highlights the significant
degree of continuity that best characterizes the history of judicial selection in the American
states.
Chapter 4 provides a quantitative assessment of the problem of state judicial
selection. Fourteen explanatory variables drawn from extant theories of institutionalism,
policy innovation and diffusion research, and the history of state judicial selection
developed in Chapter 3, are conceptualized and operationalized. A hypothesis for each is
formulated and tested. Event history analysis is then used to test a series of general models
and the theoretical propositions advanced in Chapter 2. Statistical results demonstrate that
the passage of time since last changing its method for selecting state supreme court judges
has an overwhelmingly negative impact on the likelihood that a state will adopt merit

13

selection to choose jurists for its highest court. The results also demonstrate that lawyers
play an important role in the adoption of merit selection in instances where an opportunity
for reform is available.
The final chapter combines the theoretical, historical, and quantitative assessments
of state judicial selection into a single discussion. Following a short, general discussion of
the research and results, the six theoretical propositions introduced in Chapter 2 are
considered in light of the historical record of state judicial selection discussed in Chapter
3 and the quantitative analysis provided in Chapter 4. The major finding is that state judicial
selection institutions are highly path dependent and whether a state will adopt merit
selection to choose justices for its state supreme court justices is increasingly unlikely the
longer an alternative method has been in place. A secondary finding is that where an
opportunity for reform is available, lawyers play a critical role in the adoption of merit
selection. These findings comport well with the broader understanding of institutions
which holds that institutions are path dependent and institutional change is the result of the
efforts of interested actors. The chapter concludes with a short discussion of future
research possibilities.

14

Table 1.1: States Using Merit Selection for Courts of Last Resort
Missouri
New Mexico
Kansas
Alaska
Nebraska
Iowa
Colorado
Oklahoma
Indiana
Maryland
Wyoming
Vermont

1940
1952
1958
1959
1962
1962
1966
1967
1970
1970
1972
1974

Arizona
Massachusetts
Florida
New York
Delaware
Hawaii
South Dakota
Utah
Connecticut
Tennessee
Rhode Island
New Hampshire

1974
1975
1976
1977
1977
1978
1980
1985
1986
1994
1994
2000

Note: Date shown represents the year of implementation of merit selection by a state for
choosing judges to its state court of last resort.

15

CHAPTER 2: A THEORY OF STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION

Introduction
The significance of state judiciaries is difficult to overstate. While U.S. Supreme
Court rulings on gay marriage, abortion, and gun control routinely grab headlines, it is state
laws and the interpretation of those laws that are most impactful on ordinary Americans.
The policy-making role of state supreme court justices on questions of domestic relations,
property rights, torts and criminal law affect the lives of millions of people daily.
There is a dearth of social science research on the important question of why and
how states choose particular judicial selection methods (Hanssen 2004). This omission is
particularly unfortunate since there are existing and underutilized research paradigms that
contribute much to our understanding of the topic. The instant research combines important
aspects of two well-established research traditions to investigate state judicial selection.
Specifically, it seeks to wed the theoretical conventions of institutionalism with the
rigorous methodology of policy innovation and diffusion research. This allows the
formulation and testing of theoretical propositions about state judicial selection that are
currently absent.
The logic of a multiple-paradigm approach to social science inquiry is obvious. An
effort to synthesize differing intellectual traditions complements existing knowledge,
especially when similar concepts are of concern. Since each has different strengths and
weaknesses, the strength of one approach may be used to address the weakness of another.
The cross-pollination of research traditions within a disciplinary subfield may seem self-
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evident. However, there is greater reluctance to cross theoretical and methodological
borders across subfields.
Maintaining boundaries is reasonable where different phenomena are being
explored and different questions are being asked. It is unpropitious to ignore potential
contributions from other subfields, however, when similar concepts are of concern. The
oversight is even more glaring where the conventions complement one another and have
the potential to fill conspicuous gaps in existing scholarship.
For example, diffusion is identified as an important causal factor by both
institutionalists and public policy scholars. Institutionalism provides a rich theoretical basis
for diffusion in the context of institutional change, but suffers from a failure to adequately
specify the mechanisms involved in such change. Critical causal concepts remain vague
and furtive (Campbell 2004). Conversely, diffusion in the public policy context is the
subject of an extensive literature that has developed a sophisticated and well-honed
methodology. However, since most diffusion studies confine their study to a single,
nonrepeating event–the adoption of a particular policy or program–little attention is paid
to the development of a broad theoretical construct (Berry and Berry 2007).
This research seeks to pool the strengths of these two intellectual traditions while
simultaneously addressing their weaknesses. In doing so, we gain not only a better
understanding of the phenomena of interest but also of institutions and public policy more
generally.
The remainder of this chapter starts with an overview of contemporary institutional
analysis and a brief discussion of its three primary variants: rational choice institutionalism,
organizational or sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism. Next, I
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discuss theories of institutional change that accentuate the causal mechanisms of path
dependence, actors, and diffusion. Significantly, each mechanism is best understood from
a different variant of institutionalism than the others. Emphasis then shifts to tracking the
evolution of innovation and diffusion research from its genesis of identifying states as
innovators to a methodologically sophisticated means to trace and explain a range of policy
changes over time. A brief review of the extant literature on the choice of judicial selection
methods employed by the American states follows. The chapter concludes with a theory of
merit selection adoption which offers six testable theoretical propositions that are
scrutinized in later chapters.

The Problem of Institutional Analysis
Institutions are the foundations of social existence (March and Olsen 1984). The
basic premise of the study of institutions is that institutions matter; they are the variables
that explain much of political life and they require explanation (Peters 1999). The
contemporary study of institutions, generally referred to as the new institutionalism,17 is
divided into the three primary variants of rational choice institutionalism, organizational or
sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism.18 All three investigate formal
and informal institutions, the relationship between institutions and behavior, and are
particularly concerned with institutional continuity and change. Important differences exist
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To contrast, old institutionalism refers to the intellectual traditions of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. It focused on describing formal institutions such as constitutions and legislative bodies
in great detail. It was largely normative in approach; hypothesis formulation and testing was given little
attention (Campbell 2004).
18
The decision to use lower case designations is intentional. New institutionalism and its variations are too
loosely connected to be considered a single, coherent school of thought worthy of designation as a proper
name.
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in terms of their theoretical roots, levels of analysis, and theories of action and constraint
(Campbell 2004; Hall and Taylor 1996).
Rational choice institutionalism traces its roots to neoclassical economics. It is
predicated on a set of behavioral assumptions that holds that individual actors behave
instrumentally to attain and maximize their preferences. Institutions are narrowly defined
as “formal and informal rules and compliance procedures” (Campbell 2004, 11). Politics
is viewed as a collective action problem where a particular institution is the equilibria of
the strategic interactions of self-interested individuals. These conventions permit formal
modeling and favor micro-level analysis. Institutions are difficult to create and expensive
to change. It becomes increasingly difficult to modify them in fundamental ways the longer
they are in place. Actors will continue to pursue their interests within the constraints of
existing institutions (Campbell 2004; Hall and Taylor 1996).
Organizational institutionalism places great emphasis on normative and cognitive
dimensions. It adapts a broad definition of institutions that includes not only formal and
informal rules and procedures, but also “cultural frameworks, cognitive schema, and
routinized processes of reproduction” (Campbell 2004, 11). The paradigm evolved from
the organizational theory subfield of sociology and from cognitive psychology.
Organizational fields and populations are the objects of inquiry. Organizations of a
common type share a common institutional environment and are expected to adopt similar
forms and practices over time. The particular form of an institution is less about efficiency
and more about cultural legitimacy where behavior is rationally bounded by world view
(Hall and Taylor 1996). This is especially true where actors do not have a well-defined
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sense of self-interest. They will look to existing scripts and practices to guide their behavior
as well as constrain it (Clemens and Cook 1999).
Historical institutionalism has emerged as the dominant exemplar of
institutionalism, and is the subject of an extensive body of literature (Pierson and Skocpol
2002). It is generally viewed as intellectually lying somewhere in between the rational
choice and organizational institutionalisms (Hall and Taylor 1996). Institutions are broadly
defined as formal structures as well as formal and informal procedures, rules, norms and
conventions. Emphasis is given to historical processes and legacies. The effects of
institutions are viewed as a blend of culture (ideas and appropriateness) and utility (selfinterest and instrumentalism). Research examines the interaction of institutions, the
formation of preferences, the asymmetry of actors, and the mechanisms of change and
continuity (Campbell 2004; Ma 2007).
Historical institutionalists are drawn to big-picture problems such as the
development of welfare states (Skocpol 1992), variations in national health systems
(Immergut 1992), regime development and change (Mahoney 2001), and economic
regionalism in Europe and East Asia (Choi 2012). Historical institutionalism developed
primarily through scholarship examining how the institutional arrangement of nation-states
impacts political and economic decision making in a macro-level, comparative context. A
critical takeaway from this research is that institutions tend to constrain outcomes rather
than cause them (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Another important finding, and perhaps the
defining characteristic of historical institutionalism, is the deduction that institutions, once
established, are path dependent.

20

Although the literature often views differences between the approaches as more
important than their commonalities, a growing second movement of new institutionalism
seeks rapprochement and synthesis rather than division within the field of institutional
analysis (Campbell and Pederson 2001; Campbell 2004; Pierson 2004). This work is
already underway. For example, Katznelson and Weingast (2005) illustrate advancement
toward a better understanding of actor preferences. Rational choice institutionalists are
inclined to impute preferences upon actors at the micro-analytical level without any
consideration of institutional constraints. Historical institutionalists tend to favor the view
that preferences are caused by historical developments without considering how they are
affected by restricting institutional settings. By focusing their attention on institutions, both
sets of scholars have been able to enhance and complement our understanding of
situationally induced incentives and preferences without harming extant knowledge
(Katznelson and Weingast 2005).
Comprehending causal processes is a central point of inquiry in the social sciences
and is crucial to understanding why states choose their particular judicial selection
methods. It is therefore necessary to advance accurate theoretical conceptions of the critical
causal mechanisms impacting state judicial selection. This research is theoretically
grounded in new institutionalism and deliberately borrows from each of the three
institutionalism variants where they contribute important insight, particularly to our
understanding of causality. The mechanisms of path dependence, actors, and diffusion are
key causal concepts that have received much attention from institutional scholars. 19 Each
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There is some inconsistency in the language used to describe these mechanisms. For example,
organizational institutionalists tend to use the term “choice-within-constraints” instead of “path
dependence” (Campbell 2004).
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of these mechanisms plays a key role in explaining why states choose their particular
judicial selection methods.

Path Dependence and Institutional Change
Historical institutionalists posit that critical junctures establish equilibria in
institutional arrangements that launch them on trajectories or “paths” which are very
difficult to alter (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 342). These paths create various positive
feedback processes that reward actors for behaving in ways that are consistent with past
behaviors. Each step down the path increases the relative cost of choosing other options,
thereby creating greater dependence (Pierson 2000).
These increasing returns lock in institutional forms and associated behaviors in a
number of important respects. First, institutions generally have high start-up costs and
established actors will avoid seeking change, especially where they view as remote the
chances of other actors doing so. Second, established actors will deliberately build
institutions and develop procedures in a manner that makes them difficult to dismantle.
Third, over time, established actors gain knowledge about how a particular policy or
decision-making style has been institutionalized and are hesitant to abandon it. Finally,
those who benefit from an existing arrangement will seek to reinforce and perpetuate their
advantage. People generally seek only to make modest adjustments to existing institutions
that result in path-dependent change (Campbell 2004).
Recognition of path dependence as a guiding principal redefines the object of
inquiry in several important respects. First, the timing and sequence of happenings is
critical. Events that happen early in the process have key long-term effects injecting
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randomness and unpredictability to end-states; seemingly minor, even accidental, events
are remembered. Since institutions become increasingly static, sufficient distance down a
path will eventually lock in a particular arrangement, even where outcomes are inefficient
and generate lower payoffs than alternatives (Pierson 2000). Second, opportunities for
change evolve as relevant institutions and actors interact over time creating an everchanging political game. The calculations of political actors concerning what is at stake
and the nature of existing constraints will vary, perhaps even significantly. Though
constrained, institutional development is a diverse and dynamic process (Fioretos 2011).
Path dependency strongly suggests a basic pattern of smooth and gradual change in
a certain direction for existing institutions. Institutions are sticky and prone to inertia.
Change is normally evolutionary in the sense that current forms of institutions strongly
resemble the qualities of their forerunners. Much scholarship illustrates this conclusion
(e.g., Lindblom 1959; Nelson and Winter 1982; North 1998; Riker 1998).
Change, of course, is not always path dependent. Rapid and profound changes
periodically occur when a crisis, revolution, shock or other major event leads to the
adoption of institutional structures that are fundamentally different from their predecessors.
Scholars commonly refer to a discontinuous pattern of institutional change as a punctuated
equilibrium (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007).
Thus, a dual model of institutional development emerges. It begins with a critical
juncture (the punctuated equilibrium of an earlier institution) that defines the starting point.
A set of institutional constructs and learned behaviors evolve over time as path dependency
sets in. Increasing returns reinforce the status quo and maintain it upon a certain trajectory
even when more desirable options exist. The older the arrangements get, the higher the
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cost of available alternatives becomes and the inertia deepens even further. Finally, a
punctuated equilibrium occurs and the long-established institution is gone.

A new

equilibrium is established and the cycle repeats.
While this dual model provides a useful framework for explaining much about
institutional change, a conspicuous omission is how to explain a less revolutionary change
that still has important, transformative effects, where many characteristics of existing
institutions remain. Campbell (2004) describes an innovative process of such mid-range
institutional change as bricolage.

He notes that actors often craft new institutional

arrangements by reshuffling their existing repertoire of options. Substantive bricolage is
designed to accomplish certain goals and is instrumental in nature. Symbolic bricolage is
more idealistic and aimed at furthering dominant societal norms. Some bricolage combines
both substantive and symbolic elements. The resulting change is meaningful, but stops
well short of anything revolutionary. It is path dependent in the sense that reformers are
limited to variations of existing schema and change is endogenous (Campbell 2004).
Distinguishing between evolutionary change, punctuated equilibrium, and
bricolage is difficult where a situation fails to lend itself to an exact grouping. Institutions
do not exist in a vacuum so it is unsurprising that sometimes features overlap categorical
definitions.

It is still necessary, however, to establish distinguishing parameters.

Accurately characterizing the type of change that is occurring is a prerequisite to
understanding that change. Evolutionary change is denoted by endogenous, incremental
change.

Punctuated equilibrium is characterized by exogenous forces that result in

fundamental alternation of existing institutions. Bricolage results in an important change
to existing arrangements, but the resulting institution retains most of its key features.
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Although exogenous forces may have an impact, path dependence will constrain the choice
of alternatives.

Actors and Institutional Change
Implicit in any discussion of path dependency is the notion of agency. Whether
acting as individuals, groups, or with institutional authority, it is human actors who seek or
resist change, and are ultimately responsible for the form of the change that occurs. There
is an extensive literature in political science on the duality of structure and agency that is
well beyond the scope of this project. However, it is important to observe that both matter
in the context of institutional change. Path dependency tends to constrain innovation.
Actors bring innovation about.
Rational choice institutionalists take a sometimes extreme view of what motivates
actors. They contend that actors are fully rational and self-interested; actors apply a logic
of instrumentality and seek to maximize benefits. Organizational institutionalists favor a
logic of appropriateness. Actors fashion solutions that are acceptable and legitimate in a
broader social context. Institutions must be consistent with the norms and values of their
environment in order to survive. Historical institutionalists take the middle ground when
contemplating the motives of actors. People act intentionally toward a goal, but do not
necessarily have to be acting in self-interest. In some situations, self-interest dominates
and actors behave instrumentally. In others, actors fashioning institutional arrangements
are sometimes more influenced by ideas and principled beliefs (Knight 1992).
Mahoney and Thelan (2010) investigate the role of change agents within the context
of path dependent institutions. They observe that ambiguities inherent in institutions and
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uncertainty concerning outcomes sometimes make it difficult to assess who are winners
and losers. Actors are working with far less than perfect information. Where people are
embedded simultaneously in various institutions, it is not unusual for them to win in one
context and lose in another. The key to understanding actors and their activities begins
with consideration of their positions in existing social and political arrangements.
Identifying relevant change agents and assessing their particular roles and interests,
therefore, are context specific (Mahoney and Thelan 2010).
Those wanting change seldom work alone or seek to satisfy a single constituency,
especially when they are part of existing institutional arrangements (Mahoney and Thelan
2010). It is important to keep in mind that change agents are seldom able to act alone. If
able to position themselves at the intersection of multiple networks, organizations or
institutions, they are more likely to bring about change and enhance its magnitude
(Campbell 2004). Such placement is particularly helpful in marshaling resources, gaining
support, and cultivating ideas. Conversely, actors who are poorly situated find themselves
lacking connections, cut off from knowledge of feasible alternatives to existing practices,
and wanting for critical resources necessary to innovate (Aldrich 1999).
Change agents in path dependent institutions have the capacity to alter institutional
trajectory through creative interpretation and modification of rules. They can interpret,
create, elaborate and act in other ways that have transformative effects on institutions. Rule
creativity is central to the process of path dependent institutional change. By rethinking
and creatively combining rules, actors produce novel practices and establish new
precedents for action (Sheingate 2010).

They will seek to establish institutional

complementarities that fit within existing schema to address new circumstances, interests,
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and power relations (Thelen 2004). Often, they will look beyond their own boundaries for
successful innovations that seem to best fit their environment.

Diffusion and Institutional Change
Diffusion is the spread of principles and practices through a defined population,
such as a set of nation-states (Campbell 2004). It is a complex process that involves the
flow of information, communications networks, power relationships, and receptivity to
change (Kopstein and Reilly 2000). The adoption of an institution by a neighboring state
shows the appropriateness of that feature to other states in a region, especially where they
have similar cultural foundations, including ties of language, religion, and ethnicity
(Fordham and Asal 2007).
The logic of diffusion is straightforward. States experiencing institutional or policy
failure will look to others in search of viable alternatives. Actors will seek and adopt
practices when they believe it is in their best interest, because they believe it is an
appropriate or legitimate way to operate, or they face uncertainty to a degree that settling
on a known outcome is preferred (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Diffusion is a process
where decision makers interpret a given situation and conclude a particular approach offers
a preferred solution that creates outcomes they seek, or at least can live with (Walsh 2001).
Tracking institutional diffusion across jurisdictions helps identify patterns of
change and requires researchers to make sense of them (Kopstein and Reilly 2000). It
touches on three key theoretical questions that are vital to understanding the adoption of
specific institutions in particular jurisdictions. First, diffusion considers whether internal
or external features drive institutional change. Second, it investigates whether decision
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makers are motivated by self-interest, a quest for legitimacy, or other motivational factors.
Finally, it explores whether decision makers process information in a systematic, unbiased
fashion (Weyland 2008).
Diffusion allows us to compare different states at different levels of social,
economic and political development. It looks beyond actors to consider broader contextual
and environmental factors that condition the actor’s behavior (Kopstein and Reilly 2000).
It helps explain commonality amid diversity (Weyland 2008). Another attraction of
diffusion is that it does not require the same interests to be present in every situation; the
logic of diffusion can be molded to fit unique situations.

However, diffusion can be

difficult to disaggregate from other process of change because it encompasses a variety of
qualifying factors (Kopstein and Reilly 2000).
There is a substantial literature regarding the diffusion of institutions across nationstates that investigate a range of questions. Negretto (2009) looks to diffusion to explain
adoption of constitutional designs in Latin American countries. Hariri (2012) examines
the development or rejection of democratic institutions in non-European societies.
Women’s political equality (Fordham and Asal 2007) and

whether

protests

against

European Union policies in member nations are endogenous or affected by other nationstates (Reising 1999) are also subjects of inquiry. The targeting of inflation (Mukherjee
and Singer 2008), the adoption of information and communication technologies in India
(Vijaybaskar and Gayathri 2003), and European monetary policy (Walsh 2001) have also
been studied.
These studies tend to stand in isolation from one another. They consider a particular
phenomenon of interest but make little effort to talk to one another. Also notably lacking

28

is the use of time-series, large-N analyses, which permit a precise, empirical comparison
of similarities and differences in the decision to adopt. These omissions in the institutional
literature are in sharp contrast to the sophisticated methodology utilized in the study of
policy innovation and diffusion. The marriage of the theoretical bases of institutionalism
with the robust quantitative techniques of innovation and diffusion research offers much
promise to our understanding of the problem of state judicial selection.

Innovation and Diffusion Research in Public Policy
Beginning with the foundational work of Walker (1969, 1973) and Gray (1973a,
1973b), policy innovation and diffusion models have been utilized to study a wide range
of substantive issues ranging from welfare services (e.g., Allard 2004; Gray et al. 2007;
Volden 2006) and environmental policies (e.g., Jeong 2006; Sapat 2004) to state lotteries
(e.g., Alm et al. 1993; Berry and Berry 1990; Caudill et al. 1995) and election reform (e.g.,
Bali and Silver 2006; Krutz 2005). Most research has focused on the activities of the
American states (e.g., Allen 2005; McLendon et al. 2006; Mooney and Lee 2000).
However, a substantial and growing literature applies policy innovation and diffusion in
the international context (e.g., Meseguer 2004; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Way 2005).
Similarly, the framework has been extended to explore policymaking by local governments
(e.g., Hoyman and Weinberg 2006; Jun 2007; Lubell et al. 2002). Vertical diffusion, the
process by which American state governments emulate or respond to the policy directives
of the federal government or local governments respond to state governments, has received
much recent scrutiny (e.g., Allen et al. 2004; Daley and Garand 2005; Patton 2007).
Innovation and diffusion studies have also considered the role of actors (e.g., Balla 2001;

29

Daley 2007; Minstrom 1997) and ideas (e.g., Boehmke and Witmer 2004; Grossback et al.
2004; Mintrom and Vergari 1998). As would be expected from such a diverse body of
scholarship, a variety of approaches and methods have been utilized to further this research.

Leader-Laggard Models
The earliest efforts of political scientists to study policy innovation and diffusion
looked to identify policy innovators among the American states. Walker (1969) develops
an innovativeness score for each state by computing a scaled value of the relative speed
with which a state adopted, or failed to adopt, 88 policies drawn from twelve different issue
areas (e.g., welfare, highways, labor, taxes). Leader refers to those states with higher
innovativeness scores (Gray 1973a, 1184) and laggard is used to describe a state whose
score is low (Walker 1969, 895). Walker (1969) posits that the key differentiation between
leaders and laggards rests on the rules for decision-making employed by policymakers.
Gray (1973a) offers a critical assessment of general innovativeness indices.
Borrowing data from Walker (1969) on twelve policies in three issues areas (civil rights,
education, welfare), she recalculates state innovativeness scores and finds meaningful
variation within the more general scores obtained in the Walker analysis. A case study of
Mothers’ Aid legislation suggests state party politics are an important factor in the timing
of adoption of such policies by individual states. Accordingly, Gray she concludes that
policy innovativeness is time and issue specific and suggests innovation indexes are of
limited usefulness (Gray 1973a). In an effort to resolve these issues, Savage (1978) uses a
new data set to develop and test a measure of general state innovativeness. A total of 181
policy measures from fourteen general areas are incorporated into his analysis. He finds
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that while general innovativeness may be a pervasive quality of some state governments,
policy adoption is time and issue specific (Savage 1978).
Although clearly falling short of a definitive answer, the research was sufficient to
preclude further efforts to utilize general state innovativeness as a dependent variable.
Subsequent studies do, however, make use of innovativeness measures as an independent
variable. Grattet et al. (1998) and Soule and Earl (2001) find that innovativeness is
positively correlated to whether a state adopts hate crime laws. Friedlander and Sawyer
(1983) and Regens (1980) discover only a minimal relation between general innovativeness
and state-initiated energy policies. Mooney and Lee (1995) find no relationship between
abortion regulation and a state’s general propensity to innovate. Berger et al. (1991) reach
a similar result in their investigation of state rape law reform. All of these studies utilize
the Savage (1978) index. Further investigation has failed to reveal an updated general
innovativeness index for the American states.
It is not surprising that including state innovativeness as a variable has fallen into
disuse. Walker (1969) properly characterizes his efforts as “primarily an exercise in theory
building” – an innovativeness measure is not an end in itself. He cautioned that data
limitations left his research with “untestable propositions” (881).
Questions of validity and reliability are especially apparent when using an
innovativeness score computed for a period other than that which is under analysis. The
inconsistency in results also cast doubt on its usefulness as an independent variable.
However, identifying which states are policy leaders and which are policy laggards was a
useful enterprise. Analysis of leader-laggard models led to the realization that other
factors, particularly the political, economic, and social characteristics of states, were
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important clues to understanding policy innovation and diffusion. By determining which
states were more innovative, and considering their individual and collective characteristics,
researchers were able to develop and construct theoretical and statistical models of the
correlates of innovation.

Internal Determinants Models
Early research also employs internal determinants models to explain policy
innovation. These models utilize statistical analysis of demographic and institutional
characteristics of political units to correlate characteristics with policy innovation and
diffusion. Such models posit that the political, economic and social characteristics of a
state cause it to innovate. Walker (1969) and Gray (1973a) both incorporate internal
determinants into their studies of the general innovativeness of states. Walker finds that
larger, wealthier, more urban and industrialized states are more likely to be policy leaders.
Gray finds that wealthier states and those having greater intrastate party competition are
more likely to be policy innovators. Most internal determinant studies, however, attempt
to explain the adoption and spread of a particular policy or program. Such studies have
investigated abortion (Mooney and Lee 1995), antismoking policies (Shipan and Voldon
2006), economic enterprise zones (Turner and Cassell 2007), grandparents’ rights (Hill
2000), and state-level tax policies and programs (Berry and Berry 1992, 1994).
Similarly, a variety of independent variables have been included in internal
determinants models. These include citizen ideology (Gray et al. 2007; Nicholson-Crotty
2004), legislative professionalism (Andrews 2000; Shipan and Voldon 2006), religious
affiliation (Berry and Berry 1990; Boehmke and Witmer 2004), interest group strength
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(Balla 2001; Daley and Garand 2005), and fiscal constraints (Allen et al. 2004; Meyer and
Konisky 2007), among many others. Not unlike the general innovativeness measure,
however, these independent variables are inconsistent in their explanatory power. For
example, in his investigation of the federal impact of state human services policies, Karch
(2006) finds that the increased professionalism of a state legislature is positively and
statistically correlated to a state adopting a medical savings account program, but
negatively associated to adoption of individual development account and family cap
policies.
Intuitively, it holds that a particular set of internal characteristics will provide an
environment generally suitable for innovation. For example, the finding of Walker (1969)
that larger, wealthier, more urban and industrialized states are more likely to be policy
innovators is consistent with the availability of the increased financial and organizational
resources required of many new policies and programs. It follows that small, poor, rural
and less industrialized states are less likely to be innovative. The dynamic of competitive
parties within a state heightening electoral accountability is congruent with the perception
of legislative willingness to consider new policies in an effort to strengthen popularity with
the electorate (Dye 1984). One would similarly expect states with noncompetitive parties
to be generally less receptive to innovation. When and where general expectations of
innovativeness (or the lack thereof) do not hold, as too often seems to be the case with
internal determinants models, it is incumbent upon researchers to identify the reasons for
such failures. A blanket, yet far too common, call for further research is inadequate.
Noting the failure of received wisdom must be accompanied by a reasoned discussion of
possible explanations as to why expected relationships fail to hold in a particular case.
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Geographic Diffusion Models
While leader-laggard and internal determinants models are primarily concerned
with the propensity of a state to innovate by considering the specific attributes of the state,
geographic diffusion models are more focused upon the process by which an innovation
“moves” from one jurisdiction to another (Mooney 2001). The main underlying premise
of these models is that closely located states regularly interact, communicate, compete with
and learn from one another, which lead states to adopt policies that are perceived as
successful in other jurisdictions (Berry and Berry 2007). Geographic diffusion models
assume that states are especially influenced by their regional and contiguous neighbors.
Regional models posit that state-to-state interaction has a regional character – states are
more aware of the policy successes and failures of regional neighbors than of more distant
states – and a state is more likely to emulate or respond to policies of other states within
their region (Canon and Baum 1981; Mooney and Lee 1995; Mooney 2001). Contiguous
models similarly assume that states learn from their neighbors, but place particular
emphasis on bordering states. These models posit that emulation of and competition with
bordering states increases the probability that a state will adopt a similar policy (e.g., a state
lottery), especially if there is a perceived negative economic impact in the absence of policy
adoption (Berry and Berry 1990; Berry and Baybeck 2005).
Daley and Garand (2005) assess the impact of regional effects on state hazardous
materials policymaking using the ten Environmental Protection Agency designated
regions. They suggest that use of these regions is particularly appropriate as the regional
offices are designed to support state environmental activities within each region, and state
governments are likely to learn about the activities of other states within the region through
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this process. They find regional diffusion to be a strong influence on the adoption of strong
hazardous waste programs (Daley and Garand 2005). Chamberlain and Haider-Markel
(2005) also show regional effects are key factors in the diffusion of state policies relating
to the filing of frivolous liens by domestic extremist groups, so-called “paper terrorism.”20
Their findings suggest that not only is the adoption of policies by regional neighbors
important, the perception of regional threats posed by these groups is more significant to
innovation than the perception of intrastate threats (Chamberlain and Haider-Markel 2005).
Numerous studies demonstrate that adoption by neighboring states is a critical determinate
of adoption of state lotteries (Alm et al. 1993; Berry and Berry 1990; Caudill et al. 1995;
Coughlin et al. 2006). Contiguous diffusion models also help explain the adoption and
spread of Voluntary Remediation Programs and hate crime laws (Daley 2007; Grattet et al.
1998).
Although geographic diffusion makes intuitive sense for many policies and such
models are well represented in policy innovation research, it remains problematic to
differentiate between purely regional and purely contiguous effects. Regional models
assume that a region border state is affected more by a non-adjacent regional neighbor than
an adjacent state that happens to be in a different region. Contiguous models assume a
close neighbor with no common border will have no impact on a state’s learning – the
identical effect presumed for a state literally on the other side of the country. This
reasoning is clearly suspect in some instances. While the reasoning seems to hold where

20

Between 1995 and 1999, 27 state governments enacted policies aimed at combating the filing of harassing
liens. The liens purported to create encumbrances on the property of individuals and governments and
complicated the sale of such property or its use as collateral. The technique was widely used by right-wing
Patriot groups who created the liens under the authority of self-constructed courts, especially in states in the
Midwest and the West (Chamberlain and Haider-Markel 2005).
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well-defined regional effects are at work (such as hazardous waste programs), it does not
in all instances (such as a lottery). Diffusion models based upon geography often lack
sufficient theoretical grounding to differentiate between strictly regional and purely
contiguous effects, especially to the extent that a state considering a policy may be more
affected by regional neighbors in one instance and contiguous neighbors in another. Each
inquiry requires a well-reasoned rationale as to why geography matters and in what way.
This in turn will allow for better model specification and improved hypothesis testing.

Vertical Influence Models
Whereas geographic diffusion models assess the spread of innovation from country
to country or state to state, vertical influence models consider the movement between more
central governments and their political subdivisions (in either direction). In the United
States, this would include federal-to-state (or vice versa) and state-to-municipal (or vice
versa) diffusion. Vertical influences on innovation involve both communication between
governmental levels and more direct methods of influence. An important component of
federal-to-state relations that is absent from state-to-state relations is the ability of the
federal government to reward or punish states through use of financial means to compel
adoption of a preferred policy (e.g., the withholding of federal highway funds if a state fails
to criminalize operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content of greater than .08
milliliters of alcohol per liter of blood). In an early study, Welch and Thompson (1980)
find that federal financial incentives generally influence the speed with which states adopt
incentivized policies. Allen et al. (2004) find that the awarding of federal grant money is
positively and significantly related to state adoption of criminal truth-in-sentencing laws.
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The overall level of federal funding to a state in a particular program area (e.g.,
environmental policies), however, is distinct from federal incentive programs and appears
to have a more modest impact on program diffusion (Daley and Garand 2005).
The federal government effectively communicates with states in a number of
important ways other than through use of financial incentives. The raising or lowering of
obstacles such as altered tax treatment (Karch 2006) or providing litigation opportunities
(Miller 2006) are means by which the federal government expresses opinions on state
policy adoption. The U. S. Supreme Court, with its unique and nearly omnipotent
constitutional authority, has had a significant impact on state policy adoptions in areas such
as abortion (Patton 2007). The failure of federal action in a matter is sometimes sufficient
to spark state policy innovation. For example, the 1996 congressional passage and
subsequent veto of national partial-birth abortion legislation by President Clinton was a
key determinant in the adoption of such policies by thirty states before 2001 (Allen et al.
2004). Thus, vertical diffusion may result either directly through financial incentives or
through more subtle, indirect means.
The causal relationship between federal incentive programs and state policy
innovation is unsurprising and well tested. There are important theoretical questions,
however, concerning the impact of less direct means of vertical diffusion. Such concerns
are the result of the difficulties inherent in identifying causality.

How does one

satisfactorily differentiate between the forces that bring a question to the national spotlight
and the result of that attention? Inquiry into the impact of causal mechanisms has become
a recent focus of diffusion research. Investigation of the roles of women’s groups (Allard
2004), interstate professional organizations (Balla 2001), national advocacy campaigns
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(Haider-Markel 2001), and policy entrepreneurs (Minstrom 1997; Minstrom and Vegeri
2000) suggests that a variety of causal mechanisms drive the relationships between
variables. Theoretically, it is often difficult to distinguish the role these factors have in
placing a policy proposal on the agenda from the eventual impact on whether the policy is
adopted in a given jurisdiction (Karch 2006). This is due, at least in part, to the fact that
some of the same factors that get an item on the agenda also lead to eventual policy
enactment. It should be noted that, due to the special-case requirements of vertical
influence models, the approach is limited to a relatively few number of policy issues.

Event History Analysis
The discussion thus far may intimate that the various research frameworks
commonly employed in innovation and diffusion policy research have been utilized in
isolation. They have not. Starting with Walker (1969, 1973) and Gray (1973a, 1973b),
scholars have consistently theorized that both internal conditions and external influences
were important determinants of policy innovation and diffusion. Difficulty in integrating
internal conditions models (e.g., leader-laggard and internal determinants) with external
influences models (e.g., geographic and vertical diffusion), usually due to methodological
limitations, caused researchers to analyze statistical results in relative isolation (Berry and
Berry 2007). A constellation of inconsistent results followed with a propensity toward
conclusions that lack generalizability: leader-laggard models produced innovation indices
with limited practical application; internal determinants models lacked consistency in
results and failed to establish clear causal relationships; geographic diffusion models often
lacked a solid theoretical basis; and vertical influence models applied only to a limited
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number of cases. These tendencies resulted in a pattern of false-positive errors, which were
later identified by simulations using improved statistical tools (Berry and Berry 1994).
In response, Berry and Berry (1990, 1992, 1994) introduced the use of event history
analysis (EHA) to policy innovation and diffusion research, and it has since come to
dominate this area of inquiry. EHA models are constructed using individual jurisdictions
(again, the American states being the most common) at discrete time periods (usually every
year) as the unit of analysis. Independent variables include internal determinants, external
effects, geographic diffusion variables, and other variables appropriate for study of the
phenomena of interest. The dependent variable is operationalized as a mortality function
where a jurisdiction that has yet to adopt a proposed policy is at hazard for doing so during
a particular period. If a state survives by failing to adopt a policy during a given period, it
is included in the next period for additional analysis. Once a jurisdiction adopts a policy,
it dies and is removed from the model. The model is run for a definite period of years or
until the last state adopts the policy in question. EHA allows statistical analysis of each
state prior to and at the time of adoption of a policy. By including each jurisdiction for a
period of multiple years, EHA harnesses the power of large-N statistics even where the
number of “real cases” is relatively small (e.g., the 50 American states). As a result, a more
nuanced statistical assessment of the data is obtained (Berry and Berry 1990, 1992, 1994;
Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).
EHA provides a depth of analysis that is simply not attainable with any of the other
innovation and diffusion models. This event-specific and historical approach provides
meaningful insight into the complex social process that is policy adoption and is preferable
to cross-sectional and panel designs (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). It has been
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applied to a variety of policy questions in the American states, including abortion
regulation reform (Mooney and Lee 1995), bans on same-sex marriages (Haider-Markel
2001), managed care in Medicaid programs (Satterwhite 2002), and telephone regulation
reform (Kim and Gerber 2005). Additionally, EHA has been used to analyze the adoption
of policy by entities other than the American states, including adoption of pension
privatization by nations (Brooks 2005), creation of regulatory agencies in Latin America
(Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005), local watershed projects (Lubell et al. 2002), and acceptance
of International Monetary Fund rules by nations (Simmons 2000). Unfortunately, as is
revealed by the following review of the limited extant literature on the subject, EHA has
not been employed to study the question of judicial selection methods employed by the
American states.

The Choice of State Judicial Selection Method
Published research on the choice of judicial selection methods by American states
comes from just a few sources. When considered as a whole, the extant literature fails to
provide either a sound theoretical foundation or a set of identifiable features to distinguish
states from one another. This study benefits greatly from progress in developing theoretical
bases for the study of institutions and several important methodological advancements that
were unavailable to earlier scholars. Nonetheless, the contributions of Henry Glick (1981
and 1983), Marsha Puro, Peter J. Bergerson and Steven Puro (1985), Judith Ann Haydel
(1987), Philip L. Dubois (1990) and Andrew F. Hanseen (2002 and 2004) provide a useful
starting point for additional research.
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Glick posits state judiciary reforms as a process of policy innovation and diffusion.
He tries unsuccessfully to link a variety of judicial modernizing policies (in this context, a
broad concept encompassing financial, budgetary, rulemaking, and organizational policies,
as well as the adoption of merit-based judicial selection) with the diffusion of other, nonjudicial, state policy innovations. Judicial innovations, he finds, are best understood as the
product of posturing by political factions seeking to either consolidate or expand their
power (Glick 1983). Contrary to the expectations of judicial selection reform proponents,
merit selection had little or no bearing on the decision of states to develop modernized
court systems. Rather, innovation occurs in general patterns closely linked to centralized
management of state courts and the overall size of state government (Glick 1981).
The earliest published study focusing specifically on adoption of the Missouri Plan
similarly approaches the question as an issue of the diffusion of a policy innovation.
Utilizing a determinants model, Puro, Bergerson and Puro (1985) acknowledge that they
have no sense, a priori, of what variables will most likely explain the adoption of merit
selection by the American states. Their single period,21 multivariate and ‘kitchen-sink’
approach begins with the regression of the general innovativeness indices of American
states developed by Walker (1969) and Gray (1973a). The Walker index produces a
positive and statistically significant relationship and the Gray scores were discarded from
the model. Next, institutional variables measuring governors’ power (Schlesinger 1972),
intrastate party competition (Ranney 1976) and legislative professionalism (Grumm 1971)
are added. The addition of these variables negates the effect of the Walker scores and only

21

A conspicuous omission from the article is a discrete operationalization of the dependent variable. It is
noted that the dependent variable is dichotomous and the context suggests that the values of the dependent
variable are as of 1976. Uncertainty arises, however, in that additional states adopted merit selection between
1976 and the 1985 publication date.
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the legislative professionalism variable demonstrates statistical significance, albeit
negative. The Walker value is removed from the equation and a set of political culture
variables is added. These, too, fail to produce any meaningful results and are removed.
Positive and statistically significant values are produced when demographic variables
measuring urbanization and industrialization are added. The final additions to the research
model are dummy regional variables (Puro, Bergerson and Puro 1985).
Overall, the model reveals a statistically significant, yet intuitively weak, model
that suggests, “[T]hat states with nonprofessional legislatures and with relatively large
urban and industrial populations [are] the states most apt to adopt the Missouri Plan” as
compared to those states that “are usually involved in innovativeness” (Puro, Bergerson
and Puro 1985, 96). Considering these results within the context of history, they posit an
interest group driven theory wherein rural legislators pushed merit selection to limit urban
influence on the reapportionment of judges in response to Baker v. Carr.22 They perceive
maintenance of the political status quo as the primary explanation for policy innovation
regarding state judicial selection methods. A notable strength of the research is that it
produces a model with impressive predictive ability. The final model, which includes
variables for legislative professionalism, industrialization, urbanization, and the regional
dummy variables, accurately predicts whether a state utilizes merit selection in all but five
cases (Puro, Bergerson and Puro 1985).

369 U.S. 186 (1962). Prior to the Court’s ruling in Baker, the United States Supreme Court had consistently
held that reapportionment issues, the realignment and redistribution of seats in legislative bodies, were
‘political questions’ and therefore not subject to judicial review. The progeny of Baker, especially Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), established the concept of ‘one-man, one-vote’ as the benchmark for
reapportionment schemes to survive federal constitutional scrutiny.
22
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Dubois (1990) seeks to evaluate the reapportionment theory advanced by Puro,
Bergerson and Puro (1985) by qualitatively and quantitatively reviewing the political
dynamics at work when individual states were considering merit selection.23 Utilizing a
review of historical accounts of reform efforts and a truncated statistical analysis of state
legislative reform bill sponsorships and county-by-county vote totals for merit plan
proposals subject to popular vote, he fails to find statistical evidence supporting the
reapportionment theory. Instead, Dubois posits that while the available evidence tends to
demonstrate that merit selection and retention plans do have a popular political base in
urban areas, it is the success of political mobilization campaigns by the ABA, AJS, League
of Women Voters and other organizations that are ultimately determinative of reform
(Dubois 1990).
The most ambitious effort to date to explain the choice of merit selection in the
American states comes from Haydel (1987). She formulates five hypotheses and examines
each using multivariate and time series regression techniques. First, merit selection may
be a political instrument for elected leaders. As voters become less predictable and
uncertainty in electoral outcomes increases, the approach is a means for the party in power
to retain control of the judiciary. Educational attainment, voter turnout in presidential
elections, and interparty competition variables are formulated as measures of electoral
stability and tested. Increased levels of education and decreased voter turnout are found to
be related to merit selection adoption, while greater party competition within a state is not
(Haydel 1987).

23

His set of cases differs from that employed by Puro, Bergerson and Puro (1985) and includes two additional
states that adopted merit selection between 1976 and 1980 and ten other states that rejected reform efforts
between 1941 and 1980 (Dubois 1990).
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Related hypotheses involving political culture and general innovativeness are also
advanced. A moralistic political culture has a desire to increase the quality and efficiency
of government to the betterment of the entire community and is suggested as an impetus to
merit selection. Similarly, some states proactively seek innovative policies in response to
their changing needs and are more likely to adopt merit selection.

Variables are

operationalized using the familiar Elazar (1966) political culture categorization and the
Walker (1969) composite innovation score for each state. Moralistic political culture
shows a minimal positive impact, but it is negated by the inclusion of the general
innovativeness variable. Contrary to expectations, general innovativeness and adoption of
merit selection are negatively related (Haydel 1987).
A fourth hypothesis is that merit selection is part of a greater process of
professionalization in state governance. Beginning in the 1950s, state reform movements
sought to increase the efficiency of legislative and executive offices to meet increasing
demands on state governments. A range of enhancements such as increased gubernatorial
appointment power and larger legislative staffs were varyingly adopted by individual
states. Separate indices for executive and legislative professionalism present inconsistent
and contrary-to-expectations results across models.

One such finding is a negative

relationship between executive professionalism and the adoption of merit selection (Haydel
1987).
The final hypothesis argues that bar association activity in judicial reform efforts is
positively related to adoption of merit selection by a state. Legal groups are at the forefront
of judicial reform efforts as they have the means and interests to lobby for change. Court
unification and the establishment of an office of state court administrator are identified as
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two indicia of bar association activity in judicial reform efforts. The Berkson and Carbon
(1978) unification ratio and whether a state has a state court administrator are included as
separate explanatory variables. Direct state-level bar activity in judicial reform is measured
through two sets of questionnaires used by Sweeny (1980) and Sheldon (1977, 1986).24
Bar association activity and court unification are found to be positively and significantly
related to merit selection across models (Haydel 1987).
Haydel (1987) concludes that her major finding is that bar association activity is
the key factor related to adoption of merit selection by individual states between 1950 and
1980. The deduction is based on probit analysis testing simple adoption or non-adoption
during the period.

She acknowledges, however, that primarily due to data and

methodological problems “one is loathe to conclude much from these time series analyses”
(Haydel 1987, p. 99). Subsequent research suggests that her findings were at least on the
right path.
Support for the bar playing an integral role in the adoption of merit selection and
its perpetuation is found in Hanssen (2002). He finds that lawyers gain two important
benefits from merit selection. First, lawyers are directly involved in choosing judicial
nominees through selecting members to and participating in judicial nominating
commissions. Second, demand for legal services is higher in states whose supreme courts
are chosen through merit selection. Thus, lawyers are incentivized to seek and maintain
merit selection as a means to greater influence and pecuniary gain (Hanssen 2002).

24

The bar association activity measure is difficult to comprehend from the information provided. The text
states that the variable is a ranking of state bar associations’ responses to five questions, but only four
questions (apparently those used in the Sweeny (1980) study) are listed in an endnote. Sheldon (1986) is
cited as an unpublished paper entitled “The Effectiveness of State Bar Activities in the Recruitment of State
Judges,” which was prepared for the Annual Law and Society Meeting in Chicago, Illinois.

45

Hanssen (2004) finds substantial cross-sectional and time-series variation in the
procedures used to select judges in the American states.

He observes that three major

reform movements aimed at increasing the independence of state judiciaries occurred
during different periods of American history. However, not all states chose to adopt the
proposed alternations. He seeks to distinguish between those states that adopted reforms
and those that maintained their existing institutions.
Hanssen conducts a multivariate analysis using a probit model. States with higher
administrative costs, resistance to change by other branches of government, and a general
opposition to change were significantly less likely to adopt the proposed alternation.
Administrative costs are measured by considering whether a state held a constitutional
convention during the period and is found to be positively related. Resistance to change is
operationalized as the size of the majority party in the state legislature and is found to be
negatively related. Finally, general opposition to change is measured as the time since a
state entered the Union and is also found to be negatively signed (Hanssen 2004).
The extant literature on the adoption of merit selection by the states yields a number
of important observations and reveals a research topic ripe for theory construction and
quantitative investigation.

Since state judiciaries are foundational governmental

institutions that are similar to other legal and constitutional institutions in a variety of
respects, this research will borrow and build upon the current theoretical understanding of
institutional change. In addition, existing studies on policy innovation and diffusion,
particularly those that utilize the American states as the unit of analysis, provide additional
insight into why and how a state might choose merit selection for choosing judges to their
state supreme court. It is to this query we turn next.
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A Theory of Merit Selection Adoption in the American States
The foregoing sections argue that our existing knowledge of institutional change, taken
together with the methodological erudition of policy innovation and diffusion research as well as
the extant literature on state judicial selection, yields a serviceable foundation for the further study
of the adoption of merit selection for the selection of state court judges. What follows, then, is an
effort to articulate a rudimentary theory of merit selection adoption in the American states. It
consists of a set of overlapping theoretical propositions that are derived directly from the arguments
advanced above. They are intended as starting points that can then be modified by this and future
research.
Every state has had its own judiciary since inception. State judiciaries are co-equal
branches of government along with the legislative and executive branches in each of the fifty
American states. The purpose and role of state judiciaries remains essentially unchanged over time.
Alteration of the structure of state court systems is infrequent and almost exclusively in response
to increasing population and case-load demands. Relevant actors who seek change, whether they
be judges, lawyers, the public, members of the executive and legislative branches of government,
or political parties experience increasing costs over time. Returns increase as the status quo is
perpetuated and reinforced; change tends to be evolutionary in nature. To wit,

Proposition 1: State judicial institutions are path dependent.
Judicial merit selection is a hybrid of two well-established approaches to picking
officials in the American states. It combines a specialized appointive process by duly
chosen officials with a unique form of popular election. Each state has a tradition of
appointing some officials and electing others that dates back to its inception.

The

substantive aspects of merit selection, while unique, are clearly within the established
parameters of governance in the American states. Merit selection advocates argue it is the
best method available for securing the independence of state court jurists. Judicial
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independence, arguably the defining characteristic of the federal judiciary, is a key feature
of the principal checks and balances as it is expected to function at the state level.
Therefore, merit selection also advances symbolic norms. To wit,
Proposition 2: Adoption of merit selection by a state is an instance of
substantive and symbolic bricolage.
Demand for institutional change becomes relevant when exogenous or endogenous
factors arise that give relevant actors the perception that the distribution of power or other
resources is changing, or needs to be changed in order to pursue whatever self-interested,
altruistic, or other goal they may have. Demand for merit selection is created by a range
of factors including increasing populations, political realignment, and the financial
interests of lawyers. Actors may fail to recognize or acknowledge this demand. They may
also disagree over the seriousness of the problem or the appropriate solution. Alternatively,
they may seek to address solutions within existing institutions to avoid the demand for
change. To wit,
Proposition 3: Demand is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the
adoption of merit selection.
The assent of decision makers is essential to the adoption of any institutional
arrangement. State legislators, governors and political parties respond to calls for judicial
merit selection by evaluating the threat to or the enhancement of their power and resources.
If they perceive benefit, they are more likely to permit and support change. Conversely, if
they perceive threat, they are more likely to resist and oppose change. To wit,
Proposition 4: Decision makers are more likely to adopt (or reject) merit
selection if they perceive it will increase (or decrease)
their power and/or resources.
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It is essential that advocates of institutional change are able to effectively frame
situations as problems, else there would be no need to take action. Additionally, they must
communicate their preferred solution in clear and simple enough terms that decision
makers and constituents can understand. It is particular helpful when a change advocate is
able to express the need for reform in terms of a greater principal. Public interest groups
are particularly capable of advancing a reform agenda where they appear to gain no
particular benefit other than the greater good.

The ability of actors to frame and

communicate merit selection of state court judges as an appropriate response to real
problems that are consistent with prevailing beliefs such as the need for judicial
independence enhances the likelihood of a state to adopt. To wit,
Proposition 5: Merit selection is more likely to be adopted where there
are advocates who can effectively frame and communicate
its needs and benefits.
The final piece of the puzzle is the ability of advocates to point at a proposed reform
and confidently pronounce that it will work in the instant jurisdiction. Decision makers
tend to copy practices that have solved similar predicaments in other places. In the context
of the American states, this often relies on the experience of other states, especially
contiguous and regional neighbors who share history, political culture, and economic
interests. The credibility of merit selection of state judges rests on the simple notion that
it has worked in other similarly-situated jurisdictions. To wit,
Proposition 6: Merit selection is more likely to be adopted where relevant
actors are able to present evidence to decision makers that
it has worked effectively elsewhere and is likely to work for
the decision makers and their constituents.
These propositions address the key theoretical aspects of understanding the
adoption of merit selection in the American states. They are predicated upon existing
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theoretical constructs and are consistent with extant knowledge.

In addition, each

proposition is testable and falsifiable using well-accepted techniques. This will be done in
Chapter 4. Such scrutiny allows us to determine whether adoption occurs due to common
factors across jurisdictions, the idiosyncrasies of individual states, or some combination of
both.

Conclusion
Bridging the scholarly gulf between the theoretically rich traditions of
institutionalism with the methodologically robust conventions of innovation and diffusion
research and applying them to the question of state judicial selection provides an
opportunity to develop knowledge of an important, yet understudied, phenomena. This
research advances six propositions that collectively advance the mechanisms of path
dependence, actors, and diffusion, key mechanisms in theoretical constructs of institutional
change, as being significant in the adoption of merit selection for choosing state supreme
court justices in the American states. Each of these propositions is further developed,
tested, and assessed in the remaining chapters.
Chapter 3 is a short history of state judicial selection. A close reading of the
historical record provides many qualitative indicators that are consistent with the broader
themes of institutional change raised in this chapter, including path dependence, the role
of actors, and the diffusion of preferred forms of judicial selection. The next chapter also
serves as a basis for the operationalization and conceptualization of independent variables
utilized in Chapter 4. The historical record, along with the extant theoretical understanding
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of institutional change and the methodology of innovation and diffusion research, is an
integral part of gaining understanding of the problem of state judicial selection.
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CHAPTER 3: A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE JUDICIAL
SELECTION

Introduction
This chapter presents a brief survey of the history of state judicial selection in the
United States. Understanding that history is a prerequisite to comprehending the
phenomena in the modern context. It is also critical to the instant study. The tale provides
the philosophical foundations of the various forms of judicial selection and explains the
circumstances that gave rise to the perceived need for reform in different epochs. In
particular, it tracks the intellectual development and rise of merit selection. In identifying
some of the key factors involved in that process, it helps establish a basis for the
conceptualization of the variables to be included in the quantitative models which are the
subject of Chapter 4. It also provides qualitative and anecdotal evidence that is essential to
this assessment of state judicial selection. Ultimately, the historical record is a chronicle of
considerable continuity in the midst of seemingly constant change.
This chapter is divided into six parts. The next section provides an analytical
framework for dividing discussion of the history of state judicial selection into four distinct
periods based upon the preferred method of would-be reformers. The historical antecedents
of judicial selection in the American states and the founding period, when each of the
original states chose to appoint their judges, follows. A discussion of the wave of
democratization which enveloped the American states in the early 19th century and gave
rise to the popular election of judges is explored in the third part. The Progressive Era and
advocacy of nonpartisan elections by the bench and bar is the subject of the fourth segment.
Part five tracks the evolution of merit selection from a Progressive idea to its current form
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and application in thirty-eight states. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of key
phenomena identified in the historical survey and how these factors apply to the analyses
in the remaining chapters.

The Standard Story
The history of judicial selection in the American states illustrates the difficult and
sometimes arduous trade-off between the ideals of judicial independence and judicial
accountability. It highlights the political dimensions of trying to attain conflicting ideals
by deciding who gets to select state court judges and why: should they be appointed by
elected leaders in a republican fashion, elected by the people through direct election, or
selected through a process which combines the positive aspects of both appointment and
direct elections, while limiting the negative effects of the two approaches? The current
arrangement of state judicial selection systems is a result of the variation, over time and
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, of which ideal was preferred and who was politically best
situated to decide how that ideal should be realized. Scholars have developed a “standard
story” of the history of state judicial selection which holds that states choose the system
deemed best by reformers during a particular period (Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova
2002). The saga is divided into four overlapping phases distinguished by the selection
method most preferred by those states entering the Union or choosing to alter their selection
process during the span (e.g., Berkson 1980; Berkson, Beller, and Grimaldi 1981; Bonneau
and Hall 2009; Carrington 1999; DuBois 1980; Escovitz, Kurland, and Gold 1975;
Friedman 1985; Goldschmidt 1994; Haydel 1987; Hanssen 2004; Haynes 1944; Hurst
1950; Nelson 1993; O’Conner 2009; Price 1996; Sheldon and Maule 1997; Streb 2007;
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Tarr and Porter 1988; Volcansek and Lafon 1988; Watson and Downing 1969; Winters
1966b, 1968).
The standard story begins with the founding period, which lasted from the nation’s
creation until around 1846, when appointment was the near exclusive method by which
states chose their jurists. A wave of democratization enveloped the country during the first
half of the nineteenth century and created a move toward the popular election of state
officials. By mid-century, popular election had become the preferred method of reformers
for choosing state court judges and would remain so throughout the remainder of the
century. As the twentieth century approached, popular elections had become embroiled in
partisan politics and reformers pushed to remove partisan labels from candidates for
judicial offices. The nonpartisan election of judges gained momentum during the early
twentieth century and was instituted in more than a dozen states. Simply removing party
labels proved insufficient, however, as contested elections of any form required judges to
be politicians. Merit selection, a Progressive reform which traces its genesis to the early
twentieth century but gained real momentum only after World War II, was first adopted by
Missouri in 1940. The standard story concludes in the present day with a total of thirtyeight states having adopted some form of merit-based plan for the selection of some or all
of their jurists.
The standard story, however, is not accepted by all scholars. Epstein, Knight, and
Shvetsova (2002) reject it as an oversimplification that fails to consider important political
factors. As such, it is directly at odds with other theoretical accounts of institutional change
in the political science literature. They contend that as political uncertainty periodically

54

diminished, states adopted systems for selecting, retaining and granting tenure to their
judges that created greater accountability (Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2002).
Alternatively, Shugerman (2012) argues the history of judicial selection in the
American states is the unfolding pursuit of judicial independence. Each succeeding
generation feared evils apparent in their immediate past and were willing to entrust judges
with significant power and independence as a hedge to counter them. A change in judicial
selection reflected the ever-evolving ideal of which method best permitted judges to
properly do their jobs. He contends there are five stages of development roughly equating
to the colonial period (unseparated judiciary), the founding period through the midnineteenth century (judicial aristocracy), the mid-nineteenth century through the midtwentieth century (judicial democracy), the third quarter of the twentieth century (judicial
meritocracy), and the current era (judicial plutocracy). The point of demarcation between
periods is the particular individuals or groups who came to dominate the judicial selection
process (Shugerman 2012).
Numerous scholars, including some who generally acquiesce to the standard story,
acknowledge that purely political motives entered into the choice of judicial selection
institutions in a range of contexts (e.g., Carrington 1998; Daugherty 1997; Fitzpatrick
2009; Hall 1983, 1984c; Hanssen 2002; Haydel 1987; Haynes 1994; Nelson 1993;
Volcansek and Lafon 1988; Watson and Downing 1969). It bears mentioning that Epstein,
Knight, and Shvetsova (2002) and Shugerman (2012) are explicitly engaging in developing
a theory of judicial institutional development and change, the former being political
scientists and the latter an historian, while the other scholars include a historical discussion
of state judicial selection to add context to quantitative analyses (e.g., Hanssen 2002;
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Haydel 1987), normative arguments (e.g., Carrington 1998; O’Conner 2009), or exploring
a particular period of American history (e.g., Hall 1983; Nelson 1993).
Despite these varied motives and approaches, scholars consistently draw two key
conclusions. First, the preferred method of each period was a direct and thoughtful response
to the perceived problems of the preceding epoch. Reform advocates consistently offered
their new design as the best remedy to past shortcomings. The willingness to sacrifice
independence for accountability or vice versa expressed what champions of change
believed most appropriate to recruit and secure quality judges. Second, political selfinterest played an important role in the motivation of many relevant actors. Nonetheless,
the key philosophical arguments offered by proponents of each selection method invariable
focused on benefits to society.

Founding Period
The authors of the first state constitutions were primarily concerned with the
intrastate distribution of political power, including the selection and tenure of judges, in a
way that embodied and effectuated republican political principles (Tarr 1998b). Draftsmen
of judicial articles found themselves caught in a veritable tug-of-war between their
admiration for the English system of laws and their contempt for the Crown’s abuse of it.
The manipulation of judges by the King and their insecure tenures had a marked effect on
the framers of early state constitutions (Sheldon and Maule 1997). The key reform was to
separate the judicial function from the executive.
Borrowing from English tradition, appointment was instituted as the basic method
for staffing state judiciaries; however, important checks were placed upon the appointive
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power (Escovitz 1975). The legislatures of eight25 of the original thirteen states directly
selected judges while the governors of the four26 others chose jurists together with or
subject to the approval of their state executive councils. The governor of Massachusetts
appointed judges subject to the consent of the state senate, a process later duplicated by the
federal constitution.27 Tenure was typically during good behavior,28 although six states29
provided shorter terms of office. Thus, the principles of republicanism and, to a lesser
degree, judicial independence were applied to state judicial selection in a deliberate effort
to avoid the more egregious foibles of the colonial judicial system and the historic conflict
between the Crown and Parliament over the English judiciary.
A century-long struggle between the Stuart monarchs and British Parliament
involving control of the English judiciary helped inform views on the proper fabrication of
American state judiciaries. James I assumed the throne in 1603 claiming virtually absolute
power over questions of public policy and insisted upon being consulted in advance
regarding important cases (Haynes 1944). He dismissed judges at will, including the muchrevered Lord Edward Coke, the most famous and respected jurist of the age (McIlwain
1913). In 1616, James called the justices of the King’s Bench together and demanded they

Connecticut (CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT – 1662, REVISED 1776), Georgia (Ga. CONST. OF 1777, ART. LIII),
New Hampshire (N.H. CONST. OF 1776), New Jersey (N.J. CONST. OF 1776, ART. XII), North Carolina (N.C.
CONST. OF 1776, ART. XIII), Rhode Island (CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS –
1663, REVISED 1776), South Carolina (S.C. CONST. OF 1776, ART. XX), and Virginia (VA. CONST. OF 1776).
26
Delaware (DEL. CONST. OF 1776, ART. XII), Maryland (MD. CONST. OF 1776, ARTS. XLVIII), New York
(N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, ARTS. XXIII), and Pennsylvania (PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 20).
27
MASS. CONST. OF 1780, CH. 2, § I, ART. III.
28
Delaware (DEL. CONST. OF 1776, ART. XII), Maryland (MD. CONST. OF 1776, ARTS. XL), Massachusetts
(MASS. CONST. OF 1780, CH. 2, § I, ART. III), New York (N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, ARTS. XXIV), North Carolina
(N.C. CONST. OF 1776, ART. XIII), South Carolina (S.C. CONST. OF 1776, ART. XX), and Virginia (VA. CONST.
OF 1776) all provided for tenures of good behavior for their judges.
29
Connecticut (CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT – 1662, REVISED 1776), Georgia (Ga. CONST. OF 1777, ART. LIII),
New Hampshire (N.H. CONST. OF 1776), New Jersey (N.J. CONST. OF 1776, ART. XII), Pennsylvania (PA.
CONST. OF 1776, § 23) and Rhode Island (CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS –
1663, REVISED 1776).
25
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stay a suit when ordered. The other members of the court capitulated, but the chief justice
defiantly refused (Shugerman 2012). Coke was fanatical in his veneration of the law and
judicial process. He staked his career on the ability of judges to remain independent of the
Crown – and lost (Bailyn 1965). James was also personally involved in the divorce of the
Countess of Essex, and the trials that resulted from the murder of Sir Charles Overbury
(McIlwain 1913). When Charles I succeeded his father in 1625 and continued the tactic of
royal interference with judges, a constitutional crisis ensued.
Shortly after Charles’ ascent, the House of Commons impeached his chief advisor.
The King responded by dissolving Parliament, the Crown’s primary source of revenue. The
ensuing financial situation forced Charles to look to other, legally dubious, means for
raising revenue (Haynes 1944). Judges who refused to certify the legality of royal loans
and new taxes were dismissed, including the new chief justice of the King’s Bench, Sir
Randolph Crew, in 1626 (McIlwain 1913). Royal threats and promises ensued and the
questionable methods by which the Crown was raising money were upheld by the courts
(Haynes, 1944). In 1634, the chief justice of the Common Pleas, Sir Robert Heath, was
dismissed and four days later the controversial writ for ship-money, a royal levy, issued
(McIlwain 1913). Thus, taxation without the assent of Parliament was accomplished by
royal manipulation of the judiciary. The royal victory, however, proved short lived.
Charles was forced to reconvene Parliament in 1640 in order to raise revenue and
support against a worsening Scottish rebellion that had commenced three years earlier.
Parliament seized the occasion to restore constitutional balance and exert legislative and
judicial authority over the Crown. The King was summarily forced to consent to a series
of statutes, including a provision that granted judicial tenure during good behavior rather
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than at the pleasure of the King. His principal counselor, the Earl of Stafford, was tried and
condemned pursuant to a bill of attainder and executed. Royalist judges were impeached
and imprisoned, or otherwise disabled from holding judicial office due to their support of
the Crown against the authority of Parliament (Haynes 1944). For his part, Charles
honored his promise and appointed several judges during good behavior (McIlwain 1913).
The King and many of his supporters nevertheless fled London in 1642 and the
English Civil War soon commenced. Parliament temporarily assumed authority of the
appointment and removal of judges. The brief English Commonwealth, occasioned by the
execution of Charles in 1649, witnessed the rule of Oliver Cromwell and his council of
state. Cromwell was duly authorized to appoint judges subject to the approval of Parliament
and proved adept, not unlike his royal predecessors, at maintaining a loyal judiciary
(Haynes 1944). In 1655 alone, despite having tenure of good behavior, Baron Thorpe,
Judge Newdigate, and Chief Justice Rolle were either removed or resigned from the bench
(McIlwain 1913). The death of the Lord Protector in 1658 led quickly to the demise of the
English Commonwealth and restoration of the monarchy two years later (Haynes 1944).
The Restoration and reign of Charles II ostensibly represented a reversion to the
ideas of earlier times, but fundamental change had occurred. He initially honored his
father’s decision to appoint judges during good behavior and appears to have made an
effort to appoint good men to the bench. England soon divided again between King and
Parliament, however, and Charles found it expedient to remove judges who were too
independent or opposed to the policies of the Crown (Haynes 1944). In 1672, he attempted
to remove Sir John Archer from the court of common pleas. Archer refused to surrender
his patent, however, as he held office during good behavior. Charles stripped Archer of his
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salary and appointed a replacement, although he still received fees derived from fines and
other activities of the court. Succeeding judicial appointments were held during pleasure,
and transfers and removals were common (McIlwain 1913). In 1681, Charles dissolved
Parliament and ruled alone until his death four years later.
James II replaced his brother and ascended the throne for three plus years. His great
aim was to reestablish Catholicism in England which set the monarchy, yet again, at odds
with Parliament. Initially proroguing Parliament and later dissolving it, James issued a
royal declaration suspended application of the penal laws established by Parliament against
religious dissenters, and sought to convene a reconstituted Parliament to support his
agenda. The courts were enlisted to uphold the King’s prerogative power to override
Parliament. James dismissed judges opposed to his efforts and the retention of judges was
based solely upon sympathy to the Crown (Haynes, 1944). The rate of removals during this
time was unprecedented. Four were removed in one day in 1686 for refusing to side with
the Crown while two others were dismissed the following year for declining to transfer the
site of an execution to a place where the King thought it would have a greater effect
(McIlwain 1913). When James had a son and the threat of a Catholic dynasty took shape,
key Protestant members of Parliament invited the King’s son-in-law, William of Orange,
to assume the throne. James was soon forced to flee England (Haynes 1944).
The aftermath of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 appeared to settle the issue of the
Crown breaking judges. William and Mary, his wife, were named dual monarchs upon their
acceptance of a Declaration of Rights, which ceded considerable authority to Parliament
(Haynes 1944). The Settlement Act of 1701 provided that judges would serve during good
behavior, their salaries would remain certain, and they could only be removed by both
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houses of Parliament through the process of address which required the Crown’s consent
(Shugerman,2012). Nonetheless, the next three monarchs, Anne, George I and George II,
all subsequently dismissed judges notwithstanding their apparent tenure (Haynes 1944).
The last major issue regarding judicial tenure was cessation of judicial commissions
upon the death of the King. A 1696 law provided that judges would continue in office for
six months after the appointing sovereign died (McIlwain 1913). Prior to that time, judicial
patents ceased with the death of the King. A 1760 statute finally decreed that judicial
appointments would remain in effect during good behavior, notwithstanding the death of
the monarch (Shugerman 2012). The prolonged battle between the Crown and Parliament
over control of English judges underscored the desire for an independent judiciary, but,
ironically, did not apply directly to the American colonies.
Royal charters and governor’s commissions were the de facto constitutions of the
individual colonies. They granted legislative authority, within the context of English law,
but no such power was devised with respect to the judiciary. For example, assemblies were
permitted to create courts for the hearing of minor cases, but the power to erect and
constitute the general courts was reserved and judicial authority was vested in governor
and council, creatures of the King (Goebel 1971). There was a blurred line between the
judicial function and that which was political. Colonial assemblies routinely heard private
petitions involving only one individual or group against another and entered judgment
(Wood 1969).
The King nevertheless maintained absolute control over the appointment and
removal of colonial judges (Goldschmidt 1994). This aspect of British rule became
particularly poignant after 1760, when George III assumed the throne. As part of his
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determination to regain royal prerogatives ceded to Parliament, he limited the tenure of
judges in the American colonies (Volcansek and Lafon 1988). The same year he decreed
that English judicial commissions survive the death of the appointing monarch and any of
his or her successors, George announced that colonial judges would serve at the pleasure
of the Crown (Shugerman, 2012). The justification offered was that in the colonies
education was so poor and men of ability were so few that it was essential to the proper
administration of justice that incompetent judicial officials could be easily replaced (Ervin
1970).
Colonists found some refuge from unpopular royal legislation in the courts where
judges, unwilling to openly defy English laws, refused to enforce them (O’Conner 2009).
In response, the Crown took additional steps to control the colonial judiciary. Colonies
were prohibited from compensating judges (Volcansek and Lafon 1988) and judicial
salaries were funded through revenue collected under the Townsend Act of 1767
(O’Conner 2009). Although difficult to measure, royal patronage exerted an influence on
colonial affairs that furthered antagonism toward the power of appointment (Wood 1992).
These affronts to judicial independence were famously encapsulated within the list of
grievances specified in The Declaration of Independence: “He has made Judges dependent
on his Will alone, for the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their
Salaries.”
The leaders of the American Revolution were drawn from a range of professions
and backgrounds and the contribution of clergy, merchants, physicians and newspaper
publishers is well documented. However, no group was better equipped to articulate the
colonial argument than members of the legal profession and the roster of well-known
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lawyers active in the cause is impressive: Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, George Mason,
James Otis, John Jay, Patrick Henry, Jarod Ingersoll, James Iredell and William Smith, Jr.,
to name but a few (Klein 1960). Many of the men who participated in the constitutional
conventions that followed were lawyers30 and all of them were familiar with the on-going
struggle for judicial independence in England (Ervin 1970).
Responding to a resolution of the Continental Congress, individual colonies set
about instituting and establishing their own independent governments. Between January,
1776 and April, 1777, ten31 adopted new constitutions. Two others32 chose to alter their
colonial charters and a thirteenth, Massachusetts, did not adopt a formal constitution until
1780 (Tarr and Porter 1988).33 The constitutional abuses of the Crown and the lessons of
royal interference in the colonies were well known to the authors of these early state
charters (Volcansek and Lafon, 1988). Some of the similarities found among the founding
period state constitutions can be traced to this shared experience of British tyranny and
understood in terms of a shared republican political theory of governance (Tarr and Porter
1988).
Written by men weary of excessive executive authority, these constitutions
assigned primary responsibility for governance in the new states to legislative bodies. The

30

My research fails to reveal an exact rendering of the number of lawyers in attendance at the original state
constitutional conventions, but their roles were clearly significant. More than half of the signers of the
Constitution of the United States were lawyers, including fifteen signers who had also attended their
respective state conventions. Of these, ten were lawyers (Lloyd, n.d.).
31
Delaware (DEL. CONST. OF 1776), Georgia (Ga. CONST. OF 1777), Maryland (MD. CONST. OF 1776), New
Hampshire (N.H. CONST. OF 1776), New Jersey (N.J. CONST. OF 1776), New York (N.Y. CONST. OF 1777),
North Carolina (N.C. CONST. OF 1776), Pennsylvania (PA. CONST. OF 1776), South Carolina (S.C. CONST. OF
1776), and Virginia (VA. CONST. OF 1776).
32
Connecticut (CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT – 1662, REVISED 1776) and Rhode Island (CHARTER OF RHODE
ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS – 1663, REVISED 1776).
33
MASS. CONST. OF 1780. Upon the advice of the Continental Congress, Massachusetts resumed use of the
Charter of 1691 during the summer of 1775. For most of the revolutionary period, the state was managed
without a governor and the council acted as the executive (Wood, 1969).
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specific provisions for judicial selection embodied this approach and signified rejection of
how a preferred legal system had actually operated in the colonies (Sheldon and Maule
1997). State judiciaries were made subservient to legislatures who had primary
responsibility for electing judges, some for very limited terms, and the authority to remove
judges by a mere majority vote of the legislature (Tarr and Porter 1988). The state
legislatures assumed control over judicial salaries and fees, further weakening the
independence of many state courts. This acute republican form of control over the judiciary
represents the culmination of the struggle of colonial assemblies against the Crown for
control of the colonial courts (Wood 1969).
The original constitutions of North Carolina,34 South Carolina35 and Virginia36
provided for the appointment of judges by the legislature for terms of good behavior. The
legislatures of Connecticut,37 Rhode Island,38 Georgia,39 New Hampshire40 and New
Jersey41 were empowered to appoint judges, but for short, fixed terms. The chief executives

34

N.C. CONST. OF 1776, ART. XIII.
S.C. CONST. OF 1776, ART. XX. South Carolina adopted a second constitution in 1778 which also provided
for appointment of judges by the legislature for terms of good behavior (S.C. CONST. OF 1778, ART. XXVII).
36
VA. CONST. OF 1776.
37
Connecticut did not write a formal constitution until 1818. Rather, all mention of royal authority was
removed from the colonial Charter of Connecticut – 1662 by the general assembly in 1776 and it continued
as the governing document for the new state. Judges were selected annually (Wood, 1969).
38
Like Connecticut, Rhode Island chose in 1776 to operate under the Charter of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations – 1663 and continued to do so until 1842. Rhode Island judges were chosen annually (Eaton
1905).
39
Ga. CONST. OF 1777, ART. LIII. The chief justice of Georgia was appointed annually while other jurists
held their tenure at the pleasure of the legislature (Wood, 1969).
40
The New Hampshire Constitution of 1776 is silent with respect to the judiciary but provides “That all civil
officers for the colony and for each county be appointed, and the time of their continuance in office be
determined by the two houses” of the state assembly (N.H. CONST. OF 1776).
41
The justices of the supreme court of New Jersey held seven year terms; other judges five year terms (N.J.
CONST. OF 1776, ART. XII).
35
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of Delaware,42 Maryland,43 Massachusetts44 and New York,45 with input from their
legislatures and executive councils, appointed judges to serve during good behavior. The
governor of Pennsylvania, together with his executive council, appointed judges for a
period of seven years.46
Between 1784 and 1798, five of the original thirteen states adopted six new
constitutions. Georgia47 established discreet terms for its judges while New Hampshire48
and Pennsylvania49 adopted good behavior as tenure for their jurists. Delaware50 and South
Carolina51 did not meaningfully alter their judicial articles. When Vermont entered the
Union in 1791, its constitution provided for the legislature to select state judges annually.52
Kentucky mirrored the federal model when it joined the United States in 1792 as its
governor appointed judges with the advice and consent of the state senate.53
Although the federal constitution has since become the object of almost reverential
praise, it did not have an immediate impact on state constitution making. Rather, the
Massachusetts constitution served as the primary model for other early state compacts (Tarr
and Porter 1988). Federal judicial selection and tenure support an English liberal view of
The chief executive of Delaware was chosen by the legislature, designated the “president or chief
magistrate” and together with the general assembly selected judges (DEL. CONST. OF 1776, ART. XII).
43
The governor of Maryland, with the advice and consent of his council, appointed judges to commissions
held during good behavior (MD. CONST. OF 1776, ARTS. XL, XLVIII).
44
Massachusetts provided that judges be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of his council
(MASS. CONST. OF 1780, CH. 2, § I, ART. III).
45
Judges in New York were chosen by an appointment committee comprised of the popularly elected
governor and a committee of the state senate (N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, ARTS. XXIII, XXIV).
46
The chief executive of Pennsylvania, designated the “president” and chosen by the state legislature,
together with his council appointed judges for terms of seven years (PA. CONST. OF 1776, §§ 20, 23).
47
GA. CONST. OF 1789, ART. III, § 5 and GA. CONST. OF 1798, ART. III, §§ 1, 4.
48
N.H. CONST. OF 1784, ART. 73.
49
PA. CONST. OF 1790, ART. V, § 2.
50
DEL. CONST. OF 1792, ART. VI.
51
S.C. CONST. OF 1790, ART. III, § 1, ART. VI, § 1.
52
VT. CONST. OF 1786, § IX. A subsequent constitution provided for the annual selection of all judges by
the state legislature (VT. CONST. OF 1793, CH. 2, § 9). From 1777 through 1786, a sovereign and
independent Vermont chose common plea judges in popular elections (VT. CONST. OF 1777, ART. XXVII).
53
KY. CONST. OF 1792, ART. II, § 8 AND ART. V, § 2.
42
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republican governance. French intellectual concepts of democratic republicanism can be
seen in early state constitutions as the power of appointment was largely held by popularly
elected legislatures (Volcansek and Lafon 1988). These early state constitutions embody
political principles and represent the best efforts of their framers to develop processes and
create institutions that carry those principals into effect. They represent an evolution of
governance, not a series of political compromises between such factions as those present
at the federal convention (Tarr and Porter 1988).
The divergence of the federal constitution and state constitutions is well illustrated
by the provisions for judicial selection and tenure of the thirteen states that joined the Union
between 1796 and 1845. Appointment authority was vested entirely in the governor of four
states54 and in the legislature of seven others.55 Indiana was unique in that the governor
was the appointing authority for the state supreme court, the legislature chose presiding
circuit judges, and associate circuit judges were chosen by popular election.56 Supreme
Court judges in Michigan were appointed by the governor with all others being elected.57
Eight states granted their jurists tenure during good behavior58 while five prescribed fixed
terms.59

54

Louisiana (LA. CONST. OF 1812, ART. III, § 9), Maine (ME. CONST. OF 1820, ART. V, § 8), Missouri (MO.
CONST. OF 1820, ART. V, §13); and Texas (TEX. CONST. OF 1845, ART. IV, § 5).
55
Alabama (ALA. CONST. OF 1819, ART. V, § 12), Arkansas (ARK. CONST. OF 1836, ART. VI, §7), Florida
(FLA. CONST. OF 1838, ART. V, § 12) Illinois (ILL. CONST. OF 1818, ART. IV, § 4), Mississippi (MISS. CONST.
OF 1817, ART. IV, § 17); Ohio (OHIO CONST. OF 1803, ART. III, § 8), and Tennessee (TENN. CONST. OF 1796,
ART. V, § 2).
56
IND. CONST. OF 1816, ART. V, § 7.
57
Michigan (MICH. CONST. OF 1835, ART. VI, §§ 2, 4).
58
Alabama (ALA. CONST. OF 1819, ART. V, § 13), Florida (FLA. CONST. OF 1838, ART. V, § 13), Illinois (ILL.
CONST. OF 1818, ART. IV, § 4), Louisiana (LA. CONST. OF 1812, ART. IV, § 5), Maine (ME. CONST. OF 1820,
ART. VI, § 4), Mississippi (MISS. CONST. OF 1817, ART. V, § 9), Missouri (MO. CONST. OF 1820, ART. V, §13),
and Tennessee (TENN. CONST. OF 1796, ART. V, § 2).
59
Arkansas (ARK. CONST. OF 1836, ART. VI, §7), Indiana (IND. CONST. OF 1816, ART. V, § 4), Michigan
(MICH. CONST. OF 1835, ART. VI, §§ 2, 4), Ohio (OHIO CONST. OF 1803, ART. III, § 8), and Texas (TEX. CONST.
OF 1845, ART. IV, § 5).
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The Democracy Movement
The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed a unique and fundamental change
in judicial selection in the American states. A marked swing toward democratization gave
rise to the widespread popular election of judges (Haynes 1944). By the outbreak of the
Civil War, twenty-four of thirty-four states employed popular election to choose some or
all of their judges (Berkson 1980). This innovation marked a break with both European
tradition and the early practices of America states (Volcansek and Lafon 1988). At its
zenith, more than 70% of the American states employed popular election to determine who
their judges would be (DuBois 1980). The transition from more traditional appointive
methods to popular elections was neither sudden nor complete (Sheldon and Maule 1997).
It did, however, leave a permanent and indelible mark on conventions of democratic norms
and American republicanism. Today, the United States is the only nation in the world that
selects most of its judges through popular election (Brandenburg and Schotland 2008).
The rise of popular election of judges in the American states is rooted in
Jeffersonian democracy. Thomas Jefferson distrusted the judiciary and contributed
materially to the contention that judges should be popularly elected for short terms (Haynes
1944). Like many of his founding contemporaries, he had originally believed that judges
should be independent and hold their offices for life. In the 1780s, he had become
concerned about the “elective despotism” of state governments that had so concentrated
power in the legislative branch that it was impeding the efficient administration of justice.
However, in the wake of the French Revolution of 1790 Jefferson and his supporters began
to openly champion popular democracy (Volcansek and Lafon 1988).
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His “vital principles of republics” expressed in his first inaugural address included
respect for the power of the state governments, the right of election by the people, and
acquiescence to majority rule (Volcansek and Lafon 1988). The U. S. Supreme Court
decision in Marbury v. Madison60 and his ensuing feud with Chief Justice John Marshall
over judicial review led Jefferson to openly support popular election and limited tenure for
jurists (Haynes 1944). He charged that the judiciary was out-of-control, aristocratic and
unaccountable (Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2002), and efforts at impeachment proved
unsuccessful for removing contrarian judges at both the federal and state levels (Haynes
1944; Volcansek and Lafon 1988). Discontent with judges who held office during good
behavior led many, including Jefferson, to advocate alternate methods for staffing the
judiciary.
Change in methods of selecting state court judges was slow in coming. Rather, state
judiciaries were weakened in the first third of the eighteenth century by ripper bills,61 the
implementation of shorter terms, and by political punishment of judicial review through
impeachment (Shugerman 2012).

These efforts tended to make the judiciary more

accountable to the legislative branch than to the people.
Two other tenets of Jeffersonian thought, majority rule and universal suffrage,
would have important implications for those who desired to have an elected judiciary,
particularly in the West. In the years immediately following the War of 1812, the
constitutions of the states entering the Union provided for universal suffrage62 and
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1 Cranch 137 (1803).
“Ripper bills” circumvented service during good behavior by eliminating the courts upon which jurists
with life tenure served and replacing them with reconstituted judicial offices with new judges. The purpose
of the legislation was “purely partisan” (Shugerman, 2002, p. 72).
62
In this context, “universal suffrage” is limited to free white male persons aged twenty-one and older who
have not otherwise been disqualified to vote through felony conviction or otherwise. However, it was an
extension of the franchise from early state constitutions which usually required electors to own property of a
61
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apportioned representation based on population rather than geography. 63 This egalitarian
form of democracy permitted farmers, artisans, mechanics, and later, industrial laborers
from Eastern urban areas, to participate in government (Volcansek and Lafon 1988).
During the 1830s, Andrew Jackson succeeded Jefferson as the champion of popular
democracy. He believed people were virtuous and was supremely optimistic about the
capacity of Americans for self-governance. Jacksonian democracy was built on the familiar
fear of unrepresentative officials using government to promote narrow interests and confer
special privileges (Nelson 1993). It emphasized extension of the franchise, attacks on
privilege and deference, and the spirit of popular rule.

Jacksonians thought of the

independent judiciary as the bastion of the aristocracy, insulated from any direct
responsibility to the people (Volcansek and Lafon 1988).
The momentum of the democratic movements created a groundswell for
constitutional change. Between 1821 and 1860, more than half of the states existing in 1820
adopted new constitutions and Louisiana, New York and Virginia replaced their
constitutions twice.64 Michigan and Iowa, two states that joined the Union between 1821
and 1860, were also compelled to replace their original constitutions prior to the outbreak

certain value or to have paid a property tax as a condition of their eligibility to vote (e.g., PA. CONST. OF
1790, ART. III, § 3 and CONN. CONST. OF 1818, ART. VI, § 2).
63
Indiana (IND. CONST. OF 1816, ART. III, §§ 2, 6 and ART. VI, § 1); Mississippi (MISS. CONST. OF 1817, ART.
III, §§ 1, 8, 10); IL (1818); Illinois (ILL. CONST. OF 1818, ART. II, §§ 5, 27); Maine (ME. CONST. OF 1820, ART.
II, § 1, ART. IV – FIRST PART, § 2, and ART. IV – SECOND PART, § 2), and Missouri (MO. CONST. OF 1820, ART.
III, §§ 4, 6, 10).
64
N.Y. Const. of 1821, VA. CONST. OF 1830, DEL. CONST. OF 1831, MISS. CONST. OF 1832, TENN. CONST. OF
1835, PA. CONST. OF 1838, N.J. Const. of 1844, LA. CONST. OF 1845, N.Y. Const. of 1846, ILL. CONST. OF
1848, KY. CONST. OF 1850, IND. CONST. OF 1851, MD. CONST. OF 1851, OHIO CONST. OF 1851, VA. CONST.
OF 1851, and LA. CONST. OF 1852. Rhode Island jettisoned its colonial charter and adopted its first formal
constitution in 1842. R.I. CONST. OF 1842.
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of hostilities.65 All told, the 40 years prior to the Civil War witnessed two-thirds of the
American states adopting new constitutions.
The fundamental issue confronting state constitution-makers of the period was how
to best secure republican government (Tarr 1998b). The conventions focused on
controlling the legislatures and limiting their power to regulate (Shugerman 2012).
Although not the primary concern, how to make the judiciary more responsive to the people
was an important aspect of that question. The answer given was popular election of judges
for limited terms.
While uncommon, judicial elections were not unheard of in the United States. The
first incidence of popular election of judges occurred in Vermont in 1777.66 Georgia
amended its constitution in 1811 and again in 1812 to allow for the election of inferior
judges.67 In 1816, the new state of Indiana chose to elect its associate circuit judges and
justices of the peace,68 while Michigan entered the Union in 1836 providing for the popular
elections of trial judges.69 Mississippi, beginning in 1832, was the first state to require all
of its judges to be chosen by popular election.70
The embrace of popular election for all its judges by the important state of New
York in 184671 marked a critical juncture. Fourteen72 other then-existing states switched to
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MICH. CONST. OF 1850 and IOWA CONST. OF 1857.
Vermont was an independent state from 1777 until it joined the United States in 1791. Its original
constitution called for the popular election of common pleas judges (VT. CONST. OF 1777, ART. XXVII).
67
GA. CONST. OF 1798, AMENDS. II AND III.
68
IND. CONST. OF 1816, ART. V, §§ 7, 12.
69
MICH. CONST. OF 1835, ART. VI, §§ 4, 6.
70
MISS. CONST. OF 1832, art. IV, §§ 2, 5, 11, 16, 18, 23.
71
N.Y. CONST. OF 1846 ART. VI, §§ 2, 12, 14, 17-18.
72
Alabama, all judges except chancellors and judges of the supreme court (ALA. CONST. OF 1819, ART. V, §
12 AS AMENDED 1850); Arkansas, circuit and county court judges only (ARK. CONST. OF 1836, ART. VI, §7
AS AMENDED 1848);
Florida, all judges (FLA. CONST. OF 1838, ART. V, §§ 11, 12 AS AMENDED IN 1852);
Illinois, all judges (Ill. CONST. OF 1848, ART. V, §§ 3, 9, 17, 19, 27); Indiana, all judges (Ind. CONST. OF 1851,
ART. VII, §§ 3, 9, 14); Kentucky, all judges (Ky. CONST. OF 1850, ART. IV, §§ 4, 20, 30, 35, 40, 41); Louisiana,
all judges (LA. CONST. OF 1852, TITLE VI, ARTS. 64, 78, 81); Maryland, all judges (MD. CONST. OF 1850, ART.
66
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popular election for some or all of their judges within ten years and every state except
Iowa73 that joined the Union between 1846 and 191274 provided that all of their judges be
chosen through popular election. At the brink of the Civil War, 60% of the states elected
judges to their courts of last resort and two out of every three states elected their trial judges
(Nelson 1993).
There is an interesting and relevant scholarly debate surrounding the reasons behind
the rise of judicial elections, much of it less than flattering for proponents of the method.
Prominent legal scholar James Willard Hurst (1950, 100) argues “the movement was based
on emotion rather than on a deliberate evaluation of the experience under the appointive
system” and “[t]here is no evidence that the spread of the elected bench after 1850 was the
result of anything but imitation and sentiment.” Evan Haynes (1944, 100-1) similarly
observes, “It seems reasonable to say that the fundamental causes of that change had very
little to do with the relative merits of this or that system of judicial selection and tenure,
but were rather . . . completely without regard for the particular considerations of policy

IV, §§ 4, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 19); Michigan, all judges (MICH. CONST. OF 1850, ART. VI, §§ 2, 6, 13, 17); Missouri,
supreme court and circuit court judges only (MO. CONST. OF 1820, AMENDMENTS ARTS. VI AND VII); Ohio,
all judges (OHIO CONST. OF 1851, ART. IV, §§ 2, 3, 7, 9, 10); Pennsylvania, all judges (PA. CONST. OF 1838,
ART. V, § 2, AS AMENDED 1851); Tennessee, all judges (TENN. CONST. OF 1834, ART. VI, §§ 3, 4 AS AMENDED
1853); and, Virginia, all judges (VA. CONST. OF 1850, ART. VI, §§ 6, 10, 27, 34).
73
Iowa chose to elect district court judges and supreme court judges were appointed by the legislature (IOWA
CONST. OF 1846, ART. VI §§ 3, 4).
74
Wisconsin (WIS. CONST. OF 1848, ART. VII, §§ 2, 6, 7, 14, 15), California (CAL. CONST. OF 1849, ART. VI,
§§ 3, 5, 8, 14), Minnesota (MINN. CONST. OF 1857, ART. VI, §§ 3, 4, 7, 8, 9), Oregon (OR. OF 1857, ART. VII,
§§ 2, 10, 11), Kansas (KAN. CONST. OF 1859, ART. III, §§ 2, 5, 8, 9), West Virginia (W. VA. CONST. OF 1863,
ART. VI, §§ 4, 7), Nevada (NEV. CONST. OF 1864, ART. VI, §§ 3, 5, 8), Nebraska (NEB. CONST. OF 1866, ART.
III, §§ 1, 5), Colorado (COLO. CONST. OF 1876, ART. VI, §§ 6, 12, 22), North Dakota (N.D. CONST. OF 1889,
ART. IV, §§ 90, 104, 110, 112, 113), South Dakota (S.D. CONST. OF 1889, ART. V, §§ 5, 11, 15, 19), Montana
(MONT. CONST. OF 1889, ART. VIII, §§ 6, 12, 20), Washington (WASH. CONST. OF 1889, ART. IV, §§ 3, 5, 10),
Idaho (IDAHO CONST. OF 1890, ART. V, §§ 6, 11, 22), Wyoming (WYO. CONST. OF 1889, ART. V, §§ 4, 19, 22),
Utah (UTAH CONST. OF 1896, ART. VIII, §§ 2, 5, 8), Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. OF 1907, ART. VII, §§ 3, 9, 11,
18), New Mexico (N.M. CONST. OF 1912, ART. VI, §§ 4, 12, 26), and Arizona (ARIZ. CONST. OF 1910, ART.
VI, §§ 3, 5, 9).
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and principle which arise out of the nature and functions of the judicial arm of the
government.”
Caleb Nelson (1993, 224) is critical of the suggestion that reformers were “. . .
simple minded democrats. [T]he elective judiciary was intended to enlist some officials–
judges–in the process of weakening officialdom as a whole. At the same time, other
reforms were curtailing the independent power of judges themselves, in a concerted effort
to rein in the power of all officials to act independently of the people.” Francis Aumann
(1940, 186-7) points to partisan concerns. “Politics had a great deal to do with [it].
Jeffersonian Democracy viewed the judicial branch as a bulwark for the opposition group.”
Finally, Kermit Hall (1983, 354) posits, “The decision to elect state court judges was
neither emotional nor expedient. It was an essentially thoughtful response by constitutional
moderates in the legal profession to ensure that state judges would command more rather
than less power and prestige.” Although Hall’s theory has not gained widespread
acceptance among historians, it raises interesting points about the role of lawyers in the
judicial selection process.
Hostility toward lawyers in the United States had been rife since the Revolution
(Bloomfield 1968). A strong feeling of hostility toward lawyers arose in the postRevolution period because of their role in the debt crisis (Haynes 1944). The subsequent
economic and political success of lawyers occasioned opposition to the class structure of
the organized bar which sought to limit their ranks by establishing qualifications for the
practice of law. The Jeffersonians capitalized on anti-lawyer sentiment that resulted from
their economic success and the presence of a disproportionate number of lawyers in
government offices (Volcansek and Lafon 1988).
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Despite their questionable standing in the community, lawyers were an important
presence at the antebellum state constitutional conventions. They comprised half of the
delegates at the 1832 Mississippi convention, better than forty percent of those at the 1846
New York convention, and were represented in significant numbers at other conventions
(Nelson 1993). At every convention, lawyers and judges who had personal and professional
stakes in the outcome controlled the committees on judicial articles as well as floor debate
once the issue of judicial selection reached the convention floor (Hall 1983). Irrespective
of whether the efforts of lawyers was the reason for the shift to popular election of judges
or merely contributed to an inevitable outcome, members of the bench and bar had
established themselves as important actors in deciding how judges were to be chosen.
The Civil War and its aftermath led to the busiest period of constitutional revision
in the history of the American states, but had minimal long-term effect on state judicial
selection. Between 1861 and 1900, fifty-eight state constitutions were adopted, of which
thirty-three were in the former Confederate states. By comparison, only seven of the
twenty-three states that remained a part of the Union created new state charters during the
span (Tarr 1998b). Reconstruction led six former Confederate states to temporarily adopt
gubernatorial appointment for selecting judges,75 but all later returned to popular election
as their primary means to select jurists (Haynes 1944). Among Southern states, Virginia
was distinctive in that it abandoned popular election of judges and returned to legislative
appointment while the war was still on-going.76 All eleven states that joined the United
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Arkansas, all judges (ARK. CONST. OF 1868, ART. VII §§ 3, 5); Georgia, all judges except justices of the
peace (GA. CONST. OF 1868, ART. V, § 9); Florida, all judges (FLA. CONST. OF 1868, ART. VI §§ 3, 7, 9, 15);
Louisiana, supreme court only (LA. CONST. OF 1868, TITLE IV, ART. 75); Mississippi, all judges except justices
of the peace (MISS. CONST. OF 1868, ART. VI, §§ 2, 11, 17, 23); and, Texas, all judges except justices of the
peace (Tex. CONST. OF 1869, ART. V, §§ 2, 6, 19).
76
VA. CONST. OF 1864, ART. IV §§ 1, 6, 10. South Carolina had maintained legislative appointment as the
exclusive means of choosing its judges since 1776.
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States between the outbreak of hostilities and the turn of the century chose popular election
as the exclusive means of selecting their judges77 and most of the North steadfastly
maintained popular election (Hall, 1984c). New England remained distinctive from the rest
of the country due in part to its isolation from several movements for constitutional change,
including the popular election of judges (Tarr 1998b). At the end of the 19th century, the
six New England states, Delaware and New Jersey retained their historical methods of
choosing judges either by gubernatorial or legislative appointment. When Mississippi
reinstated popular election for all judges in the second decade of the 20th century,78 thirtyeight of the forty-eight U. S. states used the method as the primary means for selecting their
jurists while the other ten favored an appointive method.

Progressive Reform
Significant dissatisfaction with popular elections arose in the closing decades of the
nineteenth century (Goldschmidt 1994). State court judges were widely perceived as
incompetent, corrupt and under the control of political machines (Berkson 1980). The
electorate had proven unable to monitor and control the activities of judges as advocates of
popular election had envisioned. Instead, popular election had allowed the courts to be
captured by party machines (Hanssen 2004).
Lawyers led the assault on popular election of judges (Hall 1984a). For many, the
concept of judicial accountability had changed from democratic accountability to
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West Virginia (W. VA. CONST. OF 1863, ART. VI, §§ 4, 7), Nevada (NEV. CONST. OF 1864, ART. VI, §§ 3, 5,
8), Nebraska (NEB. CONST. OF 1866, ART. III, §§ 1, 5), Colorado (COLO. CONST. OF 1876, ART. VI, §§ 6, 12,
22), North Dakota (N.D. CONST. OF 1889, ART. IV, §§ 90, 104, 110, 112, 113), South Dakota (S.D. CONST. OF
1889, ART. V, §§ 5, 11, 15, 19), Montana (MONT. CONST. OF 1889, ART. VIII, §§ 6, 12, 20), Washington
(WASH. CONST. OF 1889, ART. IV, §§ 3, 5, 10), Idaho (IDAHO CONST. OF 1890, ART. V, §§ 6, 11, 22), Wyoming
(WYO. CONST. OF 1889, ART. V, §§ 4, 19, 22), and Utah (UTAH CONST. OF 1896, ART. VIII, §§ 2, 5, 8).
78
MISS. CONST. OF 1890, ART. VI §§ 145, 153, AS AMENDED 1916.
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professional accountability (Hall 1984b). Bar leaders initially worked within the existing
framework of popular elections to effectuate change by minimizing the power of political
parties (Watson and Downing 1969). They eventually joined forces with progressives79
who advocated a range of electoral reforms including nonpartisan elections for judges and
other officials (DuBois 1980).
Lawyers hoped taking politics out of the process would permit them to fill the void
of who chose judges (Sheldon and Maule 1997). By 1920, more than a dozen states had
adopted nonpartisan elections to choose at least some of their judges. Nonpartisan elections
failed to become the dominant form of state judicial selection, but it is used today in some
form in twenty states.80
The half-century following the end of the Civil War witnessed a profound series of
changes in the United States. The economy transformed from an agricultural and
commercial base to one of manufacturing and industry, causing a dramatic increase in
urban populations (Hall and Karsten 2009) and giving rise to political machines in large
cities. These machines took advantage of the political ignorance and complacency of the
urban electorate toward judicial candidates and seized control of the local bench, such as
the Tammany organization in New York City (Escovitz 1975). Electoral rules that
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Progressivism was a reform movement that sought to inject efficiency and expertise into government. It
took the form of numerous, independent reform-minded groups that proposed a variety of programs ranging
from electoral to administrative reform (Goldschmidt 1994, 6-7). Progressives were able to secure legislative
support for many reforms in the late 19th and early 20th century. However, they also suffered major setbacks
in the courts, the most notable being Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). This helped give rise to two
other legal reforms supported by progressives, the recall of judges and a supermajority voting rule for the
exercise of judicial review by state supreme courts (Shugerman 2012).
80
Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin select all of their judges in nonpartisan
contests, although Michigan state supreme court justices are nominated at party conventions. Ohio judges
are nominated in partisan primaries and run without party affiliation in the general election. California,
Florida, Oklahoma, and South Dakota choose all of their trial judges in nonpartisan elections, while Indiana
elects only some of its trial court judges through nonpartisan means.
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permitted party list ballots allowed voters to mark their ballots once to cast votes for all
party candidates, including judges, thereby effectively making judges responsible to party
strongmen (Sheldon and Maule 1997). The corruption was so apparent that the “stench
from the courtroom” and lawyer resentment over party control of the local bench
contributed to the establishment of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York City
in 1870, the first modern bar association (Friedman 1985, 373-4).
A generation earlier, New York had taken a leading role in the implementation of
popular election of judges. By 1867, corruption on the state bench was viewed as rampant
and bar elites made judicial reform a top priority. At the state’s constitutional convention
that year, delegates were able to secure an extension of judicial terms to fourteen years–
what some delegates saw as tenure for life. Reform efforts continued in the midst of yet
another corruption scandal that implicated Tammany Hall over railroad business deals, led
to the resignation of trial court judge Albert Cardozo, and reached almost every level of
state government. An 1873 referendum to reinstate judicial appointments nevertheless
failed, despite the efforts of reformers and a record number of judges awaiting trial for
corruption (Shugerman 2012).
The American Bar Association (ABA) formed in 1878 and came out in favor of
eliminating partisanship in judicial elections on the grounds that the partisan process
rendered judges susceptible to undue and damaging political pressure (Hanssen 2004). The
efforts of bar associations to minimize partisan influence in judicial races and to replace it
with input from lawyers included the appraisal of candidate qualifications, active support
of approved candidates, and explicit opposition to those found to be unqualified (Hurst
1950). However, these efforts proved largely unsuccessful (Watson and Downing 1969).
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In 1906 Roscoe Pound, the future dean of Harvard Law School, delivered a famous
address to the annual meeting of the ABA entitled “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice.” He argued the judiciary failed to address modern
problems like rapid population growth and the transition of the economy from agriculture
to manufacturing. Drawing parallels with the prior transformation of the colonial legal
structure away from the English magistrate system into a series of decidedly American
institutions, Pound called for an overhaul of the substantive law through both legislation
and judicial empiricism. His most famous observation aimed squarely at limiting untoward
influences on the courts: “Putting courts into politics, and compelling judges to become
politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench”
(Pound [1906] 1962, 66).
Pound was not alone in his disenchantment. Speakers at legal symposia and bar
association meetings throughout the nation took aim at the causes and effects of the
diminishing reputation of the judiciary and a series of proposals were offered and debated.
At the 1913 ABA annual meeting, then-former U. S. President and future chief justice of
the U.S. Supreme Court William Howard Taft addressed the assembly of delegates on the
question of judicial selection. He lobbied against popular elections and endorsed the
appointive system. Taft viewed politics as evil and an irreconcilable impediment to the
proper administration of justice (Winters 1968).
Progressives shared in the frustration of partisan political influence in the popular
election of judges. They sought scientific efficiency in government and viewed partisan
control of judicial selection as inefficiency in need of reform (Goldschmidt 1994). In their
view, being a partisan had little to do with being a judge and it often resulted in unqualified
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persons being placed on the bench (Sheldon and Maule 1997). They offered a range of
alternatives to the status quo which were adopted in many states including nominating
committees, direct judicial primaries, shortened ballots and, most importantly, nonpartisan
elections (Goldschmidt 1994).
Beginning in 1908, Washington became the first state to employ nonpartisan
judicial elections. Judges of the supreme and superior courts were to be chosen on a nonpartisan judiciary ticket that was separate from the regular ballot. The enabling legislation81
also called for the use of a direct primary for the selection of essentially all public offices.
The state legislature quickly retreated, however, and the following year mandated that
supreme court judges be nominated in party conventions and voted upon at the regular
general election ballot.82 The Washington experience of partisan retrenchment was soon to
repeat in several other states.
In 1913, the legislative assemblies of Kansas,83 Iowa,84 and Pennsylvania85 all
passed legislation providing for nonpartisan judicial elections. Kansas abandoned reform
almost immediately, repealing the act at the next legislative session.86 In 1919, Iowa
discarded nonpartisan elections in favor of partisan nomination of judges at special judicial
nomination conventions held separately from regular state party conventions with
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Act of Mar. 15, 1907, ch. 209, 1907 Wash. Laws 457 (providing for nomination of candidates for public
office).
82
Act of Mar. 12, 1909, §11, ch. 28, 1909 Wash. Laws 169 (providing that supreme court justices be
nominated at party conventions and their names placed on the general election ballot designating the party
that nominated them).
83
Act of Mar. 11, 1913, ch. 193, 1913 Kan. Sess. Laws 309 (concerning the nomination and election of
justices of the supreme court and judges of the district court.
84
Act of April 11, 1913, ch. 104, 1913 Iowa Acts 91 (providing for nonpartisan nomination and election of
judges of the supreme, district and superior courts of Iowa).
85
Act of July 24, 1913, No. 457, 1913 Pa. Laws 1001 (regulating and providing for nonpartisan nomination
and election for all offices of judge of a court of record).
86
Act of Mar. 24, 1915, ch. 207, 1915 Kan. Sess. Laws 264 (repealing chapter 193 Kansas Session Laws of
1913).
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nominees facing off during the general election.87 Similarly, the Pennsylvania reforms
survived less than a decade when the state returned to the use of partisan primaries and
party-competitive general elections.88 Despite these setbacks, nonpartisan judicial elections
found favor in other reform-minded states.
Ten Midwest and Western states, where progressive influence was strongest,
adopted nonpartisan judicial election for some or all of their judges between 1909 and
1921. The North Dakota89 legislature acted earliest and was joined two years later in 1911
by their Ohio90 and California91 counterparts. Beginning the following year, judges in the
new state of Arizona were nominated in party primaries and selected in nonpartisan general
election contests (Dunn 1967, 298). Minnesota adopted nonpartisan election for judges, as
well as some school and municipal officers, at a 1912 special session. 92 Nebraska,93
Wisconsin,94 Wyoming,95 Nevada96 and South Dakota97 also adopted nonpartisan means
for nomination and election of their judicial officers.
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Act of March 17, 1919, ch. 63, 1919 Iowa Acts 75 (relating to the nomination and election of judges of the
supreme, district and superior courts).
88
Act of May 9, 1921, No. 198, 1921 Pa. Laws 423 (providing for the nomination and election of judges of
courts of record, and repealing certain acts).
89
Act of March 6, 1909, ch. 82, 1909 N.D. Laws 84 (providing for the nomination and election of judges of
the supreme and district courts)(codified at N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 904-906 (1913)).
90
Act of Feb. 8, 1911, S.B. 2, 1911 Ohio Laws 5 (providing for the election of judicial officers by separate
ballot without party designation).
91
The Direct Primary Law, ch. 398, 1911 Cal. Stat. 769 (providing for partisan primaries for most offices
and making judicial and school offices nonpartisan).
92
Act of ________, 1912, § 2, ch. 2, 1912 Minn. Laws 4 (providing for non-partisan primary ballot for
judiciary and other offices).
93
Act of Apr. 11, 1913, ch. 96, 1913 Neb. Laws 247 (providing for the nonpartisan nomination and election
of judicial officers).
94
Act of June 17, 1913, ch. 492, 1913 Wis. Laws 558 (relating to nomination and election of school and
judicial officials).
95
Act of Feb. 24, 1915, ch. 74, 1915 Wyo. Sess. Laws 71 (relating to the nomination and election of judges
and providing for the nonpartisan selection thereof)(codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-1001 to 31-1005
(1945)).
96
Act of March 22, 1917, ch. 148, 1917 Nev. Laws 249 (defining judicial officers and offices and school
officers and offices, and declaring them nonpartisan)(codified at NEV. STAT. §§ 2568-2569 (1929)).
97
An Act to Provide for the Non-Political Nomination and Election of Judges of the Supreme, Circuit and
County Courts, ch. 224, 1921 S.D. Laws 331 (codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 7205-A to –H (1930)).
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The Progressive era and the accompanying spirit of wide-spread legal reform had
ended by the early 1920s, but the adoption of nonpartisan elections as a method of state
judicial selection continued. During the 1930s, Oregon,98 Idaho,99 Montana100 and
Michigan101 all adopted such measures. A 1941 Maryland law prohibited the use of party
designations in judicial races at general elections, although the nomination process
continued to be partisan. A provision was added two years later which permitted judicial
candidates to cross-file in party primaries thereby reducing, to some extent, the effect of
party membership in judicial elections (Martineau 1963).
By the dawn of the Second World War, nonpartisan elections had supplanted
partisan elections as the primary means of selecting judges in the American states. 102
Nevertheless, would-be reformers soon turned toward their attention to another progressive
solution – merit selection – as the preferred method of judicial selection.
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Act of Mar. 11, 1931, ch. 347, 1931 Or. Laws 607 (providing for the nonpartisan nomination and election
of judges of the supreme, circuit and district courts)(as amended codified at OR. STAT. §§ 36-2501 to 362507 (1935))
99
Act of Feb. 13, 1933, ch. 36, 1933 Idaho Sess. Laws 48 (providing a form of non-partisan judicial ball at
general elections for election of justices of the supreme court and district judges)(as amended codified at
IDAHO CODE §§ 33-6A101 to 33-6A108 (1940)).
100
Act of Mar. 14, 1935, ch. 182, 1935 Mont. Laws 389 (regulating the nomination and election of justices
of the supreme court and judges of the district court)(codified at MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 812.1 – 812.1
(1936)).
101
MICH. CONST. OF 1908, ART. VII, § 23 (as amended 1939).
102
General nonpartisan judicial selection reforms have since been enacted in Kentucky (KEN. CONST. § 117
AS AMENDED 1975), Georgia (GA. CONST., ART. VI, § 7, PARA. 1 RATIFIED 1983), Mississippi (Nonpartisan
Judicial Election Act, §§76-87, ch. 564, 1994 Miss. Laws 809 (establishing nonpartisan elections for all
appellate and most trial judges)), and Arkansas (ARK. CONST., AMEND. 80, (RATIFIED 2000)). North Carolina
enacted separate measure for superior court judges (Act of Aug. 2, 1996, §7, ch. 9, 1996 N.C. Laws 2 nd Ex.
Sess. 1 (establishing nonpartisan election of superior court judges)(codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§163-321
through 163-335)), district court judges (Act of Aug. 29, 2001, §1, N.C. Session Law 2001-403 (establishing
nonpartisan election of superior court judges)(codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§163-321 through 163-335)), and
appellate court judges and justices (Act of Oct. 2, 2002, § 7, N.C. Session Law 2002-158 (establishing
nonpartisan election of supreme court justices and appellate court judges)(codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§163321 through 163-335)).
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Merit Selection
For many Progressives and lawyers alike, the establishment of nonpartisan judicial
elections was more a placebo than a cure aimed at restoring the balance between
accountability and independence (Atkins 1976a). The American Judicature Society
(AJS),103 a quintessential Progressive group founded in Chicago in 1913, undertook the
task of developing and promoting an improved method for selecting state court judges
(Belknap 1992). Albert M. Kales, a professor of law at Northwestern University and the
head of the AJS drafting program, offered an early proposal where a popularly elected chief
justice would be responsible for appointing judges who would later run unopposed in
retention elections (Kales 1914).
Over the next two decades and numerous machinations later, the Kales plan had
evolved into a merit-based selection system for choosing judges (Gleason 2013). The
approach won widespread support among lawyers nationwide and gained the official
endorsement of the ABA in 1937 (Wood 1937). Missouri became the first state to adopt
merit selection for choosing some of its judges in 1940 and, as a result, merit-based
selection is often referred to as “The Missouri Plan” (Winters 1968, 63). In the seventy

103

The organization was incorporated in Illinois on June 15, 1913 under the name “American Judicature
Society to Promote the Efficient Administration of Justice” (Belknap 1992). The initial group of directors
was a veritable who’s who of Midwestern legal talent. The Chairman was Harry Olson, the Chief Judge of
the Municipal Court of Chicago. Board members included the governor of Michigan, the deans of the
Northwestern and University of Chicago schools of law, an additional faculty member from each of those
schools along with a former professor of law at Northwestern, a former Solicitor General of the United States
and past president of the ABA, two former presidents of the Illinois Bar Association, and the sitting Chief
Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The two non-Midwestern directors were Pound, who by that time
had assumed the position of Dean at Harvard Law School, and another faculty member from the Harvard
School of Law (“Introduction” 1917). Within several years of its founding, AJS was able to boast of a council
comprised of 180 lawyers from forty states, including representatives of the ABA and state bar associations.
Council members Louis Brandeis, George Sutherland, and former President Taft were all future members of
the U. S. Supreme Court (Belknap 1992).
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years since, bar associations, AJS and other reform-minded advocates have sought to
educate lawmakers and citizens about the benefits of merit selection over popular election
of judges. Though it takes many different forms today, merit selection is used by 32 states
to choose some or all of their judges.
Early reform proposals differed greatly from the Missouri Plan. Kales advocated
filling court vacancies through appointment by the chief justice who would be chosen by
frequent, popular election. An appointed judge would serve a short probationary period (he
proposed three years) and then submit themselves to retention election. If successful, they
would serve a longer term (something in the range of six to nine years) at the conclusion
of which the retention process would repeat (Kales 1914). Harold J. Laski, a professor at
the London School of Economics and Political Science, proposed gubernatorial
appointment with the assistance of the judges of the state supreme court, the state attorney
general, and the president of the state bar association (Laski 1926). The inclusion of
citizens on a nominating commission to make recommendations for judicial elections was
first discussed in a 1931 editorial in The Panel, a publication of the Grand Jury Association
of New York (Winters 1968).
A roundtable discussion at the 1931 annual meeting of AJS on the topic of selecting
judges marked the first time all of the elements of merit selection and retention that came
to be known as the Missouri Plan were discussed before a national body. Walter B. Spencer
spoke of a Louisiana bar plan that would create a nominating council composed of judges,
lawyers and lay citizens that was charged with submitting the names of qualified candidates
to the governor for consideration and appointment to judicial offices (“Various Ways”
1931). Also discussed was a California proposal allowing seated judges to face
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noncompetitive, retention elections of decreasing frequency (“Various Ways – II” 1931).
The union of these two ideas held promise to the bar for an escape from the perceived ills
of the popular election of judicial officials.
The ABA officially endorsed merit selection in 1937 as the preferred method of
selecting and retaining state judicial officials. An ABA resolution called for the initial
appointment of judges by an elected official from a list compiled by an independent agency.
If confirmation of appointees was deemed warranted, it would be done by the state senate
or some other legislative body. Finally, those seeking reappointment would periodically
stand before the electorate for retention on their record with no opposition candidates
(Wood 1937).
The ABA action came on the heels of a high level of unsuccessful bar activity
seeking a range of reforms. Georgia, Kansas, Florida and Utah lawyers had advanced
proposals that called for the appointment of judges by governors from lists of nominees
chosen through bar plebiscites (Gleason 2013). The Washington bar had developed a novel
plan that called for an eleven-member judicial council comprised of the governor, three lay
people and seven lawyers to appoint state judges (“Washington Bar’s Plan” 1935). In 1934,
California voters had rejected a state bar sponsored plan for the selection of trial court
judges in Los Angeles under which the governor would have the power to appoint from a
list submitted by the chief justice of the state supreme court, the presiding justice of the
court of appeals, and a state senator (Winters 1968). Coincidentally, a plan initiated by the
California Chamber of Commerce was approved by voters the same day. The constitutional
amendment104 provided for the governor to nominate all state appellate court judges subject

104

CAL. CONST., ART. VI, §§ 3, 16.
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to confirmation by the chief justice of the state supreme court, the presiding justice of the
court of appeals, and the state attorney general (Gleason 2013; Winters 1968).
By 1938, the state bars of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Utah
and Wisconsin had submitted for legislative consideration recommendations based on the
ABA resolution (“Present Status” 1938). The Michigan and Ohio proposals found their
way onto the fall ballot that same year but were defeated by wide margins (Barkdull 1939;
Brand 1939).
In Missouri, lawyers had been unable to gain legislative support for their reform
efforts. The state bar association shifted strategy and decided to take the issue directly to
the voters. The plan offered included selection of all state appellate judges and trial judges
in the St. Louis and Kansas City metropolitan areas. Other jurisdictions could adopt the
merit-based procedures by local referendum (“Ambitious Program” 1940).
The endeavor of securing the requisite number of voters’ signatures required to
ensure a place on the November 1940 was successful in obtaining more than double the
required number. The Missouri Institute for the Administration of Justice (MIAJ), a statewide organization of more than 20,000 members which included 3,000 lawyers, aided in
the signature-gathering process and took the proposal directly to the voters with an
educational campaign (“Vote on Missouri Court Plan Assured” 1940).
The Missouri Plan was adopted by voters with a comfortable margin on the same
day five other statewide ballot initiatives went down to defeat. The geographic areas with
the highest level of support for the proposal were the metropolitan jurisdictions which
would also be required to use the scheme to select their trial court judges (“Missouri Voters
Approve” 1940).
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In their definitive study of the Missouri Plan, Richard A. Watson and Rondal G.
Downing (1969, 9-10) observe, “It is difficult to determine the precise reasons why
Missouri became the first state to adopt the Plan favored by the American Judicature
Society and American Bar association, but certain factors contributed to the successful
campaign waged there.” They identify four particular exigencies that appeared to have
helped further the cause. First, a well-publicized fight between political factions in Kansas
City over the selection of state supreme courts justice in 1936 and the electoral success of
a pharmacist turned judge in St. Louis who was severely criticized by the press as
incompetent provided rich fodder for reform advocates. Also, proponents were able to learn
from the experiences of the Michigan and Ohio reform efforts, particularly regarding the
involvement of the lay community. Third, the bar was well organized and coordinated at
the state and local levels. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the MIAJ brought
prominent lay persons into the adoption campaign. The extensive involvement of nonlawyers helped blunt the charge that the Missouri Plan was merely a creation for the benefit
of the bar (Watson and Downing 1969).
Reformers heralded the victory as proof that they could be successful in obtaining
ideal political outcomes if it would only take the time to learn the necessary techniques,
such as cooperation between bar associations and lay agencies (“Bar Learns” 1940). John
Perry Wood, the draftsman of the ABA resolution on merit selection, viewed the results as
a “source of hope” for those working to find an effective substitute to the direct election of
judicial officials (Wood 1943, 142). However, the momentum advocates of merit selection
hoped for from its success in Missouri never materialized. World War II soon came to
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occupy the attention of the nation and it was a decade later before the next major change
occurred.
In 1950, Alabama voters approved Amendment 83 to the Alabama Constitution
which provides that vacancies on the circuit court in Jefferson County be filled by
appointment by the governor from a list of nominees provided by a nominating
commission. Appointed judges are required to run for reelection in partisan contests.105
Later amendments similarly provide for merit-based appointment for vacancies in
Madison,106

Mobile,107

Talladega,108

Baldwin,109

Tuscaloosa,110

Shelby,111

and

Lauderdale112 Counties.
In 1951, New Mexico Governor Edwin L. Mechem adopted a plan for filling
judicial vacancies in anticipation of passage of a proposed state constitutional amendment
implementing a full merit selection and tenure system set to go into effect the following
year. The amendment failed. Undeterred, Mechem continued to use the plan which in turn
was kept by his successors. Under the plan, a state bar committee was responsible for
developing and submitting to the governor a list of qualified and willing applicants for both
the appellate and trial benches. The appointed judges who sought retention then had to run
in partisan elections (Lowe 1971).
Alaska voters in 1956 approved a judicial article as part of their original
constitution113 that provided for merit selection of state supreme and superior court judges
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ALA. CONST., AMEND. 83.
ALA. CONST., AMEND. 334.
107
ALA. CONST., AMEND. 408.
108
ALA. CONST., AMEND. 615.
109
ALA. CONST., AMEND. 660.
110
ALA. CONST., AMEND. 741.
111
ALA. CONST., AMEND. 804.
112
ALA. CONST., AMEND. 819.
113
ALASKA CONST., ART IV.
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who would then stand unopposed for retention on their records (Stewart 1958). Kansas
voters adopted similar selection and tenure provisions114 for their supreme court judges in
1958 (Winters 1968).
In late 1959, the ABA, AJS and a third-organization co-sponsored115 the National
Conference on Judicial Selection and Court Administration. The Chicago conference
reinvigorated the judicial reform movement and marked the beginning of a massive and
innovative campaign for change (Belknap 1992).
In May 1962, AJS began sponsoring and conducting a series of citizens conferences
around the country. State bar associations were almost always co-sponsors. Conference
participants included business and community leaders, clergy, newspaper editors, labor
leaders, and representatives of civic groups, women’s organizations and service clubs.
They were given comprehensive resource books on state court systems, listened to lectures
about the need for a wide range of court reforms, and often heard from representatives from
states where innovative reforms had been adopted, such as Judge Elmo Hunter of Missouri
who spoke on the state’s merit selection system. Each conference concluded with a general
assembly that would adopt a statement of recommendations (Belknap 1992).
The conferences produced immediate and significant results. By August 1966,
constitutional amendments implementing conference recommendations had been approved
in seven of the fifteen states where conferences had been held prior to the end of 1964.
Between 1967 and 1974, it was common for six to eight states to adopt court reform
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KAN. CONST., ART. 3, § 5 (AS AMENDED 1958). In 1972, the Kansas Constitution was again amended to
provide individual judicial districts the option of having their judges chosen through a merit-based
nominating system (Jackson, 2000).
115
The third co-sponsor was the Institution of Judicial Administration (IJA), a nonpartisan research
organization located at New York University’s Law Center (Belknap, 1992). Research suggests that IJA did
not take part in the citizens conferences that followed.
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amendments to their constitutions during each election cycle (Belknap 1992). Of the
twenty-two states that adopted merit selection to choose some or all of their judges between
1958 and 1974, conferences had been held in seventeen (Hanssen 2002). All told, AJS
would hold or co-sponsor more than 100 conferences during the fourteen-year series
(Belknap 1992).
The 1960s and 1970s have been described as “the real heyday” of merit selection
(Anderson 2004, 793). The voters of Iowa,116 Nebraska,117 Colorado,118 Oklahoma,119
Indiana,120 Wyoming,121 Arizona122 and Florida123 approved constitutional amendments
implementing merit selection and unopposed retention elections for some or all of their
state court judges. The Tennessee legislature temporarily instituted merit-based selection
and retention for all appellate court judges in 1971,124 but repealed its action with respect
to supreme court justices three years later.125 Vermont voters revised their constitution to
provide for the appointment of judges by the governor from a list provided by a nonpartisan
nominating commission, subject to the consent of the state senate, and chose to vest the
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IOWA CONST., ART. V, §§15-16 (AS AMENDED 1962).
NEB. CONST., ART. V, § 21 (AS AMENDED 1962).
118
COLO. CONST., ART. VI, §§ 24-25 (AMENDED 1966).
119
OKLA. CONST., ART VII-B, §§2-5 (AS AMENDED 1967).
120
IND. CONST., ART VII, §§10-11 (AS AMENDED 1970).
121
WYO. CONST., ART V, §4 (AS AMENDED 1972).
122
ARZ. CONST., ART VI, §§ 36-38 (AMENDED 1974).
123
FLA. CONST., ART. V, §§10-11 (AS AMENDED 1976).
124
Act effective July 1, 1971, ch. 198, 1971 Tenn. Pub. Acts 510 (providing for a nonpartisan nominating
commission and retention election of appellate court judges and justices)(codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §17701 (repealed 2009)). This attempt to depoliticize the selection and retention of jurists did just the opposite.
The unexpected election in 1972 of a Republican governor in a heavily-Democratic state combined with the
death of one member of the supreme court and the expected retirement of three others led the legislature to
pass a provision making the nominating commission not applicable to the state’s highest court. When the
governor vetoed the measure, the politically wheels were sent into even higher gear. Eventually, the
governor’s veto was overridden in a deal that included trading Democratic votes for a medical school in
eastern Tennessee in exchange for Republican votes to override (Pierce, 2002; Behm and Henry, 2014).
125
Act of ______, 1974, ch. ___, 1974 Tenn. Pub. Acts 433 (removing the supreme court from the purview
of the nonpartisan nominating commission).
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authority of whether to retain judges with the state legislature. 126 New York127 and
Hawaii128 voters approved constitutional amendments creating judicial commissions
empowered to nominate prospective appointees to their governors. Illinois129 and
Pennsylvania130 voters adopted constitutional provisions that implemented unopposed
retention elections for judges initially chosen through partisan elections and Maryland131
voters adopted unopposed retention election for judges appointed by the governor.
During

the

1970s,

governors

in

Maryland,132

Florida,133

Georgia,134

Massachusetts,135 Delaware136 and Wisconsin,137 all constitutionally empowered to fill
empty judicial seats, issued executive orders creating judicial commissions to screen and
recommend nominees for vacant state judgeships (Healy 2012; Lowe 1971; Scott et al.
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VT. CONST., CH, II, §§ 32-34 (AS AMENDED 1974).
N.Y. CONST., ART. VI, § 2 (AS AMENDED 1977).
128
HAW. CONST., ART. VI, § 3 (AS AMENDED 1978).
129
ILL. CONST., ART. 6, § 12 (AS AMENDED 1964).
130
PENN. CONST., ART. V, §§ 14-15 (AS RATIFIED 1968).
131
MARY. CONST., ART. IV, § 5A (AS RATIFIED 1976).
132
By two executive orders entered in July, 1970, Maryland Governor Marvin Mandel created separate
nominating commissions for appellate and trial court judges. This was particularly significant as all vacant
judicial offices in Maryland are appointed by the governor (Lowe 1971). The use of judicial nominating
commissions by the governor of Maryland has continued uninterrupted and was recently extended by current
Governor Lawrence J. Hogan, Jr. (Maryland Executive Order 01.01.2015.09).
133
A series of nonpartisan nominating commissions was created pursuant to executive order by Florida
Governor Reubin Askew (Lowe 1971). The use of commissions by executive order remained in effective
until Florida adopted its version of the Missouri Plan in 1976.
134
1972 Executive Order by Jimmy Carter (need to find better evidence). Uninterrupted through current
governor (NCSC website). Current order in effect, Gov. Nathan Deal Exec. Order 01.10.11.03.
135
Governor Michael J. Dukakis implemented the first in a long series of executive orders providing for the
use of judicial nominating commissions in Massachusetts on January 3, 1975 (Massachusetts Executive
Order No. 114). Current Governor Charles D. Baker issued Executive Order No. 558 February 5, 2015
directing the continued use of judicial nominating commissions, the latest in the uninterrupted line of
governors who have done so since Dukakis (Healy 2012).
136
Delaware Governor Pierre S. du Pont, IV issued Executive Order No. 4 on February 24, 1977 creating a
nonpartisan judicial nominating commission. The use of such a commission by subsequent governors
appears uninterrupted (Scott et al. 2009). Current Governor Jack Markell issued orders continuing the
commission on March 26, 2009 shortly after taking office and most recently on May 22, 2015 (Delaware
Executive Order No. 4; Delaware Executive Order No. 50).
137
Acting Governor Martin J. Schreiber was the first Wisconsin chief executive to enlist the assistance of a
judicial nominating commission to fill interim vacancies (Wisc. Exec. Order No. 54, April 12, 1978. The
use of judicial nominating commissions by the governor of Wisconsin has continued uninterrupted and was
most recently extended by current Governor Scott Walker (Wisc. Exec. Order No. 29, May 11, 2011).
127
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2009). Similarly, between 1967 and 1976, Idaho,138 Montana,139 Kentucky,140 North
Dakota141 and Nevada142 each adopted statutory or constitutional provisions employing
judicial nominating commissions to fill vacancies. In all, twenty-four states adopted some
aspect of the Missouri Plan during the 1960s and 1970s.
The pace of adoption of merit-based provisions for choosing and retaining state
judges has since slowed considerably. During the 1980s only four states, South Dakota,143
Utah,144 Connecticut145 and New Mexico146 adopted merit-based reforms. Minnesota,147
Rhode Island,148 and South Carolina149 all instituted new merit-based measures in the
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Act of _____, 1967, ch. 67, 1967 Idaho Sess. Laws 153 (providing for a nonpartisan judicial nominating
commission)(codified at Idaho Code § 1-2102 through 1-2104).
139
Act of ____, 1973, ch. 470, Mont. Sess. Laws ___ (creating a judicial nomination commission)(codified
at Mont. Code §§ 3-1001 through 3-1014).
140
KEN. CONST. § 118 (AS AMENDED 1975).
141
N.D. CONST. ART. VI, § 13 (AS RATIFIED 1976).
142
NEV. CONST. ART. VI, § 20 (AS RATIFIED 1976).
143
South Dakota voters amended their constitution to require the governor to fill by appointment circuit and
supreme court vacancies from nominees provided by a judicial qualifications commissions. The amendment
also provides that supreme court justices are subject to retention elections after three years in office, while
appointed circuit judges run for reelection when the term they are filling expires (S.D. CONST. ART. V, § 7
(AS AMENDED 1980)).
144
The appointment of vacancies on all courts of record in Utah are made by the governor from a list provided
by a judicial nominating commission. All appointees who wish to remain in office are subject to periodic
retention elections thereafter (UTAH CONST., ART. VIII, §§ 8-9 (AS AMENDED 1985)).
145
All Connecticut appellate and superior court judges are to be nominated by the governor from a list
submitted by a judicial selection commission and confirmed by the state legislature (CONN. CONST., ART. II,
§ 2, AS AMENDED BY AMEND. ART XXV (as amended 1986)).
146
In November 1988, the voters of New Mexico approved a state constitutional amendment that provided
for the filling of judicial vacancies by gubernatorial appointment from lists provided by nonpartisan
nominating commissions. Three separate types of commissions were created to nominate appellate, district
and municipal judges (N.M. CONST., ART. VI, §§ 35-37 (AS AMENDED 1988)). Seated judges who wish to
maintain their positions must prevail in a single partisan contest and are thereafter subject to nonpartisan
retention elections (N.M. CONST., ART. VI, § 33 (AS AMENDED 1988)).
147
Minnesota created a commission on judicial selection to recommend to the governor three to five nominees
to fill any vacancy on either a district court or Worker’s Compensation Court of Appeals (Elections and
Ethics Reform Act of 1990, art. I, § 1, ch. 608 1990 Minn. Sess. Laws ___ (codified at Minn. Rev. Stat. §
480B.01)).
148
Voters in Rhode Island approved a constitutional amendment creating an independent judicial nominating
commission tasked with providing nominees to the governor for appointment to judicial offices (R.I. CONST.,
ART. X, § 4 (AS AMENDED 1994)).
149
A merit selection commission was added by constitutional amendment to recommend qualified candidates
to the South Carolina legislature, which in empowered to appoint judges (S.C. CONST., ART. V, § 27 (AS
AMENDED 1996)).
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1990s, and Tennessee revised its judicial selection and retention paradigm with the
adoption of the so-called “Tennessee Plan.”150 New Hampshire,151 West Virginia152 and
North Carolina153 are the most recent states to integrate merit-based provisions into their
judicial selection and retention schemes.154
Today, thirty-eight states use some form of merit-based selection and retention
method for some or all of their judges. Of those, twenty-five use a nominating commission
to screen all prospective members of their state courts of last resort.155 Nominating
commissions are used by eight others to fill interim vacancies on their highest courts.156
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The soap opera-like saga that is judicial selection in Tennessee entered witnessed a new chapter in 1994
with passage of the Tennessee Plan (Act of _______, 1974, ch. 942, § 3, 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts ____)(creating
a new judicial selection commission for the nomination of all appellate court judges and justices and
implementing retention elections for all those nominated by the commission). A bevy of state and federal
lawsuits ensued, and the resulting frenzy led the state supreme court to observe, “We take judicial notice that
following issuance of our orders in these cases something approaching legal chaos ensued” (State of
Tennessee ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson, 249 S.W.3d 331, 335 (1996)). In the wake of the tumult Justice
Penny White, who had to sue in order to be placed on a retention ballot, became the only jurist to be rejected
by the voters of Tennessee in a retention election (Behm & Henry, 2014).
151
Beginning in 2000, the governors of New Hampshire have created by executive order and relied upon a
judicial nominating commission to assist them in the appointment of judges (N.H. Exec. Order No. 2000-9,
N.H. Exec. Order No. 2005-2, N.H. Exec. Order No. 2013-06).
152
A judicial vacancy advisory commission was created by the legislature of West Virginia to assist the
governor in filling judicial vacancies (Act of Mar. 20, 2010, ch. 77, 2010 W. Va. Acts ___ (codified at W.
Va. Code § 3-10-3a).
153
By executive order, North Carolina Governor Beverly Perdue established a judicial nominating
commission in 2011 to assist her in the appointment of judges (N.C. Exec. Order No. 86, Apr. 5, 2011). The
order was temporarily suspended less than a month before she left office after her unsuccessful reelection bid
(N.C. Exec. Order No. 137, Dec. 5, 2012). Her successor, Pat McCrary, subsequently issued an executive
order explicitly superseding the prior orders (N.C. Exec. Order No. 1, Jan. 7, 2015). North Carolina recently
adopted retention elections for justices of the state supreme court (Act effective June 11, 2015, ch. ___, 2015
N.C. Sess. Laws ___ (to be codified, in relevant part, at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§7A-4.1 through -4.2)).
154
An epilogue to the drama that is staffing Tennessee courts is in order. The Tennessee Plan was repealed
by a now Republican-dominated Tennessee legislature effective June, 2013 and substantial uncertainty
ensued. In a strange twist of events, a majority of the legislature rejected a proposal supported by chamber
leadership and Republican Governor Bill Haslam to provide for merit selection of judges through a
constitutional amendment. Instead, a constitutional amendment placing judicial appointment power with the
governor subject to confirmation by the legislature was presented to voters November 3, 2014 (Behm &
Henry, 2014). The measure passed (TENN. CONST., ART. VI, § 3 (AS AMENDED 2014)) and three days later
Governor Haslam issued an executive order reinstating the previously disbanded judicial nomination
commission (Tenn. Exec. Order No. 41, Nov. 6, 2014).
155
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming.
156
Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and West Virginia.
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Twenty states utilize retention elections for those who wish to serve on their state court of
last resort beyond their initial term.157

Conclusion
The history of judicial selection in the American states is a study in the on-going
search for the proper balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability.
The saga easily divides into four overlapping periods that equate with the preferred method
espoused by the reformers of the day as the best combination of the two competing ideals.
The founding period through the 1840s witnessed the appointment of judges by governors
and legislatures, which was viewed as the appropriate response to the historic abuses of the
English monarchy.
Reliance on popular elections as a means to establish more democratic controls
began to talk hold in the second quarter of the eighteenth century and by the time of the
Civil War partisan elections became the most commonly employed method for selecting
state jurists. The rise of party machines in the second-half of the nineteenth century raised
the ire of Progressives who pushed for the nonpartisan election of judges as part of a general
reform agenda as a means to take politics out of judicial selection.
In 1937, the ABA formally adopted merit selection as its ideal method for selecting
judges in an effort to combine the positive aspects of judicial elections and appointment
while avoiding the pitfalls of each. Lawyers and other reformers have since focused their
efforts on expanding adoption of merit selection. Along the way, some states retained their
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Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah and
Wyoming.
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existing methods for selecting jurists while others adopted reform. The resulting
configuration of judicial selection is as varied as the fifty states. Members of the bench and
bar were active participants in judicial selection reform at each stage.
The historical record also provides insight and meaning to the quantitative analyses
to follow. For example, lawyers are shown to be deeply involved in each period of reform
from the establishment of state judiciaries in the founding period to the adoption of merit
selection in the late-20th century. Therefore, the strength of the bar in each state is included
in explanatory models. Key features of the development and implementation of merit
selection are also considered. The Progressive Era was a reaction to a larger, wealthier,
more educated and increasingly urbanized American society. Accordingly, the impact of
population, wealth, educational attainment, and urbanization are estimated and tested.
Similarly, historical evidence suggests that the AJS-sponsored citizens conferences played
a conspicuous role in the development and implementation of merit selection so the level
of reform activity within each state by the organization is considered.
Chapter 4 presents a quantitative assessment of why states alter their existing
judicial selection institutions and adopt merit selection for choosing jurists to their courts
of last resort.

Fourteen explanatory variables drawn from this history of state judicial

selection, institutionalism theory, and policy innovation and diffusion research, are
conceptualized and operationalized. A hypothesis for each is formulated and tested. Event
history analysis is then used to test a series of general models and the theoretical
propositions advanced in Chapter 2. The quantitative analysis adds yet another part to the
puzzle that it is the problem of state judicial selection.
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CHAPTER 4: EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS OF STATE JUDICIAL
SELECTION

Introduction
This chapter seeks to add to our understanding of merit selection in the American
states by means of a time-series quantitative analysis that combines the theoretical and
historical dimensions of state judicial selection discussed in the preceding chapters. Like
many other social processes, the current status of state judicial selection is an extension of
past experiences and of people’s future expectations. It is a phenomenon that is constantly
in flux yet likely trends in a predictable way or exhibits patterns that recur over time.
Identifying and understanding causal relationships between key variables over time is
necessary to explain and forecast past and future adoptions of this important institutional
feature (Box-Steffensmeier, et al. 2014).

This analysis tests hypotheses relating to

individual explanatory variables as well as the more intricate theoretical propositions
advanced in Chapter 2. In turn, the results of this study can then be applied as a vehicle
for understanding institutional processes in a broader, more general, context (Berry and
Berry 2007).
This chapter begins with a short description of event history analysis and explain
why Cox proportional hazards modeling is the appropriate statistical tool to employ in this
study. In the next section, the explanatory variables are conceptualized and operationalized
and the data sources for each is identified, including distinguishing missing information
that requires interpolation of data points or the omission of individual cases. A hypothesis
is posited about the expected relationship of each covariate to the dependent variable. The
third part lays out a series of equations and models designed to test the hypotheses and
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theoretical propositions advanced in this dissertation. A discussion of the statistical results
follows with emphasis on the overall explanatory power of the models tested and the
impact of individual explanatory variables. The chapter concludes with a depiction of the
synergy between the statistical results, historical record, and theoretical foundations of
institutions in understanding the choice of merit selection by states for choosing jurists to
their courts of last resort.

Event History Analysis and Cox Proportional Hazards Models
Event history analysis is the ideal tool for investigating the adoption of merit
selection by states to choose judges for their courts of last resort (Berry and Berry 2007).
It accentuates the issues of timing and change, which are critical to assessment of the
theoretical propositions and hypotheses advanced in this dissertation. Understanding an
event history involves examination of not only whether something happened, but also when
it happened. The analysis occurs through statistical examination of longitudinal data
collected on a set of theoretically relevant variables (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).
Event history models conceive of a single risk set – here, whether a state is able to adopt
merit selection during a given time period. A dependent variable measuring risk status is
coded ‘1’ if a state adopts and ‘0’ if it does not. If a state adopts a nonrecurring event such
as merit selection, it is removed from the risk set for subsequent periods (Berry and Berry
2007). Coefficient estimates of the explanatory variables provide information on the
relative impact of each variable and permit computation of a hazard rate – the likelihood a
state in the risk set will adopt – for each covariate that is consistent over time (Alison 2014).
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Cox proportional hazards models will be employed in this study. They are routinely
employed in event history analysis due to their flexibility and capacity to adequately
address common methodological issues (Mills 2011). Event history data often involve
censored and time-varying explanatory variables, both of which are present in my data set,
which are problematic for more standard statistical techniques such as linear regression
and ordinary least squares regression (Allison 2014; Box-Steffensmeier and Sokhey,
2010). Similarly, while other forms of hazard modeling are quite limiting in regard to
available theoretical assumptions regarding time to adoption, Cox modeling permits less
rigorous assumptions (Allison 2014; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Mills 2011).
Yamaguchi (1991) argues that, although none of the disadvantages to Cox
regression are serious, they do require some qualification. None of the major disadvantages
to Cox regression are relevant to this study. First, the technique is not recommended with
a very small sample size as parameter estimates become more precise as the number of
cases increase. The number of cases in the instant data set is 640 and constitutes a medium
to large data set for purposes of partial likelihood estimation (Colosimo, Chalita, and
Demétrio 2000). A second potential disadvantage is an excessive number of simultaneous
failures of at risk cases. Due to computational factors, marginally biased estimates are
produced in the presence of tied events. In this study, the larger sample size mitigates any
bias and ties are never greater than 10% in a single interval (Hertz-Picciotto and Rockhill
1997). Accordingly, the Cox regression technique is well-suited to test the theoretical
propositions and hypotheses advanced in this dissertation.
The status variable for all models in this study is MERIT. It is a binary variable
coded ‘1’ when a state adopts merit selection to choose judges for its court of last resort

96

and ‘0’ when a state uses some other method. The data used to compile the variable were
obtained from numerous sources over the course of my research for the Chapter 3.

Risk Set, Covariate Conceptualization and Measurement
Institutional theory, innovation and diffusion research, and the history of state
judicial selection explicate various circumstances and events that influence the choice of
judicial selection methods in a particular jurisdiction. They collectively provide
meaningful insight into potential causal factors that may be confirmed through statistical
analysis and instill confidence that a discrete set of characteristics exists that distinguish
those states that utilize merit selection for choosing judges to their courts of last resort from
those that do not. Against this background, fourteen explanatory variables are formulated
that can be utilized to test this contention, as well as the theoretical propositions formulated
in Chapter 2. Each is grounded in the extant literature and collectively represent the key
determinants of state judicial selection. Of course, there is also the possibility that there is
no discernable pattern and that the adoption of merit selection is a result of inconsistent,
idiosyncratic factors that are unique to a particular jurisdiction.
The risk set has 620 cases and is comprised of fourteen covariates.158 The unit of
analysis is an individual state in a given year. The applicable time period spans from 1935
to 2010 and is divided into five-year intervals. Thus, for a given variable, each of the fifty
states will have a single data point for 1935, 1940, 1945 . . . 2010. 159 At such time as a
state adopts merit selection, it is no longer at risk and is dropped from subsequent periods.

158

Explanatory variables in fully or partially parametric models are called covariates because they estimate
the effects on hazard rates rather than on the value of dependent variables (Yamaguchi 1991).
159
Alaska and Hawaii are not included until 1960 since they did not become states until 1959.
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For example, only two Missouri cases are included since the state adopted merit selection
in 1940. In contrast, 16 Virginia cases are included since the state has never adopted merit
selection. 1935 was chosen as the starting time point as it the nearest period preceding the
official endorsement of merit selection by the American Bar Association in 1937 (Wood
1937). Right-censored states are able to contribute what is known about them during a
given time period, even though they never adopt merit selection. Similarly, time-varying
explanatory variables are easily included as each period at risk is treated as a distinct
observation for each state (Allison 2014; Mills 2011). Summary statistics are shown in
Table 4.1.
[Insert Table 4.1 about here]

LASTCHANGE
The temporal aspect of state judicial selection is a phenomenon that warrants
investigation and can be addressed quantitatively. Path dependence suggests that a state is
less likely to seek change the longer an institution is in place. Existing institutional
arrangements are on trajectories or “paths” which, once established, are very difficult to
alter (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 342). These paths create various positive feedback
processes that reward actors for behaving in ways that are consistent with past behaviors.
Institutions become more stable over time as vested interests become resistant to change.
Every step down the path increases the relative cost of choosing other options, thereby
creating greater dependence (Pierson 2000). It is therefore reasonable to expect that the
longer a judicial selection process has been in place, the less likely a state is to adopt merit
selection. Accordingly, the following research hypotheses are advanced:
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Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between the length of time states
have utilized their current judicial selection methods and the choice
of merit selection to choose judges for state courts of last resort.
LASTCHANGE measures the passage of time in years since a state has last altered its
method for choosing judges to its court of last resort.160 In instances where a state has
never made such a change, time since the state was admitted to the Union is used. I
compiled the data for this covariate from various sources while researching Chapter 3. The
natural log transformation is used to normalize the distribution of the standards errors for
this variable, as a few unusually large cases (e.g., South Carolina has not changed its
method for choosing judges since the nation’s founding) tend to positively skew results.
LASTCHANGE is expected to be negatively related to the status variable.

CHANGEEASE
While vested interests may well seek to reinforce existing institutions and resist
change, the formal barriers that must be overcome to implement merit selection are also of
interest. The easier it is for a state to change its judicial selection method, the more likely
it will do so. Since merit selection is necessarily a policy reform – all states except
Alaska161 and Hawaii162 had state judicial systems in 1935 – it is appropriate to consider
what impact the difficulty of change has on the likelihood of this policy choice. For
example, Delaware, Maryland, and Massachusetts have each established merit selection by
executive order. Formally, the governor of each of these states is granted the constitutional
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For purpose of this variable, five different methods of judicial selection are considered distinct. They are
partisan election, nonpartisan election, gubernatorial appointment, legislative appointment, and merit
selection. A change from any one to any other resets the value of the variable to zero in the year of adoption.
161
Alaska adopted merit selection as part of its initial state constitution adopted in 1958 and effective upon
statehood in 1959.
162
Hawaii initially provided for the appointment of judges to its state court of last resort. It adopted merit
selection in 1978.
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authority to appoint judges to their state courts of last resort. In contrast, some states
require constitutional amendments supported by super-majorities of both the legislature
and the electorate in order to modify their judicial selection systems. To test the effect of
the ease with which a state may change its state judicial selection method, I test the
following research hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between the ease in amending states’
judicial selection method and the choice of merit selection of judges
for state courts of last resort.
CHANGEEASE is the covariate that measures the difficulty of changing a state’s
choice of judicial selection method. Data for this variable are obtained from The Book of
the States (various years). CHANGEEASE essentially measures the number of different
decision makers who must give their assent to modify a state’s judicial selection method.
Thus, the values for CHANGEEASE are assigned as follows based upon the formal action
required to modify judicial selection within a state: a constitutional amendment with the
support of a supermajority of the legislature plus a supermajority of the electorate = 1; a
constitutional amendment with a supermajority of the legislature and a majority of the
electorate = 2; a constitutional amendment with a legislative majority and a majority of the
electorate = 3; only a legislative majority is required = 4; and, where a governor may issue
an executive order = 5. It is expected that the fewer number of individuals who are formally
required to assent to a change of a state’s judicial selection method, the more likely a state
is to adopt merit selection. Accordingly, CHANGEEASE is expected to be positively related
to the status variable.
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IDEOLOGY
Ideology is another determinant that has been linked to a range of state policy
adoptions. Berry et al. (1998) developed an ideology score for each state that integrates
measures of citizen ideology and government ideology into a single score. This score has
been found significant to state efforts to privatize prisons (Nicholson-Crotty 2004), develop
economic enterprise zones (Turner and Cassell 2007), adopt hate crime laws (Soule and
Earl 2001), respond to paper terrorism (Chamberlain and Haider-Markel 2005), and
promulgate animal cruelty laws (Allen 2005). Other measures of ideology are linked to
state tax innovation (Berry and Berry 1992), abortion policy (Mooney and Lee 1995),
electricity regulation and deregulation (Ka and Teske 2002), and adoption of the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Wohlenberg 1980). State ideology is
ordinarily expressed in the familiar liberal/conservative continuum.

Certainly since the

New Deal, progressive-type reforms are commonly associated with political liberalism.
Accordingly, the following research hypothesis is advanced:
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between the ideological liberalism
of states and the merit selection of judges for state courts of last
resort.
The state ideology covariate used in this study is IDEOLOGY. The data used to
compute the values of the covariate are taken from the Poole (1998) congressional common
space scores (CSS).163 CSS for individual members of Congress and the U.S. Senate are
compiled by tallying all legislative roll call votes cast during their legislative tenure and a
single point estimate is generated for each member. Score values range from -1.0 for very
conservative to 1.0 for very liberally and are intended to be comparable across time. CSS

163

The Berry et al. (1998) data set covers an insufficient period for use in the instant study. In contrast, CSS
are available online at www.voteview.com and include scores from the 1st through the 111th Congress.
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are used in a range of contexts including separation of powers models (Owens 2010),
turnout in congressional midterm elections (Plane and Gershtenson 2004), and
congressional conference committee appointments (Lazarus and Monroe 2007).
IDEOLOGY is computed by adding the average of the CSS for the state congressional
delegation to the average of the CSS for its senate delegation and dividing by two. The
resulting figure represents a single ideological extremism measure of a state for a given
period. IDEOLOGY is expected to be positively related to the status variable.

LEGPRO
An institutional feature that is regularly employed in the innovation and diffusion
literature is the professionalism of state legislatures. Efforts to increase legislative
professionalism were most prevalent during the 1960s and 1970s, or roughly simultaneous
with the hey-day of merit selection. State legislative professionalism is shown to be
positively related to innovative electricity regulation (Ka and Teske 2002), establishing
state enterprise zones (Turner and Cassell 2007), anti-smoking policies (Shipan and Volden
2006) and performance-accountability standards (McClendon, Hearn, and Deaton 2006).
Legislatures that have greater technical, informational and decisional capacity are
characterized as being more professional; these attributes allow state legislatures to be
more innovative (Hays 1996; Squire 1993; Walker 1969). Similarly, more professional
legislatures are likely to attract sophisticated legislators willing to implement innovative
approaches (McClendon, Heller, and Young 2005). The relationship between merit
selection of judges and legislative professionalism is tested by Puro, Bergerson, and Puro
(1985) and found to be positive and statistically significant. Thus, to test the effect of
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legislative professionalism on whether a state employs merit selection to choose judges for
its state court of last resort, the following research hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between professionalism of state
legislatures and merit selection of judges for state courts of last
resort.
The explanatory variable that measures legislative professionalism is LEGPRO. The
value for each state is taken from Squire (2012). Linear interpolation of the values
measured in the period before and after is used to account for missing data from 1940,
1955, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000.164 The 2009 score is imputed
for 2010. LEGPRO is comprised of percentage comparisons of each state’s legislature
against the U. S. Congress–the assumed ideal legislative body–averaged for each of the
following qualities: legislator compensation including salary and benefits; legislative days
in session; and, staff per legislator165 (Squire 2012). A value of 1.0 represents a state
legislature that was, on average of these factors, equal to the U. S. Congress in these
categories. This particular legislative professionalism measure is developed by Squire
(1992), but is similar to other measures of the variable (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000;
Thompson and Moncrief 1992). LEGPRO is expected to be positively related to the
dependent variable.

GOVPOWER
The formal authority granted to the governor of a state is another institutional
feature that warrants analysis. Similar to legislative professionalism, the mid- to late-20th
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Squire (2012) computes state legislative professionalism scores for 1935, 1945, 1954, 1960, 1979, 1986,
1996, 2003 and 2009.
165
The 1935, 1945, 1954, and 1960 scores are computed using expenditures for services and operations
minus legislator compensation per legislator rather than staff per legislator (Squire 2012).
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century witnessed a general increase of gubernatorial power. It is shown to be a key
determinant of Medicaid nursing home reimbursement policies (Miller 2006), electricity
regulation (Ka and Teske 2002), privatization of corrections facilities (Nicholson-Crotty
2004), and the establishment of state enterprise zones (Turner and Cassell 2007). The
institutional power of governors varies greatly from state to state, with some governors
having a large set of tools at their disposal such as extensive appointment powers and the
line-item veto while others do not (Beyle 1996).

Where governors have sufficient

authority, they can be expected to act as “policy entrepreneurs” and take the initiative to
effectuate innovation (Kingdon 1984; Minstrom 1997; Minstrom and Vegari 1998). In the
context of states where some governors are granted the authority to appoint judges to state
courts of last resort, meaningful variation is expected. Similarly, since merit selection
provides a formal role for a governor in the selection of judges to state courts of last resort,
either through direct appointment or by selecting nominees advanced by a judicial
nominating commission, it follows that stronger governors would welcome merit selection.
To test the effect of gubernatorial power on whether a state employs merit selection to
choose judges for its state court of last resort, the following research hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between the formal power of state
governors and merit selection of judges for state courts of last
resort.
The independent variable that measures a state’s governor is GOVPOWER. The data
used to assemble the variable are gathered from The Book of the States (various years). The
computation of the covariate follows the rating scheme Schlesinger (1972) developed
which assigns a 1 - 5 value for each of the following aspects of gubernatorial authority:
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tenure in office,166 appointive powers,167 budgetary powers,168 and veto powers.169 The
ratings of the components are averaged to produce a value between 1.0 and 5.0, where the
lower figure would represent minimal gubernatorial power and the higher figure denotes
maximum formal authority for a governor. GOVPOWER is expected to be positively related
to the dependent variable.

POPULATION
Demand for change is an essential prerequisite to reform. Progressives argued that
larger populations create a need for improved and more efficient government activities,
such as merit selection of judges. The innovation and diffusion literature demonstrates that
states with larger populations witness higher levels of demand for government services,
have greater complexity and size to their infrastructure, and have a greater propensity and
willingness to innovate (McClendon, Heller, and Young 2005). Population has been shown
to be a significant predictor of the innovation of energy policies (Regens 1980), child health

166

Points for tenure in office are assigned as follows: Four-year term with no restraint on reelection (5 points);
Four-year term with one reelection permitted (4 points); Four-year term with no consecutive reelection
permitted (3 points); Two-year term with no restraint on reelection (2 points); and, Two-year term with one
reelection permitted (1 point) (Schlesinger 1992, 143).
167
Appointive powers points are computed based upon a numeric formula which measures the degree to
which the governor controls the following sixteen functions or offices: Administration, Agriculture, Attorney
General, Auditor, Budget, Comptroller, Education, Environmental Protection (Conservation), Finance,
Health, Highways, Insurance, Labor, Secretary of State, Treasurer and Welfare. The states are then ranked
according to total appointive authority of the governor and the top quintile of states is given 5 points, the
second quintile of states is awarded 4 points, the third quintile of states is assigned 3 points, the fourth quintile
of states is credited with 2 points, and the bottom quintile is allowed 1 point (Schlesinger 1972, 145).
168
The governor’s budget powers are assigned points as follows: Full responsibility (5 points); Shares with
a civil service appointee or with a person appointed by someone else (4 points); Shares authority with the
state legislature (3 points); Shares authority with another popularly elected official (2 points); and, Shares
authority with several others with independent sources of strength (1 point) (Schlesinger 1972, 147).
169
Points for a governor’s veto power are assigned as follows: Line-item veto plus at least a 3/5 of elected
members of legislature required to override (5 points); Line-item veto plus majority of elected members of
legislature required to override (4 points); Line-item veto plus majority or more of legislature present to
override (3 points); No line-item veto, but super majority required to override (2 points); and, No line-item
veto and simple majority required to override veto, or no veto authority at all (1 point) (Schlesinger 1972,
147).
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insurance programs (Volden 2006), state lotteries (Alm, McKee, and Skidmore 1993), and
in post-secondary education (McClendon, Heller, and Young 2005). A similar relationship
is anticipated with respect to a state’s adoption of merit selection. Accordingly, the
following research hypothesis is advanced:
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive relationship between the population size of states
and the choice of merit selection of judges for state courts of last
resort.
POPULATION is operationalized as the natural log of a state’s population in units of
1,000. The natural log transformation is used to normalize the distribution of the
standards errors for this variable, as a few unusually large cases (e.g., California, Texas
and New York) tend to positively skew results. Data for this explanatory variable are
obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years). POPULATION is
expected to be positively related to the status variable.

WEALTH
Wealthier states benefit from having greater resources available to support new
policies and programs (Berry and Berry 1990). It has also been demonstrated that higher
levels of state wealth are consistent with a propensity to adopt innovative policies that do
not require significant financial commitments (Walker 1969), such as merit selection of
judges. The wealth of a state has been shown to be positively related to the adoption of
state-level environmental initiatives (Sapat 2004), enterprise zone development (Turner
and Cassell 2007), state lotteries (Pierce and Miller 1999), Medicare nursing facility
reimbursement programs (Miller 2006), and abortion regulation (Mooney and Lee 1995).
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Similarly, it is anticipated that wealthier states are more likely to adopt merit selection.
Accordingly, the following research hypothesis is advanced:
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relationship between the wealth of states and the
choice of merit selection of judges for state courts of last resort.
WEALTH is operationalized as the personal income per capita of a state in thousands
of real U.S. dollars. Data for the covariate are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the
United States (various years) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics historical price index for
all consumers (1982-1984 = 100). Linear interpolation of the values measured in the period
before and after was used to account for missing data from 1935 and 1945. WEALTH is
expected to be positively related to the status variable.

URBAN
Level of urbanization is another variable that impacts demand for particular
policies.170 Progressives observed a need for better selection methods for choosing judges
in highly urban areas, particularly those firmly under the control of political influences.
Those living in closer quarters will seek and prioritize a different set of policies than their
more rural neighbors. For example, more densely populated jurisdictions support the
adoption of hate crime laws (Soule and Earle 2001), while less urbanized states spend more
money on the construction of highways (Hwang and Gray 1991). Levels of urbanization
is shown to be an important determinant of state income tax adoption (Mooney 2001),
energy policy (Freeman 1985), and environmental waste programs (Daley and Garand
2005). As population density increases, interpersonal familiarity decreases and the

170

Urbanization as a variable has been utilized for a range of purposes in the innovation and diffusion
literature. For example, in one study urbanization is used as a proxy for the litigiousness of a jurisdiction
(Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty and Peterson 2004).
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dynamics of conflict change requiring improved methods of conflict resolution. Notably,
Puro, Bergerson, and Puro (1985) find a positive and statistically significant relationship
between urbanization and merit selection of judges for state courts of last resort.
Accordingly, the following research hypothesis is advanced:
Hypothesis 8: There is a positive relationship between the urbanization of states
and merit selection of judges for state courts of last resort.
URBAN is operationalized as the percentage of a state’s population residing within
urban areas as classified by the U.S. Census Bureau. Although the precise definition
changed in 1950 and 1990, since 1910 an urban area is any territory with 2,500 or more
people in an incorporated community or specially delineated fringes with more than 500
people per square mile (Bureau of the Census, 2010). Data for the variable are obtained
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years). Linear interpolation of
the values measured in the period before and after was used to account for missing data
from 1935, 1945, 1955, and 1965. URBAN is expected to be positively related to the
dependent variable.

EDUCATION
Educational attainment is a key characteristic associated with higher stocks of
human and social capital, which tends to evidence greater levels and more active support
for innovation (Lubell, et al. 2002). Higher levels of educational attainment within a state
is positively related to the adoption of innovative postsecondary education programs
(McClendon, Heller, and Young 2005), energy policies (Freeman 1995), and hazardous
waste schemes (Daley and Garland 2005). Given these robust findings, the literature
suggests a strong rationale for asserting the role of educational attainment in determining
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whether states will adopt merit selection to choose judges for their state courts of last resort
(Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993; McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton 2006; Lubell et al. 2002).
Accordingly, the following research hypothesis is advanced:
Hypothesis 9: There is a positive relationship between a state’s level of
educational attainment and merit selection of judges for state courts
of last resort.
EDUCATION is the percentage of highly-educated adults within a state over the age
of 25. Data for the variable are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States
(various years). Prior to 1990, the Census Bureau delineated the highest level of
educational attainment as a person having four or more years of college. Only persons
with a bachelor’s degree or higher have since been included in the top educational echelon.
Linear interpolation of the values measured in the period before and after was used to
account for missing data from 1935, 1945, 1955, 1965, 1975, and 1985. EDUCATION is
expected to be positively related to the dependent variable.

LAWSTRENGTH
The strength of key interest groups is another institutional phenomenon that is often
considered in the innovation and diffusion literature. Interest group strength has been
correlated to abortion policy reform (Mooney and Lee 1995), the adoption of animal
cruelty laws (Allen 2005) and hate crime legislation (Soule and Earle 2001), as well as
diffusion of a model health care act (Balla 2001). Organizations with large memberships
have a greater ability to mobilize lobbying efforts, utilize resources, and influence policy
decisions by appearing formidable to government officials (Allen 2005). Similarly,
interested organizations can exert influence through developing preferred policies,
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educating officials about those policies, and highlighting the success of such policies when
applied in other jurisdictions (Balla 2001). To the extent that the ABA has actively
endorsed merit selection since 1937 and the efforts of state and local bar associations have
followed suit, the strength of lawyers as an interest group is another potentially key
explanatory variable. Merit selection allows for an increased role for the bar in judicial
selection. Research also suggests that lawyers benefit from merit selection as the increased
judicial independence the method provides tends to increase litigation (Hanssen 2002).
Accordingly, the following research hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 10: There is a positive relationship between the influence of lawyers
within states and merit selection of judges for state courts of last
resort.
The independent variable that will measure the influence of lawyers within a
particular state is LAWSTRENGTH. Values for the computation of the covariate are taken
from The Lawyers Statistical Report (various editions). Linear interpolation of the values
measured in the period before and after was used to account for missing data points.
LAWSTRENGTH is measured as the number of lawyers per 1,000 residents of a state.
Relative size, of course, is an inexact proxy to measure the strength of an interest group,
but one that is well-represented in the literature (Mooney and Lee 1995; Soule and Earl
2001; Allen, Pettus and Haider-Markel 2004). However, size does estimate resource
capacity and the number of potential voters. This is particularly true where the members
of the group being measured are elites that tend to be politically active, such as attorneys.
LAWSTRENGTH is expected to be positively related to the status variable.
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PARTYCOMP
A commonly-employed political determinant of state policy adoption is the level
of partisan political competition within a state. Levels of intrastate party competition has
increased dramatically in the sixty years (Rosenthal 1995). Party competition within a state
is shown to be positively related to abortion regulation reform (Mooney and Lee 2000), the
adoption of state lotteries (Pierce and Miller 1996), and codification of animal cruelty laws
(Allen 2005). States that have competitive partisan political systems produce better policy
than noncompetitive states (Key 1949). This phenomenon is due to two primary features.
First, fearing electoral defeat, elected officials in competitive states will be more responsive
to constituency needs in an effort to expand support (Berry and Berry 1990; Mintrom 1997;
Walker 1969). Second, higher voter turnout rates in competitive states mean that voters
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds will constitute a larger percentage of the voting
electorate. Therefore, competitively elected officials are more likely to adopt progressive
policies (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993). To gauge the effect of party competition on
whether a state employs merit selection to choose judges, the following research hypothesis
is tested:
Hypothesis 11: There is a positive relationship between levels of party competition
within states and merit selection of judges for state courts of last
resort.
Intrastate political party competition is measured by the covariate PARTYCOMP. A
variation of the familiar Ranney (1976) index, data for computing PARTYCOMP was
compiled from The Book of the States (various years). It is an index variable of five
separate components. The first two values are the percentage of Democrats holding seats
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in the state house and state senate.171 The third factor is the percentage of votes received
by the Democratic candidate in the last gubernatorial election. A fourth value is assigned
for the party affiliation of a state’s governor.172 The final item is the percentage of the state
institutions (state house, state senate, governorship) held by Democrats.

The five

components of PARTYCOMP are then averaged and “folded” to create a common measure
of intrastate competition between 0.5 and 1.0 regardless of which party controls, where 0.5
demonstrates absolute one-party control of state offices and 1.0 denotes perfect
competition (King 2000). PARTYCOMP is expected to be positively related to the status
variable.

AJSCONF
Among other efforts to implement merit selection in state courts, the American
Judicature Society (“AJS”) sponsored a series of citizens conferences beginning in 1958.
The conferences educated participants on the benefits of merit selection and encouraged
reform (Winters 1966a, 1967). Dubois (1990) suggests that this effort was instrumental in
producing reform in some jurisdictions. As an independent and not-for-profit group, AJS
was and continues to be well-situated to advocate change in the process of selecting state
court judges. The organization frequently combines its reform effort with other civic
groups, such as The League of Women Voters, as well as state and local bar associations.

171

Minnesota and Nebraska have coding issues that make assigning values to PARTYCOMP unreliable. Today,
the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party considers itself an affiliate of the Democratic Party, but
historically that relationship did not always hold true. Nebraska has the only unicameral legislature in the
nation and elections to that body are nonpartisan. Since accurate values for PARTYCOMP cannot be computed
for Minnesota or Nebraska, cases for those states are not included in any model that includes the covariate.
172
A value of 1 is assigned if the governor is a Democrat, a value of 0.5 if the governor is an independent,
and a value of 0 if the governor is a Republican.
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In addition, AJS published a journal173 that was a potent and readily available propaganda
machine with a compelling history of pro-merit selection efforts (Gleason 2013).
Accordingly, the following research hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 12: There is a positive relationship between the number of citizens
conference held in states and merit selection of judges for state
courts of last resort.
AJSCONF will measure the cumulative number of citizens conference advocating
merit selection to choose judges held in a state. The information used to compile these
variables is obtained from Judicature174 (various volumes) and from on-site research
conducted in the archives of the American Judicature Society in Des Moines, Iowa.

REGIONMERIT and CONTIGMERIT
Geographic effect, most notably regional and contiguous states effects, is another
phenomena considered in the adoption and diffusion of policy. Mooney (2001) suggests
that geographic effects are customarily considered an artifact of states either learning from
one another or from competing against one another. Information gained from assessing
the choices of neighboring states improves domestic policy decisions and reduces political
risk (Mooney 2001; Boehmke and Witmer 2004). Imitating policies already in place within
other states also will reduce economic loss, such as instances of state lottery adoption where
states concerned with their citizens crossing into other states to purchase tickets can
minimize the effect by establishing a lottery within their own state (Berry and Berry 1990;

173

The Journal of the American Judicature Society began publication in 1917 and its name was changed to
Judicature in 1966. Although, AJS ceased operations September 30, 2014 due to lack of membership and
related issues, the journal continues to be published by my alma mater, Duke University School of Law.
This affiliation will surely serve to further enhance the reputation of the Judicature.
174
See note 15, infra. The organization was headquartered at Drake University from 2003 to 2013, when it
relocated to Vanderbilt Law School.
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Pierce and Miller 1999). A third explanation of geographic effects is that jurisdictions that
have similar historical, cultural, physical, or structural features tend to adopt innovative
policies within a very short time span (Gray 1973a; Eyestone 1973; Walker 1969). In this
context, geographic effects are essentially a proxy for similarities between jurisdictions
(Grattet, Jenness, and Curry 1998).
Regional effects are shown to have a strong effect on the adoption of hazard waste
programs (Daley and Garland 2005), efforts to combat the filing of liens by disgruntled
citizens groups (Chamberlain and Haider-Markel 2005), and the enactment of hate crime
laws (Soule and Earl 2001). Contiguous states effects are well-established with respect to
lotteries (Pierce and Miller 1999; Berry and Berry 1990; Alm, McKee, and Skidmore
1993), tax incentive programs (Berry and Berry 1992), and Medicade reimbursement
programs (Miller 2006). Although geographic effects make intuitive sense in many
contexts and the concept is well represented in the innovation and diffusion literature, it
remains problematic to differentiate between purely “regional” and purely “contiguous”
effects with respect to some policies (Mooney 2001). Merit selection of judges for state
courts of last resort is one such policy.
The standard conceptualization of regional effects variables assumes that a region
border state is affected more by a non-adjacent regional neighbor than an adjacent state
that happens to be in a different region. Similarly, standard contiguous effects variables
assume a close neighbor with no common border will have no impact on a state’s learning,
the identical impact presumed for a state literally on the other side of the country. The
extant literature fails to meaningfully differentiate between these effects. Theoretically,
there is no a priori reason to expect one particular type of geographic effect over another
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with respect to merit selection. However, to the extent that states learn from one another
and routinely emulate policies successful in nearby jurisdictions, it is reasonable to expect
the presence of merit selection in neighboring states to have a positive effect on adoption
by nearby states. Accordingly, the following research hypotheses are tested:
Hypothesis 13: There is a positive relationship between the percentage of regional
states having previously adopted merit selection and merit selection
of judges for state courts of last resort.
Hypothesis 14: There is a positive relationship between the percentage of
contiguous states having previously adopted merit selection and
merit selection of judges for state courts of last resort.
The geography-based hypotheses will be tested through analysis of the REGION and
CONTIG independent variables. REGION measures the percentage of states within the U. S.
Bureau of the Census region175 in which a state is located that utilize merit selection to
choose judges for their courts of last resort. Similarly, CONTIG is the percentage of states
contiguous to a particular state which employ merit selection to choose judges for their
courts of last resort. The value of both geographic variables is expected to be positively
related to the status variable.
A correlation matrix including all fourteen independent variables is shown in Table
4.2. EDUCATION and WEALTH (.9435) show high levels of correlation in the familiar and
intuitively obvious relationship between educational attainment and earnings.
LAWSTRENGTH and EDUCATION (.8833), LAWSTRENGTH and WEALTH (.8624), REGION

175

The four Census Bureau regions are the Midwest, Northeast, South and West. The Midwest region is
comprised of the following thirteen states: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin. The Northeast region is comprised of the
following nine states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont. The South region is comprised of the following sixteen states:
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The West region is
comprised of the following twelve states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Washington (U. S. Bureau of the Census 1998).
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and EDUCATION (.8592), REGION and WEALTH (.8404), and LAWSTRENGTH and REGION
(.7828) also demonstrate high levels of correlation, although the connection of these
variables is less obvious. When the covariates demonstrating collinearity are alternatively
omitted, the overall goodness-of-fit and the values of the remaining coefficients produced
remain essentially unchanged. The omission of variables generally has no meaningful
impact on the significance of any explanatory variables.176 Since the theoretical value of
the explanatory variables outweighs any loss of robustness, all covariates are included in
the tested and reported models.
[Insert Table 4.2 about here]

Methods, Models, and Results
Allison (2014) observes that, “In the judgment of many, Cox regression is
unequivocally the best all-around method for estimating regression models for event
history data.” (Allison 2014, 35). The method is popular because it does not require
choosing a particular probability distribution in advance.

It is robust and easily

incorporates time-varying explanatory variables. Information contained in censored cases
is included in the likelihood estimator, instead of being lost as results as occurs in other
methods. Although the baseline hazard remains unspecified, Cox models estimate
coefficients for multiple covariates and produce non-negative hazard rates (Mills 2011).
Cox regression is remarkably flexible and much better equipped to deal with common

176

Likelihood ratio tests for nested models were conducted to compare the goodness-of-fit for alternative
models that included some or all of the correlated variables. Results are presented in Appendices A through
E.
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issues present in event history analysis than other statistical techniques (Allison 2014; BoxSteffensmeier and Jones 2004; Mills 2011).
The basic Cox proportional-hazards regression equation is:
hi(t) = h0(t) exp (β´X)

(4.1)

where hi(t) is the hazard for case i at time t, h0(t) is the unspecified baseline hazard, and
β´X are the model covariates and regression parameters (Box-Steffensmeier and Sokhey
2010). The distinguishing statistical feature of Cox regression is the partial likelihood
function. Initially, the likelihood function is divided into two parts. One factor contains
information about the impact of time on the coefficients and is discarded. The second
factor, which contains only information about the coefficients, is treated as a normal
likelihood function and is maximized using standard techniques. This partial likelihood
function depends on the order of events rather than the exact timing of events. There are
no intercept values in Cox regression, as the intercept is part of the unspecified function
that disappears from the partial likelihood (Allison 2014).
Given the exploratory nature of this effort to assess the effects of forces on the
likelihood of states adopting merit selection for choosing judges to their courts of last
resort, I begin with preliminary bivariate tests of each research hypothesis. Using the basic
Cox formula, I estimate the following equations:

β´X = β1LASTCHANGEi(t)

(4.3.1)

β´X = β1CHANGEEASEi(t)

(4.3.2)

β´X = β1IDEOLOGYi(t)

(4.3.3)

β´X = β1LEGPROi(t)

(4.3.4)
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β´X = β1GOVPOWERi(t)

(4.3.5)

β´X = β1POPULATIONi(t)

(4.3.6)

β´X = β1WEALTHi(t)

(4.3.7)

β´X = β1URBANi(t)

(4.3.8)

β´X = β1EDUCATIONi(t)

(4.3.9)

β´X = β1LAWSTRENGTHi(t)

(4.3.10)

β´X = β1PARTYCOMPi(t)

(4.3.11)

β´X = β12AJSCONFi(t)

(4.3.12)

β´X = β1REGIONi(t)

(4.3.13)

β´X = β1CONTIGi(t)

(4.3.14)

The results of each are reported in Table 4.3 as shown.
[Insert Table 4.3 about here]
Each column presents the Cox regression coefficient for an equation with
unstandardized errors shown beneath in parentheses. Positive coefficients identify an
increased likelihood of a state adopting merit selection. These results present strong
preliminary support for seven of the fourteen hypotheses. LASTCHANGE, CHANGEEASE,
WEALTH, EDUCATION, LAWSTRENGTH, REGION, and CONTIG yield coefficients consistent
with the hypothesized direction and are statistically significant. LEGPRO, GOVPOWER,
PARTYCOMP and AJSCONF also yield coefficients in the expected direction, but fail to
attain levels of significance sufficient to reject the null hypothesis. LASTCHANGE,
EDUCATION, LAWSTRENGTH, REGION, and CONTIG each individually explain sufficient
variance in MERIT that those models reach conventional levels of significance (where p <
0.05).
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The following six equations are designed to test each of the theoretical propositions
set out in Chapter 2. They are as follows:
β´X = β1LASTCHANGEi(t) + β2CHANGEEASEi(t)

(4.4.1)

β´X = β1IDEOLOGYi(t) + β2LEGPROi(t) + β3GOVPOWERi(t)

(4.4.2)

β´X = β1POPULATIONi(t) + β2WEALTHi(t) + β3URBANi(t) +
β4EDUCATIONi(t) + β1LAWSTRENGTHi(t)

(4.4.3)

β´X = β1LEGPROi(t) + β2GOVPOWERi(t) + β3PARTYCOMPi(t)

(4.4.4)

β´X = β1LAWSTRENGTHi(t) + β2AJSCONFi(t)

(4.4.5)

β´X = β1REGIONi(t)

(4.4.6)

β´X = β1CONTIGi(t)

(4.4.7)

The results of each are reported in Table 4.4 as shown.
[Insert Table 4.4 about here]
Model 4.4.1 is designed to test whether the adoption of merit selection is path
dependent. It includes the covariates LASTCHANGE and CHASEEASE, and considers
durational and complexity of change effects. Overall, the model produces impressive
goodness-of-fit, as it is significant at the p < .001 level. It offers strong evidence that state
judicial selection methods are path dependent. LASTCHANGE demonstrates a high degree
of significance (p < .001 level) within the model and yields a coefficient consistent with
research expectations. The impact of CHANGEEASE is also in the direction predicted, but is
not statistically significant.
Model 4.4.2 is constructed to test whether adoption of merit selection by a state is
an instance of bricolage, a meaningful but less than revolutionary institutional change. The
covariates in the model are IDEOLOGY, LEGPRO, and GOVPOWER. It demonstrates very
poor goodness-of-fit with an overall significance of p = 0.8971 and fails to offer
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sustentation of the bricolage proposition. None of the explanatory variables attain standard
levels of significance. LEGPRO and GOVPOWER produce coefficients in the appropriate
direction while the effect of IDEOLOGY is inconsistent with research expectations. The
performance of this model suggests that decisions to adopt merit selection are independent
of political liberalism and other institutional adjustments.
Another model that manifests notable goodness-of-fit is Model 4.4.3, which is
designed to gauge demand for merit selection. POPULATION, WEALTH, URBAN,
EDUCATION, and LAWSTRENGTH are the explanatory variables included in the model. It
tests whether larger, wealthier, more densely populated and educated jurisdictions with a
strong presence of lawyers are more likely to adopt merit selection for choosing their state
supreme court judges. The model is significant at the p < 0.01 level. Although it does not
reach a conventional level of significance, LAWSTRENGTH (p < 0.086) is the strongest
indicator of merit selection and its coefficient is in a direction consistent with theoretical
expectations. None of the other covariates adds much weight to the model although
WEALTH and EDUCATION yields coefficients in the appropriate direction. These results
offer notable support for the proposition that demand is a necessary prerequisite to the
adoption of merit selection.
The weakest model in this set is Model 4.4.4, which fails to attain overall statistical
significance (p = 0.9745). It is calculated to reveal support for merit selection by selfinterested decision makers. The LEGPRO, GOVPOWER, and PARTYCOMP covariates align
with leading institutions that stand to win from the adoption of merit selection. None of the
covariates are significant. GOVPOWER and PARTYCOMP have positive, albeit modest,
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effects on the likelihood of merit selection while LEGPRO is inconsistent with research
expectations. The model fails to yield support for the self-interest proposition.
Model 4.4.5 is devised to explore the role of actors as communicators in the
adoption of merit selection. LAWSTRENGTH and AJSCONF describe the strength of lawyers
as an interest group and the cumulative number of AJS citizens conferences held in a state,
respectively. The model demonstrates only modest goodness-of-fit (p = 0.0786). Once
again, LAWSTRENGTH (p < 0.05) is an indicator of merit selection and yields a coefficient
consistent with theoretical expectations. The coefficient for AJSCONF is in the appropriate
direction, but the covariate provides little explanatory strength to the overall model. These
results offer some support for the proposition that adoption of merit selection is more likely
where actors are able to communicate the need for such reform.
Models 4.4.6 and 4.4.7 are identical to Models 4.3.13 and 4.3.14, respectively.
They are the bivariate geographical models for REGION and CONTIG and are included in
Table 4.4 for ease in illustrating the theoretical propositions discussion in Chapter 5. Each
of these model yields statistically significant coefficients consistent with research
expectations and exhibits strong goodness-of-fit (p < .05 and p < .01, respectively). These
results lend support to the proposition that adopting jurisdictions look to the success of
their neighbors with merit selection when adopting the method for their own use.
A state’s decision to adopt merit selection is likely the result of a complex decision
process that cannot be adequately measured by a simple, bivariate specification.
Accordingly, I estimate four general models as follows:
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β´X = β1LASTCHANGEi(t) + β2CHANGEEASEi(t) + β3IDEOLOGYi(t) +
β4LEGPROi(t) +β5GOVPOWERi(t) + β6POPULATIONi(t) + β7WEALTHi(t) +
β8URBANi(t) +β9EDUCATIONi(t) + β10LAWSTRENGTHi(t) +
β11iPARTYCOMP (t) +β12AJSCONFi(t) + β13REGIONi(t)

(4.5.1)

β´X = β1LASTCHANGEi(t) + β2CHANGEEASEi(t) + β3IDEOLOGYi(t) +
β4LEGPROi(t) +β5GOVPOWERi(t) + β6POPULATIONi(t) + β7WEALTHi(t) +
β8URBANi(t) +β9EDUCATIONi(t) + β10LAWSTRENGTHi(t) +
β11iPARTYCOMP (t) +β12AJSCONFi(t) + β13CONTIGi(t)

(4.5.2)

β´X = β1LASTCHANGEi(t) + β2CHANGEEASEi(t) + β3WEALTHi(t) +
β4EDUCATIONi(t) + β5LAWSTRENGTHi(t) + β6REGIONi(t)

(4.5.3)

β´X = β1LASTCHANGEi(t) + β2CHANGEEASEi(t) + β3WEALTHi(t) +
β4EDUCATIONi(t) + β5LAWSTRENGTHi(t) + β6CONTIGi(t)

(4.5.4)

Models 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 are identical and contain all of the other explanatory variables,
except for the geographic variables, which are run in separate models to test the alternative
geographical operationalizations. REGION is included in the first general model and the
second includes CONTIG. Similarly, Models 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 are identical except for the
geographic variables. The third model includes REGION and the fourth includes CONTIG.
The other covariates in these models include the explanatory variables that are statistically
significant in the binary models. The results of all four general models are reported in
Table 4.5 as shown.
[Insert Table 4.5 about here]
In all four models, LASTCHANGE yields coefficients in the direction consistent with
research expectations and is the only covariate that obtains statistical significance.
CHANGEEASE, LEGPRO, WEALTH, EDUCATION, LAWSTRENGTH, AJSCONF, and REGION
have minimal impact on the models, but yield positive coefficients consistent with the
research hypotheses. IDEOLOGY, GOVPOW, POPULATION, URBAN, and PARTYCOMP also
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demonstrate minimal effect and yield coefficients inconsistent with research expectations.
An interesting result of comparing the two sets of models is that, although CONTIG
demonstrates only minimal impact, it has a differing directional effect between models. It
decreases the likelihood of adoption and is inconsistent with research expectations in the
full model, but yields coefficients consistent with expectations when tested in the limited
models. The overall goodness-of-fit of all four models is high and each is statistically
significant at the p < .001 level.

Discussion
The contribution of this event history analysis is to quantitatively differentiate
between those states that have adopted merit selection to choose judges for their courts of
last resort and those that have not. I have conceptualized and operationalized fourteen
explanatory variables and each is the subject of a separate research hypothesis. Each
hypothesis is rigorously tested in bivariate, partial, and general models. The partial models
are specifically designed to explore the theoretical propositions advanced in Chapter 2,
while the general models test the strength of each covariate against each other and in the
broader context. The statistical relationships between individual covariates and the status
variable demonstrate mixed results. The partial and general models exhibit strong
goodness-of-fit, confirm a discernable distinction between merit and non-merit selection
states, and lend support to many of the research hypotheses developed in this study.
LASTCHANGE is by far the most powerful predictive variable. It uniformly
demonstrates a high degree of significance (p < .001 level) and yields negative coefficients
consistent with research expectations in every model in which it is included. The null
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hypothesis regarding LASTCHANGE is easily rejected. LASTCHANGE is so dominate that no
other covariate attains a standard level of statistical significance in any equation in which
it is included. This outcome strongly suggests that the choice of state judicial selection
method, like other institutional arrangements, is path dependent and becomes increasingly
difficult to alter over time.
LAWSTRENGTH is another independent variables for which the corresponding null
hypothesis may be rejected. It demonstrates conventional statistical significance in the
bivariate and actors-as-communicators (Model 4.5.5) models, and is the key covariate in
the demand (Model 4.4.3) model. It also yields coefficients consistent with research
expectations. Its strength as a predictive covariate is eliminated, however, in the general
models. This is not to say that LAWSTRENGTH is not associated with the adoption of merit
selection; it merely loses explanatory power, in any model in which includes LASTCHANGE.
The explanatory variables CHANGEEASE, WEALTH, EDUCATION, REGION, and
CONTIG all demonstrate statistical significance and yield coefficients consistent with
research expectations in bivariate models, allowing rejection of the null hypotheses for
these covariates. The bivariate models also produce sufficient goodness-of-fit to conclude
that the effect of the independent variables is not random. They lose their explanatory
power, however, in any model where LASTCHANGE is included.
The remaining covariates fail to produce any statistical results that suggest their
impact on state adoption of merit selection is anything other than random. Accordingly,
the null hypotheses for IDEOLOGY, LEGPRO, GOVPOWER, POPULATION, URBAN,
PARTYCOMP, and AJSCONF cannot be rejected.
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Similar to the individual covariates, the partial models produce a mix of results.
Models 4.4.1 and 4.4.3 exhibit strong goodness-of-fit (p < .001 and p < .01, respectively)
and yield statistically significant coefficients consistent with expectations. In contrast,
models 4.4.2, 4.4.4, and 4.4.5 do not produce particularly strong outcomes. They do
demonstrate that LAWSTRENGTH is an important covariate in the absence of LASTCHANGE.
This suggests that lawyers play an important role in the adoption of merit selection in
circumstances where the opportunity for reform is otherwise available.
The overall strength of the general models is impressive. As detailed in Table 4.5,
the goodness-of-fit for each model is statistically significant at the p < .001 level.
LASTCHANGE is the only covariate that obtains statistical significance in each model and
consistently yields coefficients in the direction consistent with research expectations. The
impact of the other explanatory variables is negligible, even where a parsimonious model
is constructed. These results highlight the stability of existing arrangements for picking
state judges to the exclusion of other factors.

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to produce a statistical assessment that, when
combined with the theoretical assumptions of institutionalism, the insights of innovation
and diffusion research, and the historical record of state judicial selection, will provide a
robust analysis of the decision of states to implement merit selection to choose judges to
their courts of last resort. The results produced contribute important insights that are not
otherwise readily apparent or available, especially the overwhelmingly negative
relationship between the length of time the established selection regime has been in place
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and actual reform. The findings also suggest that absent the time variable, the strength of
lawyers within a state meaningfully increases the likelihood of the adoption of merit
selection.
This information alone, however, is insufficient to adequately address the question
in its entirety. In order to solve the puzzle of why states adopt merit selection, it is necessary
to fit all of the pieces together into a single, comprehensive picture. The final chapter
combines the theoretical, historical, and quantitative assessments of state judicial selection
into a single discussion. The six theoretical propositions introduced in Chapter 2 are
considered in light of the historical record of state judicial selection discussed in Chapter
3 and the quantitative analysis provided in Chapter 4. It is this task that is the objective of
Chapter 5.
Following a short, general discussion of the research and results, the major finding
is that state judicial selection institutions are highly path dependent and whether a state will
adopt merit selection to choose justices for its state supreme court justices is increasingly
unlikely the longer an alternative method has been in place. A secondary finding is that
where an opportunity for reform is available, lawyers play a critical role in the adoption of
merit selection. These findings comport well with the broader understanding of institutions
which holds that institutions are path dependent and institutional change is the result of the
efforts of interested actors. The chapter concludes with a short discussion of future
research possibilities.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics

LASTCHANGE
CHANGEEASE
IDEOLOGY
LEGPRO
GOVPOWER
POPULATION
WEALTH
URBAN
EDUCATION
LAWSTRENGTH
PARTYCOMP
AJSCONF
REGION
CONTIG

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

620
620
620
620
620
620
620
620
620
620
597
620
620
620

3.857
2.524
0.385
0.157
3.618
7.85
9507.9
0.565
0.117
1.729
0.764
0.845
0.18
0.152

1.184
0.804
0.2
0.107
0.719
1.076
4603.2
0.23
0.076
0.862
0.144
1.186
0.197
0.214

0
2
-0.555
0.026
1.667
4.615
1270.1
0
0.201
0.563
0.5
0
0
0

5.79
5
0.569
0.626
5
10.526
23476
1
0.394
5.348
0.999
5
0.667
1

LASTCHANGE

1

CHANGEEASE

-0.545

1

IDEOLOGY

0.090

0.056

1

LEGPRO

-0.054

0.005

-0.188

1

GOVPOWER

0.098

0.077

-0.033

0.353

1

POPULATION

0.008

0.053

0.063

0.588

0.539

1

WEALTH

0.097

0.069

-0.053

0.315

0.944

0.449

1

URBAN

0.002

0.039

-0.063

0.077

-0.074

0.082

-0.109

1

EDUCATION

0.049

-0.019

0.072

0.060

0.381

0.290

0.311

-0.027

1

LAWSTRENGTH

0.046

0.042

0.036

0.595

0.411

0.555

0.351

0.183

0.280

1

PARTYCOMP

0.033

-0.210

0.023

0.215

0.200

0.280

0.165

0.180

0.221

0.265

1

AJSCONF

0.079

0.039

-0.070

0.430

0.862

0.542

0.883

-0.015

0.338

0.467

0.261

1

REGION

0.110

-0.066

-0.136

0.218

0.623

0.252

0.620

-0.094

0.190

0.210

0.169

0.584

1

CONTIG

0.117

0.011

-0.100

0.268

0.840

0.317

0.859

-0.074

0.324

0.379

0.167

0.783

0.666

CONTIG

REGION

AJSCONF

PARTYCOMP

LAWSTRENGTH

EDUCATION

URBAN

WEALTH

POPULATION

GOVPOWER

LEGPRO

IDEOLOGY

CHANGEEASE

VARIABLES

LASTCHANGE

Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix

1
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Table 4.3: Individual Covariates Parameter Estimates with Standard Errors
VARIABLES
LASTCHANGE

4.3.1

4.3.2

4.3.3

4.3.4

4.3.5

4.3.6

4.3.7

4.3.8

4.3.9

4.3.10

4.3.11

4.3.12

4.3.13

4.3.14+

-1.650***
(0.282)

CHANGEEASE

0.408*
(0.192)

IDEOLOGY

-0.779
(1.085)

LEGPRO

0.162
(1.925)

GOVPOWER

0.032
(0.293)

POPULATION

-0.386
(0.203)

WEALTH

0.000*
(0.000)

URBAN

-0.293
(0.838)

EDUCATION

26.639**
(8.611)

LAWSTRENGTH

0.864*
(0.364)

PARTYCOMP

0.665
(1.528)

AJSCONF

0.154
(0.206)

REGION

4.273*
(1.821)

CONTIG

2.678**
(1.021)

Observations
ll
chi2
prob > chi2
N_fail

620

620

620

620

620

620

620

620

620

620

597

620

620

620

-38.17

-85.88

-87.54

-87.79

-87.79

-85.93

-85.21

-87.74

-82.44

-85.33

-83.15

-87.52

-85.05

-84.45

99.25

3.836

0.507

0.0070

0.0123

3.725

5.167

0.121

10.71

4.930

0.190

0.557

5.496

6.698

0.0000***

0.0502

0.4763

0.993

0.9117

0.0536

0.0230*

0.7285

0.0011**

0.0264*

0.6632

0.4556

0.0191*

0.0097**

24

24

24

24

24

24

24

24

24

24

23

24

24

24

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.5
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Table 4.4: Proposition Models

Model 4.4.1
(Path Dependence)

LASTCHANGE

-1.651***
(0.288)

CHANGEEASE

0.169
(0.233)

Model 4.4.2
(Bricolage)

IDEOLOGY

-0.862
(1.121)

LEGPRO

0.375
(2.065)

GOVPOWER

0.056
(0.309)

Model 4.4.3
(Demand)

POPULATION

-0.417
(0.286)

WEALTH

0.000
(0.000)

URBAN

-1.047
(1.202)

EDUCATION

20.824
(12.700)

LAWSTRENGTH

1.080
(0.629)

PARTYCOMP

AJSCONF

REGION

CONTIG
Number of Observations
Log likelihood
Chi2
Prob > chi2

620
-37.92
99.75
0.0000***

620
-87.50
0.600
0.8971

Note: Cox regression, Breslow method for ties. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, one-tailed tests.

620
-78.63
18.34
0.0025**
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Table 4.4: Proposition Models (continued)

Model 4.4.4
(Decision Makers)

Model 4.4.5
(Advocates)

Model 4.4.6
(Geography/Region)

Model 4.4.7
(Geography/Contiguous)

LASTCHANGE

CHANGEEASE

IDEOLOGY

LEGPRO

-0.085
(2.037)

GOVPOWER

0.055
(0.322)

POPULATION

WEALTH

URBAN

EDUCATION

LAWSTRENGTH

PARTYCOMP

0.842*
(0.370)
0.608
(1.578)

AJSCONF

0.081
(0.205)

REGION

4.273**
(1.821)

CONTIG

2.678***
(1.021)

# of Observations
Log likelihood
Chi2
Prob > chi2

597
-83.13
0.219
0.9745

620
-85.25
5.086
0.0786

620
-85.05
5.496
0.0191*

Note: Cox regression, Breslow method for ties. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, one-tailed tests.

620
-84.45
6.698
0.0097**
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Table 4.5: General Models

Model 4.5.1
(Region)

Model 4.5.2
(Contiguous)

Model 4.5.3
(Region)

Model 4.5.4
(Contiguous)

LASTCHANGE

-1.661***
(0.381)

-1.704***
(0.380)

-1.626***
(0.324)

-1.624***
(0.305)

CHANGEEASE

0.234
(0.367)

0.192
(0.368)

-0.050
(0.275)

-0.032
(0.267)

IDEOLOGY

-1.936
(1.799)

-1.915
(1.794)

LEGPRO

4.889
(5.444)

4.534
(5.381)

GOVPOWER

-0.628
(0.531)

-0.634
(0.527)

POPLOG

-0.480
(0.777)

-0.535
(0.812)

WEALTH

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

URBAN

-1.875
(2.275)

-1.806
(2.220)

EDUCATION

8.752
(23.770)

7.053
(24.115)

21.698
(14.054)

21.107
(14.033)

LAWSTRENGTH

0.836
(0.957)

1.049
(1.365)

0.112
(0.551)

-0.086
(0.665)

PARTYCOMP

-0.109
(3.537)

-0.332
(3.450)

AJSCONF

0.452
(0.614)

0.424
(0.622)

REGION

0.701
(3.163)

CONTIG

# of Observations
Log likelihood
Chi2
Prob > chi2

0.639
(2.573)
-0.296
(1.876)

597
-30.71
105.1
0.000***

597
-30.73
105.0
0.000***

0.736
(1.343)

620
-35.03
105.5
0.000***

620
-34.61
105.8
0.000***

Note: Cox regression, Breslow method for ties. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, one-tailed tests.
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CHAPTER 5: UNLOCKING THE PUZZLE OF STATE JUDICIAL
SELECTION

Introduction
The choice of judicial selection method employed by America states is an
understudied phenomenon. This study seeks to increase understanding of this important,
foundational question of American politics by integrating extant knowledge of institutions
and the methodological rigor of innovation and diffusion research with original research.
Two substantive additions are proffered. First, a brief narrative tracks judicial selection
reform efforts in the American states from Tudor England to the present. This history
highlights the intellectual underpinnings of preferred reforms as well as the efforts of those
seeking change. In particular, it emphasizes the role of lawyers as key, transformative
actors. Second, event history analysis is employed to quantitatively assess the decision of
American states to adopt merit selection for choosing judges to their courts of last resort.
Fourteen explanatory variables are developed and a hypothesis is generated regarding the
impact each is expected to have on the adoption of merit selection. Similarly, quantitative
models are developed to test six theoretical propositions concerning the adoption of merit
selection that can also be utilized as a means for understanding institutional change in a
broader context.
This final chapter begins with brief reviews of the theoretical, historical, and
quantitative chapters. Each of the six theoretical propositions that comprise the theory of
merit selection adoption in the American states proffered in Chapter 2 are then considered
and tested against the qualitative and quantitative evidence derived from Chapters 3 and 4.
Consideration of the key findings and their implications for understanding institutional
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change follows. The chapter concludes with a short discussion of remaining questions
about state judicial selection and potential future research. By combining new information
with extant knowledge, this research helps to unlock the puzzle that is state judicial
selection.

Theoretical Foundations
The existing body of literature on state judicial selection reveals a research topic
that is ripe for theory construction and quantitative investigation. Although it does contain
a number of helpful observations, the literature fails to yield either a sound theoretical
foundation or a set of identifiable features to distinguish states from each other. This study
looks to pool the strengths of two well-established research traditions, new institutionalism
and policy innovation and diffusion research, to the study of state judicial selection.
Extant knowledge of institutional change provides the starting point of inquiry. The
mechanisms of path dependence, actors, and diffusion are key casual concepts that have
received much attention from institutional scholars, and each plays a key role in explaining
why states choose their particular judicial selection method. Path dependence is the concept
that existing institutions create feedback that rewards consistent behavior and increases the
cost of reform over time. It suggests a basic pattern of smooth and gradual change from
existing institutions that are not meaningfully different from current forms.
To the extent that path dependency constrains innovation, it is human actors that
make it happen. They seek and resist change for various reasons, ranging from self-interest
to a logic of appropriateness. Actors seeking to change path dependent institutions are often
limited to variations of existing schemes that offer substantive and symbolic benefits
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superior to the status quo. This incremental process of bricolage requires a demand for
change as well as actors who are capable of bringing it about. Change agents are often
found at the intersection of existing social and political institutions and are seldom able to
act alone. They have to think creatively to transform existing institutions and often look
beyond their own boundaries for successfully implemented innovations.
Diffusion is the spread of principles and practices across jurisdictions. It is a process
that permits decision makers to accept an innovation as a solution that creates outcomes
they prefer. States suffering problems may look to jurisdictions in search of institutional
alternatives. The adoption of a reform by a neighboring state adds legitimacy and offers
the opportunity to prospectively confirm whether the innovation will serve the interests of
would-be reformers. Studies of diffusion within the corpus of institutionalism research are
mostly limited to nation-states and tend to stand in isolation. They also lack large-N, timeseries analyses that permit more robust quantitative assessment of a phenomenon of
interest.
Innovation and diffusion research in public policy is used to study a wide range of
substantive questions and utilizes a variety of analytical tools. The primary unit of analysis
is the American states. Initial inquiries focused on the relationship between innovative
states and those that lagged behind. Models were developed to distinguish the leaders from
the laggards. Subsequent research has come to focus on the political, economic, and social
characteristics of states, which served as the bases for theoretical and statistical
explanations of innovation. The results of studies are often at odds with one another, but
researchers tend to offer their results in isolation or respond to conflicting outcomes with
non-specific calls for further research.
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A separate but related question is why a particular innovation moves from one state
to the next. The diffusion of policies from one jurisdiction to another presumes that states
interact, communicate, compete with, and learn from one another. In effect, geography
matters. Regional and contiguous models have been used to explain the adoption of various
policies, although little effort has been devoted to explaining the practical differences
between the two types of models. Vertical models that look at the movement of policy
preferences between central governments and their political subdivisions also have been
explored.
Event history analysis was developed to address the limitations of other innovation
and diffusion research techniques. It has become the gold standard in this area of research.
The technique allows combining the theoretical insights of earlier models with large-N,
time series analysis that is not attainable with other approaches. By including a case for
each relevant jurisdiction (e.g., the 50 American states) over a period of multiple years,
researchers can utilize the power of large-N statistics even where the number of
jurisdictions is relatively small. This permits a more robust assessment of the theoretical
premises related to a phenomenon of interest. It also allows a more effective combination
of seemingly disparate areas of research.
As detailed in Chapter 2, the existing understanding of institutional changes
suggests a theory of merit selection adoption comprised of six propositions: 1) state judicial
institutions are path dependent; 2) demand is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for
the adoption of merit selection; 3) adoption of merit selection by a state is an instance of
substantive and symbolic bricolage; 4) decision makers are more likely to adopt (or reject)
merit selection if they perceive it will increase (or decrease) their power and/or resources;
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5) merit selection is more likely to be adopted where there are relevant actors on hand who
can frame and communicate its benefits in clear and essential terms; and, 6) merit selection
is more likely to be adopted where relevant actors are able to present evidence to decision
makers that it has worked effectively elsewhere and is likely to work for the decision
makers and their constituents. These propositions are tested later in this final chapter using
the historical evidence of Chapter 3 and the event history analysis of Chapter 4.

Historical Record
The history of judicial selection in the American states is the story of the on-going
quest for the proper balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability.
The saga easily divides into four overlapping periods that equate with the preferred method
espoused by the reformers of the day as the best combination of the two competing ideals.
This approach is generally accepted by scholars that study state judicial selection.
Significantly, the standard story places too much emphasis upon change and fails to
acknowledge the high degree of continuity that epitomizes state judicial selection.
The founding period through the 1840s witnessed the appointment of judges by
governors and legislatures, which was viewed as the appropriate response to the historic
abuses of the English monarchy. The original constitutions of each of the first twenty-eight
states provided for appointment of all appellate judges. Only in Indiana and Michigan were
some trial judges chosen directly by the people. Reliance on popular elections as a means
to establish more democratic controls began to talk hold in the second quarter of the
eighteenth century and soon became the most commonly employed method for selecting
state jurists. At the brink of the Civil War, 60% of the states elected judges to their courts
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of last resort, and two out of every three states elected their trial judges. The last quarter of
the nineteenth century saw further entrenchment of popular election of state court judges,
especially in the post-Reconstruction South. Despite these reforms, a consequential number
of states, especially those that comprised the original thirteen, retained appointment as their
method of judicial selection.
The rise of party machines in the second-half of the nineteenth century raised the
ire of Progressives who pushed for the nonpartisan election of judges as part of a general
reform agenda as a means to take politics out of judicial selection. Nineteen states, mostly
in the Midwest and West where Progressive influence was strongest, adopted nonpartisan
elections for selection of their judges between 1908 and 1941. The reform faced significant
opposition from established interests and retrenchment to partisan elections occurred in a
number of states. The appointment of judges was retained in New England and partisan
elections remained prominent in the South. Thus, by the entry of the United States into the
Second World War, the landscape of judicial selection methods employed in the American
states was fairly well divided on a regional basis.
In 1937, the ABA formally endorsed merit selection as its ideal method for
selecting judges as a means to combine the positive aspects of appointment and judicial
elections while avoiding the pitfalls of each. Missouri became the first state to adopt merit
selection for choosing its judges in 1940. Thirty-seven other states have since adopted merit
selection to choose some or all of their jurists. Along the way, some states have retained
their existing methods for selecting judges while others have adopted alternative reforms
such as replacing partisan elections with nonpartisan elections. The resulting configuration
of judicial selection today is nearly as varied as the fifty states.
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The historical record also provides insight and meaning into other aspects of this
research. For example, members of the bench and bar are shown to be important actors
deeply involved in each period of reform from the establishment of state judiciaries in the
founding period to the adoption of merit selection in the late-20th century. Similarly, key
features of the development and implementation of merit selection are revealed. The
Progressive Era was a reaction to a larger, wealthier, more educated, and increasingly
urbanized American society and evidence suggests that the AJS-sponsored citizens
conferences played a conspicuous role in the development and implementation of merit
selection within particular states. These historical findings help to provide the basis for the
operationalization of some of the variables included in the event history analysis.
Event History Analysis
Event history analysis is the primary investigative tool of policy innovation and
diffusion research and is well equipped to study institutional change. It employs
longitudinal time-series data that permit large-N analysis even where the number of
relevant jurisdictions is few, as in the situation of the American states. A discrete case is
created for each jurisdiction during a particular time period. Event history models assess a
risk set comprised of theoretically relevant independent variables and their impact on a
bivariate dependent variable. Once a jurisdiction adopts a nonrecurring event, it is removed
from the risk set for subsequent periods. Coefficient estimates reflect a hazard rate – the
likelihood a jurisdiction will adopt a change – that is constant over time. This permits useful
comparison of relevant cases over time, such as contrasting Indiana in 1945 to
Massachusetts in 1970.
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The risk set employed in this study is 620 cases comprised of fourteen independent
variables. The unit of analysis is an individual state during a given year and the applicable
time period is 1935 to 2010, in five-year intervals. Explanatory variables are drawn from
the extant literature and the historical record, and a hypothesis is formulated for each
regarding its expected impact on whether a state will adopt merit selection for choosing
judges to its court of last resort.
Each hypothesis is tested separately using Cox proportional hazard regression. The
independent variables are also arranged in partial Cox models to test the theoretical
propositions advanced in Chapter 2, as well as in general Cox models that assess the overall
impact of particular covariates.
The results present support for seven of the hypotheses, yielding statistically
significant coefficients consistent with the expected direction of impact on merit selection
adoption. Similar findings are present for only some of the partial models, where results
confirm the importance of path dependence, demand, and geographic factors on the
likelihood of states adopting merit selection. Although they fail to afford strong overall
goodness-of-fit, the partial models investigating the role of actors endorse the contention
that lawyers play an important role in the success of judicial selection reform. The general
models provide compelling evidence that the amount of time since the last change of
judicial selection method is the key explanatory variable considered; each demonstrates a
strong goodness-of-fit, and the timing covariate is the only explanatory variable to attain
statistical significance. This suggests that the stability of existing arrangements for picking
state court judges outweighs all other factors.
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Testing the Theory of Merit Section Adoption
The purpose of this research is to advance understanding of state judicial selection
methods, an important yet understudied social science phenomena. Theoretical, historical,
and quantitative appraisals have been developed in an effort to advance received wisdom
through new research. The final step in the process is to link these disparate parts into a
single, coherent assessment of the greater research question. New knowledge is gained by
testing the theory of merit selection adoption advanced in Chapter 2 against the historical
and quantitative findings of Chapters 3 and 4. This section considers each proposition
separately, and the following section provides an overall appraisal of the theory.
Proposition 1: State judicial institutions are path dependent.
The concept of path dependence suggests that institutions will not only remain
intact over time, but they will become more difficult to alter as the cost of change to
relevant actors increases over time. Evidence supporting this proposition is found where a
jurisdiction resists changing its existing judicial selection method even in the presence of
a meaningful reform movement. Similarly, a negative relationship between time since the
last change of judicial selection method and a state’s adoption of merit selection for
choosing judges to its court of last resort is expected.
The history of state judicial selection tells as much of a story of continuity as it does
one of change. The tumult of the revolutionary period resulted in the adoption of many new
institutions, but the new state judiciaries still relied on the monarchial method of appointing
judges. The rise of popular elections of judges in the 19th century tends to obscure that
many states, including a majority of the original 13, retained appointment as their preferred
method of judicial selection. Similarly, although nonpartisan election of judges became the
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single-most popular selection method by the mid-20th century, a majority of states retained
either their existing partisan election or appointment schemes. It is unsurprising, then, that
only 24 states have chosen merit selection to choose members of their courts of last resort
even though it is the most popular state judicial selection reform of all.
The quantitative assessment also confirms that state judicial selection methods are
path dependent. As demonstrated by the results in Models 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, respectively, the
LASTCHANGE and CHANGE EASE covariates are statistically significant and yield
coefficients consistent with the hypothesized impact on adopting merit selection. Model
4.4.1, designed to specifically test whether the adoption of merit selection is path
dependent, demonstrates impressive goodness-of-fit and LASTCHANGE yields a high
degree of significance. Notably, the impact of CHANGEEASE is nominal, which suggests
the formal requirements for adoption are secondary to the time since last change.
Thus, strong support for the proposition that state judicial institutions are path
dependent is found in both the historical record and the event history analysis.
Proposition 2: Adoption of merit selection by a state is an instance of
substantive and symbolic bricolage.
Merit selection of judges is a hybrid form of two common means of picking
officials. It combines facets of appointment with aspects of popular election. Therefore, the
substantive aspect of merit selection is well within the existing parameters of governance
in the American states. Proponents of merit selection argue that it is the best method
available for securing the independence of state court jurists. Since judicial independence
is a key feature of the principal of checks and balances as it is expected to function at the
state level, adoption of merit selection also advances symbolic norms. The existence of
other progressive institutional improvements, such as increased legislative professionalism
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and stronger state executive power, would tend to evidence merit selection as symbolic
bricolage. Such changes should also be accompanied by higher levels of political liberalism
within a state, since liberals have carried the mantel of progressive reforms during the study
period.
The Progressive era of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century ostensibly
was a reaction to the problems of increasing populations and urbanization. A hallmark of
the period was a deliberate effort by pro-establishment intellectuals and business to
modernize and improve existing institutions, including state judiciaries. Although widespread adoption did not begin to occur until after World War II, merit selection is a
Progressive reform that traces its genesis to the early 20th century. Since the New Deal,
reforms targeting efficiency and improved government are commonly associated with
political liberalism.
The event history analysis provides no meaningful support for the proposition that
the adoption of merit selection by a state to choose judges to its state court of last result is
an instance of bricolage. As demonstrated by the results in Models 4.3.4 and 4.3.5,
respectively, the LEGPRO and GOVPOW covariates yield coefficients consistent with the
hypothesized impact on adopting merit selection, but neither is statistically significant at
conventional levels. Model 4.3.3 reveals IDEOLOGY is neither significant nor signed
consistent with expectations. Model 4.5.2 is constructed to test whether adoption of merit
selection is an instance of bricolage, and produces poor goodness-of-fit with no significant
explanatory variables.
Thus, the historical record tends to support the proposition that adoption of merit
selection is an instance of bricolage, but the event history analysis does not.
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Proposition 3: Demand is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the
adoption of merit selection.
Demand for institutional change occurs when factors arise that give relevant actors
the perception that the distribution of power or other resources is changing, or needs to be
changed, in order to pursue their goals. Modernity, in the context of growing populations,
increased urbanization, greater wealth, and rising educational attainment, tends to strain
existing resources and create a demand for better and more efficient institutions. Positive
relationships between demographic variables representing these factors and whether states
adopt merit selection for choosing judges to their court of last resort provide evidence of
demand. Similarly, the relative strength of benefitted parties, such as lawyers, spurs
demand and should produce a positive quantitative association.
The population of states, their levels of urbanization, average wealth, and
educational attainment by adults have been on an unchecked upward trajectory since the
nation’s founding. The post-World War II period witnessed significant growth of these
demographic factors that continues today. The states with the largest populations also tend
to have higher levels of urbanization, average wealth, and educational attainment by adults.
However, only two of the thirteen largest states utilize merit selection to select judges to
their courts of last resort while seven of the nine smallest do employ the approach. History
also suggests that lawyers have been instrumental in state judicial selection reform, but
their strength varies from state to state.
Mixed results are obtained regarding the relationship of relevant demographic
variables to adoption of merit selection for choosing state supreme court judges. The
WEALTH, EDUCATION, and LAWSTRENGTH covariates have positive coefficients as
hypothesized and are statistically significant, as shown by the results in Models 4.3.7, 4.3.9,
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and 4.3.10. Conversely, POPULATION and URBAN are negatively signed and lack
significance, as revealed in Models 4.3.6 and 4.3.8. Model 4.5.3 is designed to test whether
demand is a prerequisite to the adoption of merit selection. It produces an impressive
goodness-of-fit, but none of the individual covariates attain a standard level of significance.
LAWSTRENGTH presents as the model’s key explanatory variable, as its impact is consistent
with research expectations and it approaches conventional levels of significance. These
results lend support to the hypothesis that lawyers play a key role in the adoption of merit
selection by states.
Thus, the proposition that demand is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for
the adoption of merit selection is well supported, although the evidence is less than
uniform.
Proposition 4: Decision makers are more likely to pursue (or resist) merit
selection if they perceive it will increase (or decrease)
their power and/or resources.
Decision makers will respond to calls for reform by evaluating the threat to or the
enhancement of their power and resources. Similarly, those who perceive a shift in the
status quo as a threat are likely to resist and oppose change. In most state merit selection
schemes, governors are given appointment authority from an abbreviated list of candidates.
Many state legislatures pick at least some members of their judicial nominating
commissions. Higher levels of intrastate party competition evidence less risk to the power
of political parties and their members in adopting proposed reforms. Positive relationships
between legislative professionalism, the executive power of governors, and party
competition are expected.
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The historical record is largely silent on the impact of legislative professionalism,
gubernatorial power, and party competition on state judicial selection practices. Although
formal authority to appoint state court judges was held by most state legislatures during the
founding period, the democracy movement of the 18th century ended the practice
everywhere but South Carolina and Virginia. A number of states that formally grant their
governors the power to appoint state court judges have adopted merit selection pursuant to
executive order. To the extent that a seated governor controls membership of the
nominating commission, of course, they effectively retain their domination of state judicial
selection.
The quantitative assessment fails to provide meaningful support for this
proposition. The LEGPRO, GOVPOW and PARTYCOMP covariates have positive coefficients
but fail to attain statistical significance as shown in Models 4.3.4, 4.3.5, and 4.3.11. Model
4.5.4 is designed to test the impact of decision makers in merit selection adoption. It
produces a very poor goodness-of-fit statistic and none of the explanatory variables are
significant.
Thus, neither the historical record or the event history analysis demonstrate support
for the proposition that decision makers are more likely to pursue (or resist) merit selection
if they perceive it will increase (or decrease) their power and /or resources.
Proposition 5: Merit selection is more likely to be adopted where there
are advocates who can effectively frame and communicate
its needs and benefits
Institutional change requires advocates able to effectively frame situations as
problems and identify a need to take action. They must also communicate their preferred
solution in an effective manner that decision makers and constituents alike can understand.
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Reform activities by Progressives, lawyers, and certain interest groups to develop merit
selection and actively advocate its adoption is consistent with this proposition. Positive
relationships between the strength of lawyers and the level of interest group activity
supporting merit selection within a state would be further evidence to support this
contention.
Lawyers have historically played a prominent role in state judicial selection reform.
The ABA and other bar groups have long supported the adoption of merit-based methods
for judicial selection. AJS, a non-profit dominated by lawyers and who helped develop the
approach, took an active role in pushing adoption of merit selection by individual states
through a series of citizens conferences. These conferences were often co-sponsored by
state or local bar associations.
The quantitative assessment lends support to the contention that effective advocacy
leads to the adoption of merit selection in states. Models 4.3.10 and 4.3.12 show LAW
STRENGTH

and AJSCONF are positively related to merit selection adoption, which is

consistent with hypothesized expectations. LAWSTRENGTH demonstrates a statistically
significant impact. Similar effects are shown by Model 4.5.5, which is designed to test the
advocacy proposition. Both covariates are positively related to MERIT with LAWSTRENGTH
attaining statistical significance. Although the model demonstrates a goodness-of-fit that
falls just short of conventional levels of significance, it explains much variance and adds
additional support to the importance of effective advocacy.
Thus, meaningful support for the proposition that effective advocacy increases the
likelihood of adoption of merit selection for choosing state supreme court justices is found
in the historical record and the event history analysis.

147

Proposition 6: Merit selection is more likely to be adopted where relevant
actors are able to present evidence to decision makers that
it has worked effectively elsewhere and is likely to work for
the decision makers and their constituents.
The ability of advocates to endorse a proposed reform and confidently pronounce
that it will bring desired results often requires pointing to other jurisdictions that have
solved similar dilemmas with the new approach. In the context of the American states, this
often means looking at the experiences of contiguous and regional neighbors who share
history, political culture, and economic interests. This proposition finds support in
situations where merit selection is generally adopted or not adopted within historically
bounded geographic areas. Positive relationships between geographic independent
variables and adoption of merit selection by a state would be further evidence to support
this proposition.
The history of state judicial selection reform presents geographic distinctions based
primarily on when a state joined the Union and what the preferred judicial selection method
was at that time. The original states all adopted appointment of judges, while every state
that joined the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century initially used
popular election. Merit selection is most prevalent in Midwest and Western states, which
were latecomers to the Union and where progressive reforms were more readily accepted.
For example Nebraska, a merit selection state that became in a state in 1867, is completely
surrounded by other merit selection states.
The quantitative assessment further confirms the geography proposition. Models
4.3.13 and 4.3.14 show REGION and CONTIG, respectively, are statistically significant and
signed consistent with hypothesized expectations. Both models also demonstrate goodnessof-fit that satisfied conventional levels of significance.
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Thus, the proposition that a state is more likely to adopt merit selection where
advocates can point to other states where the reform has worked effectively finds support
in both the historical record and the event history analysis.

Major Findings
The single-most important result to be drawn from this research is that the
institutions of state judicial selection are path dependent. The history of state judicial
selection in the American states tells a compelling story of continuity, even though the
story is usually framed in the context of reform. In every reform period, many states chose
to retain their judicial selection institutions despite calls for change. The result of this stasis
in the face of innovation is the patchwork of judicial selection methods that we see today;
while many states have opted for merit selection, some still employ appointive methods, a
few retain partisan election, and others have settled on nonpartisan elections.
The event history analysis reinforces the historical record. LASTCHANGE is the
key explanatory variable in all of the models in which it is included, is statistically
significant, and demonstrates an impact consistent with research expectations. Whenever
this covariate is included in a model, it renders the impact of other independent variables
negligible. The explanatory power of LASTCHANGE is so acute that it essentially suggests
state judicial selection reform is a two-step process. First, judicial selection institutions are
so engrained in a state that change is usually not possible. Second, where reform is
possible, other influences can then work to accomplish change.
The research findings proffer the agency of lawyers and diffusion as key aspects in
the second step of the reform process. From the founding period to the adoption of merit

149

selection, the historical record is replete with lawyers taking an active role in state judicial
selection reform. Lawyers took an active and leading role in each reform epoch, and were
critical to the development and advancement of merit selection. This denouement is
confirmed by the event history analysis. LAWSTRENGTH is positively related to a state’s
adoption of merit selection and the key explanatory variable in the demand model. Also, it
is positively related to MERIT and is significant in the advocacy model. The agency of
lawyers thus appears crucial when an opportunity for state judicial selection reform
transpires.
Geographical factors are also an issue in state judicial selection reform. The
historical development of the United States, including the preferred method de jure of
choosing state court judges, has a geographic quality. The various states in New England,
the South, the Midwest and the West have institutions that collectively reflect the
prevailing attitudes at their times of founding or, as in the case of the South, subsequent to
Reconstruction. A willingness to accept progressive reforms is evident in the Midwest and
the West. The importance of regionalism is confirmed by the positive and statistically
significant impact of REGION on merit selection adoption. Similarly, CONTIG is positively
and significantly related to MERIT. These indicia are consistent with the diffusion of state
judicial selection reforms where neighbors and are willing to adopt a new approach that
has proven useful to other, similarly situated jurisdictions.
These findings suggest that a state likely to adopt merit selection to choose judges
to its court of last resort is one that is not long invested in its current selection method, has
a strong presence of lawyers, and has neighbors that have implemented the reform.
Conversely, states that have a lengthy experience with their current method of judicial
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selection, lack a strong bar, and are isolated from other merit selections states are not likely
to adopt merit selection to choose judges to their courts of last resort.

Future Research
The major findings of this study, that state judicial selection institutions are path
dependent, that reform requires the agency of relevant actors, and that change occurs
through a process of diffusion, are consistent with received understanding of institutional
change. The evidence revealed in the qualitative historical record and the quantitative event
history analysis are consistent and urge similar conclusions. This consistency offers
reliability and supports the contention that innovation and diffusion methods and theory
are appropriate for use in the study of institutional change. Still, this research leaves many
unanswered questions and offers many avenues of future inquiry. Two facets seem
particularly relevant.
First, since state judicial institutions are path dependent, what are the immediate
factors that lead to an opportunity for reform? In other words, is there some identifiable
phenomenon or set of phenomena that occur regularly before change occurs? For example,
the Jacksonian democratic movement of the 18th century that led to the popular election of
judges is usually thought to be a reaction to the excesses of state legislative power. In their
seminal study of the Missouri Plan, Watson and Downing (1969) note a number of factors
that seem to have contributed to the success of the effort to implement merit selection in
the Show-Me State. While it is possible that the causal mechanisms that overcome the path
dependence of judicial selection institutions in particular states are idiosyncratic and do not
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lend themselves to systematic explanation, the question is an important one and warrants
further exploration.
A second channel of research should be aimed at better explaining the role and
behavior of decision makers in the face of judicial selection reform. The instant study
intimates that some power elites may actually act contrary to their self-interest in adopting
merit selection. This runs contrary to conventional understanding of institutional change.
The answer may lie in the judicial nominating process. For example, governors who
possess constitutional authority to appoint judges but choose to rely upon nominating
commissions to sift through would-be contenders retain near-exclusive authority to select
commission members. Commissioners would reasonably be expected to advance judicial
candidates that share legal conventions and predispositions with the governor who
appointed them. Similarly, legislators may be more willing to accept merit selection in their
state if they have a decisive role in deciding who acts as gatekeepers for future jurists.

Conclusion
This research seeks to increase understanding of American state courts through the
formulation and testing of a theory of state judicial selection, exploration of a condensed
history of state judicial selection reform, and an event history analysis of the adoption by
states of merit selection judicial selection for choosing judges to their courts of last resort.
The major finding is that, similar to other institutional arrangements, state judicial selection
methods are highly path dependent. An important secondary finding is that lawyers play
an important role in bringing about change when and where the possibility of change arises.
Geography also seems to be an influential factor in judicial selection reform.
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As would be expected from a foundational study of any topic, this research invites
criticism of the approaches and methods used to reach its conclusions. Also, many of the
obtained outcomes are at odds with theorized expectations and a number of important
questions on the topic of state judicial selection remain unanswered. Hopefully, these
shortcomings will not be deemed fatal. Rather, it is desired that they be considered an
invitation to future investigation of this important social and political phenomenon. The
crucible of science demands nothing less.
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(0.000)

URBAN
EDUCATION
LAWSTRENGTH

Observations

0.000***

(0.000)

(0.000)

-1.112

0.790

-1.134

-1.034

-1.242

-0.390

(0.000)
-1.123

-0.971

(1.223)

(0.916)

(1.116)

(1.207)

(1.219)

(1.000)

(1.198)

(1.125)

24.814*

24.551**

28.361**

(12.868)

(11.498)

(12.213)

32.262***

0.937

0.925

1.225**

1.575***

(0.625)

(0.570)

(0.601)

(0.490)

(10.137)

597

597

597

597

597

597

597

597

ll

-74.08

-81.23

-74.08

-75.97

-75.19

-76.45

-78.05

-75.36

chi2

18.33

4.035

18.32

14.54

16.10

13.58

10.38

15.77

df_m

5

2

4

4

4

3

3

3

N_fail

23

23

23

23

23

23

23

23

chi2(LLRatio)

14.29

0

3.79

2.22

4.74

7.94

2.56

P>chi2

0.003

0.964

0.052

0.136

0.093

0.019

0.278

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX B
Model 4.5.1
VARIABLES

Full

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

LASTCHANGE

-1.661***

-1.770***

-1.660***

-1.717***

-1.582***

-1.691***

-1.725***

-1.698***

-0.381

-0.353

-0.378

-0.369

-0.337

-0.366

-0.366

-0.359

0.234

0.341

0.262

0.235

0.286

0.21

0.274

0.312

-0.367

-0.335

-0.356

-0.368

-0.366

-0.35

-0.352

-0.371

-1.936

-1.026

-1.696

-2.009

-1.538

-1.944

-1.741

-1.401

-1.799

-1.448

-1.614

-1.795

-1.674

-1.798

-1.606

-1.627

4.889

8.027**

5.726

5.458

5.152

4.656

6.547

6.77

-5.444

-3.962

-4.871

-5.243

-5.304

-5.33

-4.467

-5.126

-0.628

-0.689

-0.612

-0.676

-0.564

-0.639

-0.669

-0.64

-0.531

-0.505

-0.531

-0.518

-0.522

-0.529

-0.516

-0.514

-0.48

-0.886**

-0.586

-0.678

-0.22

-0.494

-0.838**

-0.643

-0.777

-0.413

-0.729

-0.574

-0.693

-0.773

-0.425

-0.584

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

-1.96

-1.819

-0.994

-0.755

-1.555

-1.848

CHANGEEASE
IDEOLOGY
LEGPRO
GOVPOWER
POPLOG
WEALTH
URBAN
EDUCATION

-1.875

0.082

-1.499

-1.49

-2.275

-1.266

-1.974

-2.018

-2.203

-2.233

8.752

9.94

20.287

8.066

-23.77

-23.707

-19.773

-23.374

0.000
0.000

LAWSTRENGT
H

PARTYCOMP
AJSCONF
REGION

Observations

0.836

0.832

1.031

0.892

1.064

-0.957

-0.961

-0.802

-0.924

-0.792

-0.109

2.439

0.04

0.051

0.971

-0.305

0.266

2.286

-3.537

-2.935

-3.503

-3.549

-3.217

-3.43

-3.507

-3.088

0.452

0.79

0.522

0.518

0.463

0.441

0.615

0.64

-0.614

-0.52

-0.589

-0.589

-0.607

-0.612

-0.544

-0.598

0.701

0.684

0.551

1.409

0.535

1.381

-3.163

-3.166

-3.076

-2.98

-3.072

-2.75

597

597

597

597

597

597

597

597

ll

-30.71

-31.96

-30.77

-30.78

-31.1

-30.74

-30.86

-31.65

chi2

105.1

102.6

104.9

104.9

104.3

105

104.8

103.2

df_m

13

9

12

12

12

12

11

11

N_fail

23

23

23

23

23

23

23

23

chi2(LLRatio)

2.49

0.12

0.14

0.78

0.05

0.29

1.87

P>chi2

0.647

0.733

0.712

0.377

0.825

0.863

0.392

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Model 4.5.1 (continued)
VARIABLES
LASTCHANGE
CHANGEEASE
IDEOLOGY
LEGPRO
GOVPOWER
POPLOG

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

-1.739***

-1.584***

-1.689***

-1.621***

-1.723***

-1.747***

-1.739***

-1.623***

-0.354

-0.335

-0.361

-0.336

-0.353

-0.349

-0.36

-0.334

0.216

0.307

0.241

0.241

0.375

0.257

0.265

0.266

-0.351

-0.36

-0.34

-0.352

-0.351

-0.336

-0.358

-0.345

-2.018

-1.342

-1.712

-1.472

-1.044

-1.759

-1.367

-1.294

-1.791

-1.54

-1.618

-1.658

-1.45

-1.606

-1.611

-1.539

5.237

5.918

5.494

4.646

8.505**

6.334

6.193

5.407

-5.084

-4.76

-4.73

-5.148

-4.159

-4.269

-4.969

-4.56

-0.682

-0.551

-0.625

-0.577

-0.652

-0.678

-0.658

-0.57

-0.516

-0.524

-0.528

-0.519

-0.514

-0.513

-0.51

-0.521

-0.678

-0.314

-0.596

-0.208

-0.891**

-0.836**

-0.629

-0.295

-0.572

-0.642

-0.727

-0.684

-0.419

-0.424

-0.576

-0.637

WEALTH

0.000

0.000

URBAN

-1.474

-1.636

-1.459

-1.839

-0.015

-0.989

-0.665

-1.998

-1.95

-1.948

-2.133

-1.29

-1.55

-1.793

21.695

9.319

20.193

-19.332

-23.268

-19.439

0.000

EDUCATION

0.000

0.000

0.000
-1.546
-1.91
21.665
-18.894

LAWSTRENGTH

1.066

0.887

PARTYCOMP

-0.117

1.064

-0.165

0.705

2.744

0.088

2.017

0.777

-3.424

-3.22

-3.379

-3.148

-3.006

-3.361

-3.022

-3.138

-0.78

AJSCONF

1.098

-0.928

-0.769

0.506

0.528

0.51

0.43

0.814

0.603

0.606

0.492

-0.584

-0.582

-0.587

-0.603

-0.526

-0.538

-0.595

-0.577

REGION

1.39

1.443

-2.981

-2.712

Observations

597

597

597

597

597

597

597

597

ll

-30.8

-31.16

-30.8

-31.22

-31.82

-30.88

-31.78

-31.27

chi2

104.9

104.2

104.9

104.1

102.9

104.7

102.9

104

df_m

11

11

11

11

10

10

10

10

N_fail

23

23

23

23

23

23

23

23

chi2(LLRatio)

0.17

0.89

0.16

1.01

2.20

0.32

2.13

1.10

P>chi2

0.919

0.642

0.922

0.605

0.531

0.955

0.547

0.776
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APPENDIX C
Model 4.5.2
VARIABLES
LASTCHANGE
CHANGEEASE
IDEOLOGY
LEGPRO
GOVPOWER
POPULATION
WEALTH
URBAN
EDUCATION
LAWSTRENGTH
PARTCOMP
AJSCONF
CONTIG

Observations
ll
chi2

Full
-1.704***

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

-1.750***

-1.711***

-1.752***

-1.626***

-1.765***

-1.724***

-1.626***

(0.380)

(0.353)

(0.378)

(0.359)

(0.341)

(0.355)

(0.360)

(0.336)

0.192

0.369

0.209

0.189

0.267

0.210

0.295

0.296

(0.368)

(0.342)

(0.363)

(0.369)

(0.354)

(0.362)

(0.359)

(0.350)

-1.915

-1.319

-1.718

-1.962

-1.765

-1.755

-1.788

-1.464

(1.794)

(1.552)

(1.610)

(1.783)

(1.790)

(1.596)

(1.793)

(1.599)

4.534

8.493**

5.146

4.940

4.896

5.642

6.482

5.886

(5.381)

(4.066)

(4.940)

(5.229)

(5.242)

(4.728)

(5.019)

(4.719)

-0.634

-0.705

-0.622

-0.667

-0.612

-0.662

-0.699

-0.591

(0.527)

(0.518)

(0.525)

(0.515)

(0.530)

(0.510)

(0.526)

(0.528)

-0.535

-0.891**

-0.635

-0.704

-0.221

-0.829**

-0.595

-0.344

(0.812)

(0.427)

(0.739)

(0.577)

(0.699)

(0.419)

(0.593)

(0.653)

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-1.806

0.019

-1.519

-1.518

-1.889

-1.183

-0.885

-1.458

(2.220)

(1.326)

(1.957)

(1.980)

(2.198)

(1.639)

(1.924)

(1.937)

7.053

7.614

17.996

20.034

(24.115)

(24.057)

(19.777)

(19.280)

1.049

1.122

1.263

1.365

(1.365)

(1.356)

(1.153)

(1.121)

-0.332

1.840

-0.253

-0.189

0.260

-0.096

1.226

0.473

(3.450)

(3.040)

(3.433)

(3.453)

(3.264)

(3.442)

(3.207)

(3.201)

0.424

0.832

0.470

0.470

0.471

0.526

0.637

0.549

(0.622)

(0.534)

(0.610)

(0.603)

(0.609)

(0.581)

(0.597)

(0.592)

-0.296

0.901

-0.439

-0.438

0.745

-0.603

0.986

0.638

(1.876)

(1.251)

(1.819)

(1.820)

(1.262)

(1.757)

(1.268)

(1.229)

597

597

597

597

597

597

597

597

-30.73

-31.69

-30.77

-30.77

-31.04

-30.82

-31.47

-31.13

103.1

105.0

104.9

104.4

104.9

103.6

104.2

df_m

105.0
13

10

12

12

12

11

11

11

N_fail

23

23

23

23

23

23

23

23

chi2(LLRatio)

1.94

0.08

0.09

0.63

0.18

1.48

0.81

P>chi2

0.586

0.777

0.769

0.429

0.913

0.477

0.668

Standard errors in parentheses. *** <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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APPENDIX D
Model 4.5.3
VARIABLES

Full

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

LASTCHANGE

-1.626***
(0.324)
-0.050
(0.275)
-0.000
(0.000)
21.698
(14.054)
0.112
(0.551)
0.639
(2.573)

-1.651***
(0.288)
0.169
(0.233)

-1.640***
(0.319)
0.003
(0.279)
0.000
(0.000)

-1.626***
(0.325)
-0.056
(0.274)

-1.620***
(0.321)
-0.040
(0.270)
-0.000
(0.000)
22.054
(13.920)

-1.659***
(0.305)
-0.068
(0.264)
-0.000
(0.000)
21.956
(13.867)
0.119
(0.545)

-1.620***
(0.307)
0.079
(0.264)

-1.631***
(0.317)
0.025
(0.272)
0.000*
(0.000)

-1.691***
(0.312)
-0.030
(0.268)
0.000
(0.000)

-1.621***
(0.322)
-0.046
(0.266)

-1.660***
(0.306)
-0.075
(0.262)

-1.585***
(0.293)
0.201
(0.243)

-1.680***
(0.300)
0.050
(0.254)

-1.684***
(0.311)
-0.009
(0.261)
0.000*
(0.000)

-1.655***
(0.304)
-0.065
(0.254)

20.900**
(9.434)

20.256*
(10.454)
0.087
(0.516)

-1.653***
(0.303)
-0.058
(0.260)
-0.000
(0.000)
22.331
(13.730)

CHANGEEASE
WEALTH
EDUCATION
LAWSTRENGTH
REGION

0.220
(0.509)
1.076
(2.309)

Observations
620
620
620
ll
-35.03
-37.92
-36.23
chi2
105.5
99.75
103.1
df_m
6
2
5
N_fail
24
24
24
chi2(LLRatio)
5.78
2.39
P>chi2
0.216
0.122
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

20.139*
(10.624)
0.083
(0.521)
0.667
(2.560)
620
-35.05
105.5
5
24
0.03
0.865

0.664
(2.559)
620
-35.05
105.5
5
24
0.04
0.840

620
-35.06
105.5
5
24
0.06
0.804

0.549
(0.404)
1.208
(2.213)

0.230
(0.501)
1.123
(2.298)

620
-36.85
101.9
4
24
3.63
0.163

620
-36.32
103.0
4
24
2.58
0.276

0.560
(0.399)

0.680
(2.552)
620
-36.34
102.9
4
24
2.61
0.270

620
-35.06
105.5
4
24
0.05
0.974

21.043**
(9.302)

1.356
(2.124)
620
-35.08
105.4
4
24
0.1
0.953

620
-35.09
105.4
4
24
0.11
0.947

620
-37.72
100.2
3
24
5.37
0.147

620
-37.00
101.6
3
24
3.93
0.270

620
-36.44
102.7
3
24
2.82
0.421

620
-35.09
105.4
3
24
0.12
0.989
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APPENDIX E
Model 4.5.4
VARIABLES

Full

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

LASTCHANGE

-1.624***
(0.305)
-0.032
(0.267)
0.000
(0.000)
21.107
(14.033)
-0.086
(0.665)
0.736
(1.343)

-1.651***
(0.288)
0.169
(0.233)

-1.650***
(0.309)
0.009
(0.268)
0.000
(0.000)

-1.625***
(0.304)
-0.031
(0.266)

-1.631***
(0.302)
-0.041
(0.259)
-0.000
(0.000)
20.990
(14.021)

-1.659***
(0.305)
-0.068
(0.264)
-0.000
(0.000)
21.956
(13.867)
0.119
(0.545)

-1.652***
(0.302)
0.080
(0.262)

-1.650***
(0.307)
0.009
(0.261)
0.000*
(0.000)

CHANGEEASE
WEALTH
EDUCATION
LAWSTRENGTH
CONTIG

-0.006
(0.597)
0.964
(1.288)

Observations
620
620
620
ll
-34.91
-37.92
-36.05
chi2
105.8
99.75
103.5
df_m
6
2
5
N_fail
24
24
24
chi2(LLRatio)
6.02
2.28
P>chi2
0.198
0.131
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

21.527*
(11.044)
-0.072
(0.594)
0.710
(1.231)
620
-34.91
105.8
5
24
0.00
0.961

0.639
(1.118)
620
-34.92
105.8
5
24
0.02
0.896

620
-35.06
105.5
5
24
0.31
0.580

0.479
(0.449)
0.487
(1.236)

0.958
(1.103)

620
-36.92
101.8
4
24
4.02
0.134

620
-36.05
103.5
4
24
2.28
0.319
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Model 4.5.4 (continued)
VARIABLES
LASTCHANGE
CHANGEEASE
WEALTH

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

-1.691***
(0.312)
-0.030
(0.268)
0.000
(0.000)

-1.631***
(0.302)
-0.042
(0.253)

-1.660***
(0.306)
-0.075
(0.262)

-1.653***
(0.303)
-0.058
(0.260)
-0.000
(0.000)
22.331

-1.601***
(0.284)
0.195
(0.231)

-1.680***
(0.300)
0.050
(0.254)

-1.684***
(0.311)
-0.009
(0.261)
0.000*
(0.000)

-1.655***
(0.304)
-0.065
(0.254)

EDUCATION
LAWSTRENGTH

20.256*

(9.607)

(10.454)
0.087
(0.516)

0.230
(0.501)

CONTIG

Observations
ll
chi2
df_m
N_fail
chi2(LLRatio)
P>chi2

20.867**

620
-34.92
105.8
4
24
0.02
0.992

(9.302)
0.560
(0.399)

0.642
(1.097)
620
-36.34
102.9
4
24
2.86
0.240

21.043**

(13.730)

1.072
(1.126)
620
-35.08
105.4
4
24
0.34
0.843

620
-35.09
105.4
4
24
0.35
0.838

620
-37.46
100.7
3
24
5.1
0.164

620
-37.00
101.6
3
24
4.17
0.243

620
-36.44
102.7
3
24
3.06
0.382

620
-35.09
105.4
3
24
0.37
0.9464
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